While I was at the dentist's office, MCI decided to stick with the increased $26 Verizon bid over the Qwest $30 bid. (Prof. Ribstein's take is here. I am also eager to see how any resulting litigation plays out.) Either the MCI board was schooled in "new math" or the efficient market hypothesis is not getting any respect here.
I understand that the ECMH is complex and that believing simply that the share price of a heavily traded publicly-held corporation reflects the fundamental value of that share may be a bit naive, but what can the MCI board know that nobody else on Wall Street knows about the value of Qwest shares? The board points to weaknesses in Qwest's capital structure and industry risk, but surely the market has taken some of that into account by now. Theoretically, the market could value Qwest perfectly and Verizon perfectly, but the board believes that the combined [MCI + Verizon] is over $4/share greater than the combined [MCI + Qwest], even with Qwest's price protection. But even that difference, discounted by the probability of the merger happening, would be somewhat factored into the share prices of Qwest and Verizon at this point.
I'm not a true believer in the ECMH, but I always like to see when other people act as if they aren't either.
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1. Posted by SB on July 21, 2005 @ 14:18 | Permalink
What are your thoughts on the DOJ take on this deal? Some say, there will be duopoly after the Nasdaq/Instinet merger closes but is that really a bad thing for traders? Granted, there will only be a few smaller ECNs left but I cannot see how that would negatively impact competition. Nor have I seen any opposition to this deal. That leads me to believe that the DOJ will not hold-up or delay either merger. Do you agree?