There was an interesting little discussion of agency law in the Disney opinion. The question is whether the board should have gotten more involved in Ovitz’s termination. The court said it didn’t have to act at all – the CEO had the agency power to terminate Ovitz on his own, even without the board. See p. 165, n. 570.
This brings to mind the casebook chestnut, in my book and others, Lee v. Jenkins Bros, 268 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1959), which involved hiring of an executive rather than firing.
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1. Posted by lyman johnson on August 10, 2005 @ 10:32 | Permalink
Agency law should have played a far more central role, but not the issue of authority, though that is important. I think a CEO should not, especially if we want to avoid the "imperial CEO," generally be regarded as having the authority to fire an officer that the Board hired. But the more central agency concept that would have applied in this case was not used by plaintiffs' lawyers and that was a key strategic blunder. Eisner and Litvack were officers and, as such, were agents having far stricter duties than the duties of mere directors; and the standard of liability for an agent's breach is simple negligence. I will say more in a later post but Chandler in footnote 588 pretty much told plaintiffs that they might have missed a key theory of liability. Lyman Johnson
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