Here is the abstract:
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The newly enacted federal Say on Pay rule will require public firms to periodically provide shareholders with an opportunity to cast an advisory vote regarding its most recent year's executive compensation. Like other efforts to increase shareholder power, Say on Pay has attracted criticism from those who fear that empowering shareholders will harm firms. This Article instead offers a critique of Say on Pay internal to the shareholder empowerment movement. The problem with Say on Pay is that its ex post nature neuters its ability to influence executive pay at high-performing firms. This hypothesis has been borne out by the experience with Say on Pay in the U.S. where a mandatory version has been in effect for seven years. . . . (read more here).
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