July 11, 2014
Should Agencies Enforce?
Posted by Max Minzner

I wanted to finish up my discussion of administrative enforcement by considering alternatives.  We often take regulatory enforcement for granted.  A securities regulator, for example, naturally will have the power to seek out violations of the securities laws and sanction violations.  As is common in administrative law, scholars, courts, and Congress start with the assumption that expertise in the industry is the most important input into the enforcement calculus.  If an agency is familiar with an industry, it will make good enforcement choices.

In my forthcoming article in the Minnesota Law Review, I argue that this question is actually much more complex than we usually assume.  In particular, prosecutorial discretion has strong generalist aspects that largely do not depend on the regulatory subject matter.  Giving enforcement authority to a specialist agency instead of a generalist enforcer (such as the Department of Justice) trades one type of expertise for another.  Furthermore, specialists inherently see enforcement actions more narrowly.  As a result, we shouldn’t see enforcement by regulatory agencies as inevitable or automatic.  

Since it is still in draft form, I’d very much appreciate any and all comments.  Thanks again to Erik for the chance to blog this week.

Administrative Law, Crime and Criminal Law, Legal Scholarship | Bookmark

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