August 26, 2015
A CEO Is Told To Wait On Claims That The SEC ALJs Are Unconstitutional
Posted by David Zaring

In what I think is the first appellate decision on the issue, the Seventh Circuit held that timing problems prevented courts from entertaining collateral attacks on SEC administrative proceedings.  It means that defendants have to raise their constitutional claims before the ALJs, and then the SEC itself on appeal, before they can get into court on appeal from that.

These timing issues have always looked really problematic for the plaintiffs.  Essentially, they have been arguing that they think the SEC is about to open an administrative case against them, and that a court should tell the SEC that it can't do that, because administrative cases are unconstitutional. Usually, claiming that you think the government is about to do something isn't a very good reason to sue the government.  Why not wait and see?  You'll save the court's time and keep it from issuing an advisory opinion.

Put that way, it's not surprising that a CEO anticipating administrative proceedings against her was told to make her constitutional arguments to the agency, if the agency does, in fact, file papers against her, before trying to get the courts involved.

On the other hand, the case that has ginned up these suits, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOBlet a couple of accountants make their constitutional claims against PCAOB before it had lifted a finger against them.  So the Seventh Circuit basically said "we don't think the Court meant to get rid of the doctrines of standing, finality, and exhaustion in that case," which is sort of hand waving, but probably true.

Anyway, it increases the likelihood that we will soon get an initial decision from an SEC ALJ ruling whether SEC ALJs are unconstitutional.  I'm very much looking forward to that.  You can find a gloss on the opinion here, and a link to the actual opinion at the end of the gloss.

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August 14, 2015
A Modest Response to Wallach
Posted by David Zaring

I'm enjoying Philip's guest blogging with us.  I think I particularly like this part of his last post:

If it sounds condescending to suggest that the government barely even thought about legitimacy issues during the last crisis, perhaps it is fitting that I end with an obligatory presentation of Wallach’s Law, which is that everything is more amateurish than you think, even after accounting for Wallach’s Law. Everything: financial crisis responding and post-response analysis are no exceptions.

At the end of my review of his book, I said:

one of the reasons I like thinking about the financial crisis, and like reading books like Wallach’s about it, is because it was an enormous almost-disaster that was averted for thousands of different, interlocking reasons. The government’s response to it was both wise, unreflective, tremendously unfair, and highly successful, and a million other things as well.

We may never sort out what exactly happened, and we'll certainly never know whether it was the best possible approach, or three removed from best, or 17, or whatever.  Given so many inputs, what can we say about the legal output?

I think we can say a few things.  First, that the law mattered, and provided constraints, even when it shouldn't have or was just used as an excuse (ahem, Lehman Bros.).  Second, one of the ways it mattered is because it cabined the government's thinking of precisely how it could get creative.  We can't save a bank through X, so let's push through a merger to save it that way.  We may never want the government too cabined in the middle of a crisis, but there is room to impose constraints afterwards, too.  So if you're inclined, for whatever reason, to look at the world through "law only" glasses, I think you can gain some useful perspectives on what happened during that hectic period six years ago.

Though, as we found out today, they're still litigating it all!

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August 06, 2015
More On Wallach And The Fed During The Financial Crisis From Peter Conti-Brown
Posted by David Zaring

My colleague Peter Conti-Brown is interested in Philip Wallach's legal history of the financial crisis, as am I. He's got a post up on it over at the Yale J. on Reg. blog, and go give it a look.  They've debated, over there, whether the Fed had the authority to rescue Lehman Brothers; it rather famously claimed that it did not, only to give AIG a massive bailout a couple of days later:

One of the features of Philip’s stint here was a debate we had on the Fed’s claim that it lacked the legal authority to save Lehman Brothers. I say that’s a post-hoc invention; Philip thinks it’s not, or at least,not so obvious. What do we learn from this fascinating exchange?

 ....

I still think those inside the Fed—whether at the Board of Governors or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York—had the authority to do whatever they wanted with Lehman. And given the political maelstrom they faced, I’m not sure I would have done a thing differently than they did. My critique of their legal analysis is not a critique of their crisis decision-making. But the legal arguments are distracting from the bigger question, about the appropriate levels of discretion that a central bank should have in using its lender of last resort authority. What the debate with Philip has shown me is that, even if I’m not wrong—and, well, I’m not—the law is something of an omnipresence in the way the government faced the financial crisis. That omnipresence may even have brooded from time to time.

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August 03, 2015
A Review Of A Financial Crisis
Posted by David Zaring

Over at the New Rambler Review (which I'm really enjoying), I've got a review of Philip Wallach's legal history of the financial crisis.  The kick-off offers a riff on the crisis:

The government’s response to the financial crisis was an example of messy policymaking that occasioned a happy ending, although not everyone sees it that way. Some are unsure about the ending – they have decried the very modest meting out of punishment that followed the recovery of the economy. Others are unsure that the policymaking was messy – they are likely to think of the government’s response to the financial crisis as an inevitable manifestation of executive preeminence as the doer of last resort, institutionally capable of acting when courts and legislatures cannot.

But I will take a stable economy over a few prison sentences, especially when it is possible that you can’t have both at the same time. And you won’t convince me that the things government officials did during the crisis – last minute deals, concluded late at night and paired with creative reimaginings of underused statutes and regular resorts to Congress for more legislation – was the mark of the smooth progress of an imperial presidency.

Go over there and read the whole thing!

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July 29, 2015
Peter Conti-Brown on the Fed's Regional Banks
Posted by David Zaring

My colleague Peter Conti-Brown has an op-ed in the Times today regarding the Fed's crazy regional bank system.  A taste:

Congress should let the Board of Governors appoint and remove the 12 Reserve Bank presidents, as they may do with other employees of the board. The 12 regional Feds would then become branch offices of our central bank, continuing to do research and data analysis, while leaving policy making to Washington.

This plan has several benefits. First, the next time the Fed makes an egregious mistake — like failing to predict the meltdown of the housing market — we would know for certain whom to hold accountable. Second, it would allow the Fed to modernize the distribution of the 12 Reserve Banks. There is strong evidence that the cities for the 12 banks were chosen as much for politics as economics. In 2015, do we really need two regional Feds (Kansas City and St. Louis) in Missouri, but only one (San Francisco) west of Texas?

Everything Peter writes about the Fed is worth reading, and this is no exception.  Give it a look here.

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July 28, 2015
Shadow Everything
Posted by David Zaring

I was looking at Dan Scwarcz's lastest paper on Shadow Insurance, which is a thing:

Shadow insurance – defined as life insurers’ reinsurance of policies with captive insurers that are not “authorized” reinsurers and do not maintain a rating from a private rating agency – creates important risks to policyholders, the insurance industry, and potentially even the broader financial system. Although the standard state regulatory safeguards help mitigate some of these risks, they leave other hazards of shadow insurance largely unchecked. Even granting that shadow insurance likely helps reduce the cost of insurance associated with the excessive conservatism of some state reserving rules, the practice ultimately undermines insurance markets by impeding accurate risk assessments and tradeoffs by policyholders, regulators, and other market participants.

It's a nice paper, but it made me think we're at peak shadow.  There's Shadow Banking, Shadow Bankruptcy, and there if a firm called Shadow Financial Systems.

Of course, there may be a real world reason for this - shadow institutions are in theory nimbly entering markets that heavily regulated incumbents can't serve well.  This is the regulation is bad story of the growth of shadow finance.

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July 13, 2015
Cost Benefit Analysis at the SEC
Posted by David Zaring

Over at DealBook, I have a piece up on the state of cost-benefit analysis at the SEC.  Inadequacies in the CBA were how the SEC used to lose all its rulemakings in the D.C. Circuit; its latest rulemaking on clawbacks sets the stage for how seriously the agency takes cost-benefit analysis now, and how much it believes that analysis should be quantified.  A taste:

Throughout the cost-benefit analysis, the agency warns that it is “often difficult to separate the costs and benefits,” and that various effects of the rule are “difficult to predict.”

I suspect the agency thinks it doesn’t need to blow the court of appeals away with some numbers to survive, though of course the S.E.C. can do more cost-benefit analysis in the final rule. It does, however, believe that a lengthy consideration of the costs and benefits of a rule should be part and parcel of any proposal.

For those who think that cost-benefit analysis slows the pace of regulation, this may not be good news. Economists might wish that numbers were being appended to the discussion.

But I am happy enough to see rules without numbers. Justifying rules only with regard to their costs and benefits is pretty routine. As routines develop, it may become difficult for regulators and judges to consider new sorts of costs, and unforeseen benefits contained, for example, by the simple expression of what the rule favors and what it discourages.

Go give it a look!

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July 08, 2015
The Definitive Story On Bank Supervision
Posted by David Zaring

Banco Santander's American sub is in trouble.  Big trouble with the government.  Supervisors think it is undercapitalized, doesn't adequately keep track of its money, and is led badly.  The Wall Street Journal put the story about their concerns on A1.

So, what's next?  A takeover?  A fine?  A lawsuit?

The Federal Reserve issued a stinging lecture to Spanish bank Banco Santander SA,faulting the lender’s U.S. unit for failing to meet regulators’ standards on a range of basic business operations.

Oh.  A lecture.  Well that doesn't...

The Fed didn’t fine the bank but reserved the right to do so later and required the bank to write a series of remedial plans.

So a warning or whatever...

the Fed had already scolded Santander for paying an unauthorized dividend earlier in 2014 without the Fed’s required permission.

[Santander CEO] Ms. Botín spoke for 15 minutes by phone with [Fed Governor] Mr. Tarullo on Nov. 10.

She met with him again in Washington on Dec. 10, when they talked privately for an hour

Oh, and meetings.  Still, there have been resignations and promises to change the whole governance structure of the company.  So these talking-tos must have been absolutely hair-raising.  For drama, you really can beat bank supervision, amiright?

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July 06, 2015
The SEC's Clawback Rule
Posted by David Zaring

The rule, authorized by Dodd-Frank, would permit companies to claw back compensation from executives if things go south.  Or, more specifically, the rule will "require national securities exchanges and national securities associations to establish listing standards that would require each issuer to implement and disclose a policy providing for the recovery of erroneously paid incentive-based compensation."  Clawbacks would happen when, well: "the trigger for the recovery of excess incentive-based compensation would be when the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement as the result of a material error that affects a financial reporting measure based on which executive officers received incentive-based compensation."

The rule had the usual two dissenters, independent statements by each of the commissioners.  The SEC is a divided agency.  But I'm interested in how the staff hope to close the deal, assuming that the rule will be litigated.

First, even though this is a proposed rule, the agency is already responding to plenty of comments from prior concept releases, &c.  Second, 50 of the 198 pages of the rule are devoted to the cost benefit analysis that so stymied the SEC when the DC Circuit had a majority of Republican judges.  But the analysis isn't heavy on quantitative cost-benefit, but rather an assessment of the implications on a variety of affected components in the agency.  I think the agency thinks it doesn't need to blow the court of appeals away with some numbers to survive, though of course the agency can do more cost-benefit analysis in the final rule.

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June 29, 2015
Law And Custom On The Federal Open Markets Committee
Posted by David Zaring

My article on the administrative law and practice of the FOMC is available on SSRN, and has come out as part of a great symposium in Law and Contemporary Problems, with articles by Jim Cox, John Coates, Kate Judge, and many other people smarter than me.  Do give the paper a download, and let me know what you think.  Here's the abstract:

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which controls the supply of money in the United States, may be the country’s most important agency. But there has been no effort to come to grips with its administrative law; this article seeks to redress that gap. The principal claim is that the FOMC’s legally protected discretion, combined with the imperatives of bureaucratic organization in an institution whose raison d’etre is stability, has turned the agency into one governed by internally developed tradition in lieu of externally imposed constraints. The article evaluates how the agency makes decisions through a content analysis of FOMC meeting transcripts during the period when Alan Greenspan served as its chair, and reviews the minimal legal constraints on its decisionmaking doctrinally.

In addition to being your one stop shop for the legal constraints on the FOMC, the paper was an opportunity to do a fun content analysis on Greenspan era transcripts, and to see whether any simple measures correlated with changes in the federal funds rate.  In honor of Jay Wexler's Supreme Court study, I even checked to see if [LAUGHTER] made a difference in interest rates.  No!  It does not!  But more people may show up for meetings where the interest rate is going to change, tiny effect, but maybe something for obsessive hedge fund types.  Anyway, give it a look.

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June 18, 2015
Victories With No Damages
Posted by David Zaring

The AIG suit is over, and the shareholder who was zeroed out by the government won a judgment without damages.  These kinds of moral victories are cropping up against the government: a Georgia judge just ruled that the SEC's ALJ program was unconstitutional, but easily fixed.  The Free Enterprise Fund held that PCAOB was illegal, but not in any way that would undo what it had achieved.  And now AIG.  A right without a remedy isn't supposed to be a right at all, but it is true that this is incremental discipline of the government for business regulation excesses.  That won't make any of these plaintiffs happy, however.

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June 10, 2015
The SEC's Inferiority Complex
Posted by Usha Rodrigues

While reading this article I was pleased to find quotes from my good friend and colleague, Kent Barnett. I asked him to share with the Glom readers further insights on Judge May's recent ruling that the SEC's use of an ALJ in an insider trading case may be unconstitutional.  Here's Kent with more:

In, what is to my knowledge, an unprecedented decision this week, a federal district court in Atlanta preliminarily enjoined the SEC from proceeding with an enforcement action before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) because the ALJ’s appointment violated the U.S. Constitution.  
 
The court held (as I have argued elsewhere) that ALJs are not mere employees, but instead “inferior officers of the United States,” whose appointments are subject to the Appointments Clause. That clause requires that inferior officers be appointed in one of four ways: through presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation or through appointment “by the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”  Here, the relevant appointment mechanism is the last one—appointment by the head of a department. According to the court’s opinion, the ALJ was not appointed by the SEC Commissioners (the head of the department), but instead by a Chief ALJ.
 
Is this sky going to fall for the SEC if ALJs were not appointed properly? Not based on my initial take. From what I can tell, there is an easy fix: the SEC merely needs to have the Commissioners reappoint current ALJs and approve future ALJs that the Chief ALJ selects. (But I hope that those with more knowledge about the SEC can correct me if I’m wrong.)
 
Congress does not need to take any legislative action; the SEC already has authority under Section 4(b) of the ’34 Act to appoint “officers . . . and other employees.” The problem here is that, despite the SEC’s broad legislative authority to delegate functions under Section 4A(a), the delegation of appointment power is unconstitutional. That does not mean, of course, that the SEC must interview and review the CVs of ALJ candidates going forward. Instead, for future ALJs, the SEC can simply preclude the Chief ALJ’s selection from becoming effective without the Commissioners’ approval. Indeed, retaining final say on appointments is not only constitutionally required but also expressly permitted by Section 4A(b), which says that the SEC retains discretion to review delegated actions. For current ALJs, the SEC can simply reappoint them. Agencies have done so successfully in the face of past Appointments Clause violations. SeeEdmond v. United States.
 
So, in light of the easy fix, is this decision much ado about nothing? No.
 
First, this is the only decision of which I’m aware that (correctly, I think) holds that ALJs are inferior officers. Most ALJs are likely appointed by heads of departments, and thus their appointments are valid regardless of their status. But other ALJs may be appointed by agencies that are not departments, such as the CFPB or FERC (as I’ve argued elsewhere). If so, their appointments would violate the Appointments Clause.
 
Second, the decision shows how little attention agencies may be giving to appointments internally, even if statutory authority otherwise permits a constitutional appointment. The SEC’s experience suggests that the heads of departments should, as a matter of default agency design, be required to sign off on all hiring for federal officials who may be deemed inferior officers. For agencies that list of officials may be relatively lengthy, considering that courts have held that the following were inferior officers:  district-court clerks, clerks within certain executive departments, assistant surgeons, cadet-engineers, election monitors, federal marshals, military judges, and general counsel for the Department of Transportation. Approving hiring decisions may be more onerous than agencies would like, but the Appointments Clause requires that minimal involvement by the head of the department.

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Checking In With The Takings Cases
Posted by David Zaring

The Washington Post has a story on the AIG and Fannie and Freddie cases, which, as you might remember, use the Takings Clause to go after the government for its financial crisis related efforts.  In theory, that's not the worst way to hold the government accountable for breaking the china in its crisis response - damages after the fact rectify wrongs without getting courts in the way.  And I've written about both cases, here and here.

Anyway, the Post has checked in on the cases, and the view is "you people should be worrying more about the possibility that the government may lose.

Greenberg is asking the court to award him and other AIG shareholders at least $23 billion from the Treasury. He says that’s to compensate them for the 80 percent of AIG stock that the Federal Reserve demanded as a condition for its bailout. Judge Thomas Wheeler has repeatedly signaled his agreement with Greenberg. A decision is expected any day.

In the Fannie and Freddie case, the decision is further off, with the trial set to begin in the fall. The hedge funds are challenging the government’s decision to confiscate all of the firms’ annual profits, even if those profits exceed the 10 percent dividend rate that the Treasury had initially demanded. This “profit sweep” effectively prevents the firms from ever returning the government’s $187 billion in capital and freeing themselves from government control.

Earlier this year, Judge Margaret Sweeney refused to dismiss the case and gave lawyers for the hedge funds the right to sift through the memos and e-mails of government officials involved. Within weeks, Fannie and Freddie shares, which had been trading at about $1.50, started trading as high as $3 based on rumors that the documents revealed inconsistencies in government officials’ statements.

They checked in with me on the article, so there's that, too.

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June 03, 2015
Did The Fed Fail To Save Lehman Brothers Because It Legally Couldn't?
Posted by David Zaring

My soon to be colleague Peter Conti-Brown and Brookings author (and future Glom guest) Philip Wallach are debating whether the Fed had the power to bail out Lehman Brothers in the middle of the financial crisis.  The Fed's lawyers said, after the fact, that no, they didn't have the legal power to bail out Lehman.  Peter says yes they did, Philip says no, and I'm with Peter on this one - the discretion that the Fed had to open up its discount window to anyone was massive.  In fact, I'm not even sure that Dodd-Frank, which added some language to the section, really reduced Fed discretion much at all.  It's a pretty interesting debate, though, and goes to how much you believe the law constrains financial regulators.

Here's Peter:

as I discuss at much greater length in my forthcoming book, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve, the idea that 13(3) presented any kind of a statutory barrier is pure spin. There’s no obvious hook for judicial review (and no independent mechanism for enforcement), and the authority given is completely broad. Wallach calls this authority “vague” and “ambiguous,” but I don’t see it: broad discretion is not vague for being broad. In relevant part, the statute as of 2008 provided that “in unusual and exigent circumstances,” five members of the Fed’s Board of Governors could lend money through the relevant Federal Reserve Bank to any “individual, partnership, or corporation” so long as the loan is “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank.” Before making the loan, though, the relevant Reserve Bank has to “obtain evidence” that the individual, partnership, or corporation in question “is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.”

In other words, so long as the Reserve Bank was “satisfied” by the security offered and there is “evidence”—some, any, of undefined quality—the loan could occur. 

Here's Philip:

I (and most observers) read the “satisfaction” requirement as meaning that the Fed can only lend against what it genuinely believes to be sound collateral—i.e., it must act as a (central) bank, and not as a stand-in fiscal authority. The Fed’s assessment of Lehman Brothers as deeply insolvent at the time of the crisis meant that it did not have the legal power to lend. Years later, we have some indication that this assessment may have been flawed, but I don’t take the evidence uncovered as anything like dispositive. As I note in the book, the Fed’s defenders make a strong substantive case that the Fed was right to see Lehman as beyond helping as AIG (rescued days later) was not.

And the debate will be going on over at the Yale J on Reg for the rest of the week.  Do give it a look.

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June 02, 2015
What Makes People Unethical? It Might Be Other People
Posted by David Zaring

Jessica Kennedy at Vanderbilt has done research on what makes corporate officials behave unethically. Here she is, in an interview (disclosure: my department's former post-doc, now at Vanderbilt):

Previous research has often traced ethical misconduct to high-ranking people’s orders. It shows that power leads to bad behavior, in essence. Other studies have shown that the behavior of high-ranking people sets the tone in their groups — that it trickles down.

But I don’t think that presents a complete picture of how unethical practices emerge. In fact, such practices often emerge from groups. For example, prior research has found that people making decisions as a group are more willing to lie than when they are making decisions as individuals. What I found in multiple studies was that high-ranking people are more inclined than low-ranking people to accept what their group recommends to them, even when it represents a breach of ethics. That is, higher-ranking people are less likely to engage in principled dissent and actively oppose such recommendations than are lower-ranking individuals.

I've watched with interest the new vogue among regulators to insist that financial institutions behave more ethically.  What does that mean?  The language is often one of chastisement.  Jessica's research suggests - and this is consistent with what banking supervisors often point to - that the problem really might be one of culture and groups, not that she is making regulatory recommendations.  Anyway, it's an interesting compliance problem.

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