August 22, 2014
The Con Law Conundrum
Posted by Usha Rodrigues

The question: to con law or not to con law?

The context: Steve Bainbridge responding to Anne Tucker's post on including a Citizens' United/Hobby Lobby discussion in a BA course (see Anne's reply to Steve here).  The question is a timely one for me:  Georgia Law started classes this week, and I (the rare bird who rotates casebooks because she is easily bored) am happily back teaching from Steve's casebook, co-authored with Klein & Ramseyer, which I highly recommend.  I never hand out a syllabus with assigned readings because invariably we move quicker or slower than I anticipate.  I have to cut or add material, and I find that students find such midstream changes unsettling.  So I don't tell them where we're going til we get there.

But I do have a "working syllabus" I hash out for myself at the semester's opening and tweak as the classes unfold.  As Anne and Steve point out, the semester is ridiculously crowded.  In 3 credits I cover partnership, corporations, and LLCs, and I cover the MBCA and Delaware corporate code.  It's way too much material (as I told my class Wednesday as part of my "drop this class" introductory speech).  My working syllabus has material for each of the 42 50-minute classes I'm allotted, and I agonize over the choices I make in filling each one.  This year, for the first time ever, my roughed-out working syllabus includes a day for Citizens United/Hobby Lobby.

Why?  Steve makes a terrific case for private law, and I am with him.  I love teaching BA for BA's sake.   Explaining to students the basic puzzle of ownership versus control, the different ways to run the railroad in terms of choice of entity and the tradeoffs among them?  Throw in the importance of private ordering and the ability to read a statute, and I'm in heaven.  I'm no public law scholar in sheep's clothing.  I'm a true believer, proselytizing for the beauty of business law in what sometimes does feel like a con law desert.

But I have got more doctrinal material than I can possibly cover.  Throw in a class where I invite in a practitioner, a class for Bill Chandler to talk about whatever the heck it is he wants to, and a review session, and we're talking precious few classes to cover a lot of material.


So why cede a precious class to public law jibber-jabber?  I'm still not sure I will.  But the reason came to me on a playground, chatting with an English professor mom.  We were commiserating over our lack of preparation for the start of the semester (secret: professors procrastinate, too), and she said, "well, it must be nice to teach a subject so interesting to students.  Hobby Lobby, Citizens United."  She nodded knowingly. 

The comment brought me up short.  Nobody things corporations are interestng.  At least, no one used to.  But now they do.  And sure it's for the "wrong" reasons--not for coprorate law reasons, but for reasons that deal with corporations' role in society.   And I think that might be enough to devote one class out of my 42.  Not for Anne's reason,  "to “hook” students who didn’t come to my class with an interest in corporate law."  I'm confident I can hook them on the merits.  But because, as she also says, "Corporate law also matters to general members of society because corporations wield tremendous power in elections, in lobbying (regulatory capture anyone?), in shaping retirement savings, in religious and reproductive rights debates and setting other cultural norms around issues like corruption, sustainability, living wage, etc."  It struck me on the playground that the "legal literacy" reason I give for taking Corporations--it's just something that every lawyer should know--may apply here as well.  With Hobby Lobby we might have reached the point where corporate law literacy demands a passing understanding of these two cases.  

Maybe not.  The CU/Hobby Lobby class may well end up on the cutting room floor.  But one last thing: as I get older, it is increasingly less clear to me that my students retain much past the exam.  What I want them to get out of the class, ultimately, is a basic knowledge of the relevant codes, of the importance of codes, an ability to read statutes, an understanding of the importance of default rules versus mandatory ones, agency costs, the trade-offs in choice of entity, the business judgment rule, and fiduciary duty.  Looked at that way, perhaps one public law class out of 42 isn't too much of a sacrifice in terms of coverage.

Permalink | Corporate Law| Teaching | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

August 17, 2014
After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, by Davidoff Solomon and Zaring
Posted by David Zaring

Steve Davidoff Solomon and I have put together a paper on the litigation between the government and the preferred shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Do give it a look and let us know what you think.  Here's the abstract:

The dramatic events of the financial crisis led the government to respond with a new form of regulation. Regulation by deal bent the rule of law to rescue financial institutions through transactions and forced investments; it may have helped to save the economy, but it failed to observe a laundry list of basic principles of corporate and administrative law. We examine the aftermath of this kind of regulation through the lens of the current litigation between shareholders and the government over the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We conclude that while regulation by deal has a place in the government’s financial crisis toolkit, there must come a time when the law again takes firm hold. The shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who have sought damages from the government because its decision to eliminate dividends paid by the institutions, should be entitled to review of their claims for entire fairness under the Administrative Procedure Act – a solution that blends corporate law and administrative law. Our approach will discipline the government’s use of regulation by deal in future economic crises, and provide some ground rules for its exercise at the end of this one – without providing activist investors, whom we contend are becoming increasingly important players in regulation, with an unwarranted windfall.

Permalink | Administrative Law| Corporate Law| Financial Crisis| Financial Institutions | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

August 16, 2014
Ownership and Control in Startups
Posted by Gordon Smith

Since reading Barbarians at the Gate in the early 1990s, I have been a huge fan of business histories. Although I have read scores (perhaps hundreds) of business histories, my list of "must reads" is still long. Recently, I decided to read one of the books on that list, The Soul of a New Machine, Tracy Kidder's account of Data General's efforts to build a minicomputer in the 1970s. This book was published in 1981, and it deals with events during my high school years, so it is a great trip down memory lane.

Here is an observation about the founders of Data General early in the book:

Some notion of how shrewd they could be is perhaps revealed in the fact that they never tried to hoard a majority of the stock, but used it instead as a tool for growth. Many young entrepreneurs, confusing ownership with control, can't bring themselves to do this.

Hmm. The distinction between ownership and control is a familiar one in corporate law circles, but this Berle-Means concept is typically applied to large corporations. What does it mean in the startup context?

Chuck O'Kelley examines the connection between entrepreneurship and the Berle-Means corporation in his 2006 article, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. Corp. L. 753, but I am curious about viewing this from the other direction. As noted by O'Kelley, the separation of ownership and control is used by Berle and Means to describe firms after the decline of the classical entrepeneur, so it seems somewhat surprising to see Kidder use those terms to describe a startup.

Founders often exert a tremendous influence on a company, even when shares are held by other employees and investors. This control may emanate from their formal positions within the company (CEO, CTO) or perhaps from the respect they are paid from other employees. But I think it is fair to say that ownership matters a great deal in the startup context because it is more concentrated than in the public company context. Thus, to a large extent, ownership is control in a startup.

Permalink | Books| Corporate Governance| Corporate Law| Entrepreneurs| Entrepreneurship | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

August 09, 2014
Disruptive Legal Technologies: Benefit Corporations and the Crowdfunding of Firms
Posted by Eric Orts

Two recent developments in the law and practice of business include:  (1) the advent of benefit corporations (and kindred organizational forms) and (2) the application of crowdfunding practices to capital-raising for start-ups.  My thesis here is that these two innovations will become disruptive legal technologies.  In other words, benefit corporations and capital crowdfunding will change the landscape of business organization substantially.

A disruptive technology is one that changes the foundational context of business.  Think of the internet and the rise of Amazon, Google, etc.   Or consider the invention of laptops and the rise of Microsoft and the fall of the old IBM.  Automobiles displace horses, and telephones make the telegraph obsolete.  The Harvard economist Joseph Schumpeter coined a phrase for the phenomenon:  “creative destruction.”

Technologies can be further divided into two types:  physical technologies (e.g., new scientific inventions or mechanical innovations) and social technologies (such as law and accounting).   See Business Persons, p. 1 (citing Richard R. Nelson, Technology, Institutions, and Economic Growth (2005), pp. 153–65, 195–209).  The legal innovations of benefit corporations and capital crowdfunding count as major changes in social technologies.  (Perhaps the biggest legal technological invention remains the corporation itself.)

1.  Benefit corporations began as a nonprofit idea, hatched in my hometown of Philadelphia (actually Berwyn, Pennsylvania, but I’ll claim it as close enough).  A nonprofit organization called B Lab began to offer an independent brand to business firms (somewhat confusingly not limited to corporations) that agree to adopt a “social purpose” as well as the usual self-seeking goal of profit-making.  In addition, a “Certified B Corporation” must meet a transparency requirement of regular reporting on its “social” as well as financial progress.  Other similar efforts include the advent of “low-profit” limited liability companies or L3Cs, which attempt to combine nonprofit/social and profit objectives.  In my theory of business, I label these kind of firms “hybrid social enterprises.”  Business Persons, pp. 206-15.

A significant change occurred in the last few years with the passage of legislation that gave teeth to the benefit corporation idea.  Previously, the nonprofit label for a B Corp required a firm to declare adherence to a corporate constituency statute or to adopt a similar constituency by-law or other governing provision which signaled that a firm’s sense of its business objective extended beyond shareholders or other equity-owners alone.  (One of my first academic articles addressed the topic at an earlier stage.  See “Beyond Shareholders:  Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes.”  I also gave a recent video interview on the topic here.)  Beginning in 2010, a number of U.S. states passed formal statutes authorizing benefit corporations.  One recent count finds that twenty-seven states have now passed similar statutes.  California has allowed for an option of all corporations to “opt in” to a “flexible purpose corporation” statute which combines features of benefit corporations and constituency statutes.  Most notably, Delaware – the center of gravity of U.S. incorporations – adopted a benefit corporation statute in the summer of 2013. According to Alicia Plerhoples, fifty-five corporations opted in to the Delaware benefit corporation form within six months.  Better known companies that have chosen to operate as benefit corporations include Method Products in Delaware and Patagonia in California.

2. Crowdfunding firms.  Crowdfunding along the lines of Kickstarter and Indiegogo campaigns for the creation of new products have become commonplace.  And the amounts of capital raised have sometimes been eye-popping.  An article in Forbes relates the recent case of a robotics company raising $1.4 million in three weeks for a new project.  Nonprofit funding for the microfinance of small business ventures in developing countries seems also to be successful.  Kiva is probably the best known example.  (Disclosure:  my family has been an investor in various Kiva projects, and I’ve been surprised and encouraged by the fact that no loans have so far defaulted!)

However, a truly disruptive change in the capital funding of enterprises – perhaps including hybrid social enterprises – may be signaled by the Jumpstart Our Business Start-ups (JOBS) Act passed in 2012. Although it is limited at the moment in terms of the range of investors that may be tapped for crowdfunding (including a $1 million capital limit and sophisticated/wealthy investors requirement), a successful initial run may result in amendments that may begin to change the face of capital fundraising for firms.  Judging from some recent books at least, crowdfunding for new ventures seems to have arrived.  See Kevin Lawton and Dan Marom’s The Crowdfunding Revolution (2012) and Gary Spirer’s Crowdfunding:  The Next Big Thing (2013).

What if easier capital crowdfunding combined with benefit corporation structures?  Is it possible to imagine the construction of new securities markets that would raise capital for benefit corporations -- outside of traditional Wall Street markets where the norm of “shareholder value maximization” rules?  There are some reasons for doubt:  securities regulations change slowly (with the financial status quo more than willing to lobby against disruptive changes) and hopes for “do-good” business models may run into trouble if consumer markets don’t support them strongly.  But it’s at least possible to imagine a different world of business emerging with the energy and commitment of a generation of entrepreneurs who might care about more in their lives than making themselves rich.  Benefit corporations fueled by capital crowdfunding might lead a revolution:  or, less provocatively, may at least challenge traditional business models that for too long have assumed a narrow economic model of profit-maximizing self-interest.  James Surowiecki, in his recent column in The New Yorker, captures a more modest possibility:  “The rise of B corps is a reminder that the idea that corporations should be only lean, mean, profit-maximizing machines isn’t dictated by the inherent nature of capitalism, let alone by human nature.  As individuals, we try to make our work not just profitable but also meaningful. It may be time for more companies to do the same.”

So a combination of hybrid social enterprises and capital crowdfunding doesn’t need to displace all of the traditional modes of doing business to change the world.  If a significant number of entrepreneurs, employees, investors, and customers lock-in to these new social technologies, then they will indeed become “disruptive.”

Permalink | Business Ethics| Business Organizations| Corporate Governance| Corporate Law| Delaware| Economics| Employees| Entrepreneurs| Entrepreneurship| Environment| Fiduciary Law| Finance| Financial Institutions| Investing| JOBS Act| Legal Theory| Organizational Theory| Securities| Social Entrepreneurship| Social Responsibility| Technology| Venture Capital | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

August 07, 2014
New Directions in Corporate Disclosure: Politics, Environment, and Religion
Posted by Eric Orts

Corporate disclosure, especially in securities regulation, has been a standard regulatory strategy since the New Deal. Brandeisian “sunlight” has been endorsed widely as a cure for nefarious inside dealings. An impressive apparatus of regulatory disclosure has emerged, including annual and quarterly reports enshrined in Forms 10K and 10Q. Other less comprehensive disclosures are also required: for initial public offerings and various debt issuances, as well as for unexpected events that require an update of available information in the market (Form 8K).

For the most part, corporate disclosure has focused on financial information: for the good and sufficient reason that it is designed to protect investors – especially investors who are relatively small players in large public trading markets. Some doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of this kind of disclosure and, indeed, the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure in general. A recent book by Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Scheider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, advances a wide-ranging attack on all mandatory disclosure. (I think that their attack goes too far: I’ll be coming out with a short review of the book for Penn Law’s RegBlog called “Defending Disclosure”).   Assuming, though, that much financial disclosure makes sense, what about expanding it to include other activities of business firms?

Consider three types of nonfinancial information that might usefully be disclosed: information about a business firm’s activities with respect to politics, the natural environment, and religion.

1. Politics. One good candidate for enhanced corporate disclosure concerns business activities in politics. Lobbying laws require various disclosures, and various campaign finance laws do too. It is possible to obscure actual political spending through the complexity of corporate organization. (For a nice graphic of the Koch brothers’ labyrinth assembled by the Center for Responsive Politics, see here.) Good reporters can ferret out this information – but they need to get access to it in the first place. My colleague Bill Laufer has been an academic leader in an effort to encourage public corporations to disclose political spending voluntarily, with Wharton’s Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research teaming up with the nonpartisan Center for Political Accountability to rank companies with respect to their transparency about corporate political spending. The rankings have been done for three years now, and there are indications of increased business participation.  Recently, even this voluntary effort has been attacked by business groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce for being “anti-business.” See letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce quoted here.  Jonathan Macey of Yale Law School has also objected to the rankings in an article in the Wall Street Journal, arguing that the purpose of political disclosure is somehow part of “a continuing war against corporate America.” These objections, however, seem overblown and misplaced. What is so wrong about asking for disclosure about the political spending of business firms? One can Google individuals to see their record of supporting Presidential and Congressional candidates via the Federal Election Commission’s website, yet large businesses should be exempt? Political spending by corporations and other business should be disclosed in virtue of democratic ideals of transparency in the political process. Media, non-profit groups, political parties, and other citizens may then use the resulting information in political debates and election campaigns. Also, it seems reasonable for shareholders to expect to have access to this kind of information.

In Business Persons, I’ve gone further to argue (in chapter 7) that both majority and dissenting opinions in Citizens United appear to support mandatory disclosure as a good compromise strategy for regulation. One can still debate the merits of closer control of corporate spending in politics (and I believe that though business corporations indeed have “rights” to political speech these rights do not necessarily extend to unlimited spending directed toward political campaigns). It seems to me hard to dispute that principles of political democracy – and the transparency of the process – support a law of mandatory disclosure of corporate spending in politics.

2. Natural environment. Increasingly, many large companies are also issuing voluntary reports regarding their environmental performance (and often adding in other “social impact” elements). Annual reports issued under the International Standards Organization (the ISO 14000 series), the Global Reporting Initiative, and the Carbon Disclosure Project are examples. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has also established a mandatory program for greenhouse gas emissions reporting, which is tailored to different industrial sectors. One can argue about whether these kinds of disclosures are sufficiently useful to justify their expense, but my own view is that they help to encourage business firms to take environmental concerns seriously. Many firms use this reporting to enhance their internal efficiency (often leading to financial bottom-line gains). As important, however, is the engagement of firms to consider environmental issues – and encouraging them to act as “part of the solution” rather than simply as a generating part of the problem.

One caveat that is relevant to all nonfinancial disclosure regimes:   The scope of firms required to disclose should be considered.  I do not believe that the case is convincing that only public reporting companies under the securities laws should be included.  (For one influential argument to the contrary, see Cynthia A. Williams, “The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency,”  112 Harvard Law Review 1197 (1999)).  Instead, it makes to sense for different agencies appropriate to the particular issue at hand to regulate:  the Federal Election Commission for political disclosures and the EPA for environmental disclosures.

3. Religion? In the wake of the Hobby Lobby case, some have called for greater disclosure about a firm’s values on this score both with respect to employment and investors. See, e.g., Joan Heminway’s piece here. Stephen Bainbridge has also called attention to this question here.  Probably it makes sense to consider disclosure as a partial solution, though the idea of mandatory government disclosure of religious characteristics makes me nervous on “separation of church and state” grounds. It might be better to “wait” (as Frank Partnoy advises us often to do in his recent book) and see how the Hobby Lobby line of cases develops. My guess is that some tensions will become apparent that may result in keeping Hobby Lobby limited to the context of close and usually small corporations (though Hobby Lobby itself is an exception, having more than 10,000 employees).
 
But a rule of disclosure might not be the best approach with respect to religion and firms. Better in this context perhaps to bite the bullet and ascertain when for various legal purposes a business firm “crosses the line” from a private organization (with rights of self-organization and self-determination with respect to many internal business practices) to a public-facing organization (with duties to treat public customers, employees, and business partners in a non-discriminatory manner). These issues are not easy. As I suggest in Business Persons (chapter 3), a central problem in business theory concerns “the public/private distinction” which I conceive as involving “two faces of the business enterprise.” Here, the religious preferences of private owners require balancing with the public role undertaken when holding out one’s shingle in public markets. Drawing legal lines isn’t always easy, but often it’s necessary.  And disclosures alone will not always be sufficient.

Permalink | Business Ethics| Business Organizations| Corporate Governance| Corporate Law| Employees| Environment| Finance| Financial Institutions| Hobby Lobby| Legal Theory| Organizational Theory| Politics| Religion| Securities| Social Responsibility | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

August 05, 2014
The Legal and Social Ontology of the Firm
Posted by Eric Orts

Thanks to Gordon Smith and my Wharton colleague David Zaring for inviting me as a guest blogger on The Conglomerate.  I am a new entrant in the blogosphere here, and I appreciate this invitation very much.

What follows is a written version of remarks that I presented at the Society for Business Ethics in Philadelphia on August 3 at a panel on “Corporate Personhood – For or Against or Whether It Even Matters?” organized by Kendy Hess of Holy Cross.  (Thanks, Kendy!)  The panel also included excellent presentations on the topic by two of my Wharton colleagues, Gwen Gordon and Amy Sepinwall, as well as Kendy.  A longer version will be presented in a conference in London in September, and a written version will also be included in a book that I'm co-editing with Craig Smith called The Moral Responsibility of Firms (forthcoming in Oxford University Press).  It will also inform chapter 1 of a book that is underway (and still forthcoming) currently called Rethinking the Firm: An Interdisciplinary Interpretation (also under contract with OUP). 

In these posts, I've been kindly invited to revisit some themes of my new book on Business Persons:  A Legal Theory of the Firm.  So I hope that I'll generate some interest in the book:  or perhaps make some of the ideas there more accessible in "blog-sized" pieces.  The following contribution is a first entry.

***

Let me be provocative first and say affirmatively: Corporations are legal persons and it matters. The thesis is qualified, however, by the fact that to say that corporations are persons is a conclusion that only then begins arguments about what it actually means in practice with respect to particular issues.  The fact that corporations are “persons” means only that we provide them – through law – with certain capacities and powers, and certain rights and obligations.  It remains to be decided what the nature and limits of these capacities and powers, and rights and obligations, may and will be.

Three main arguments support my claim.

1. Firms exist.  Some economists (and lawyers following them) have argued that firms do not really exist.  They are mere fictions, they say, and any serious epistemological analysis must look past the “legal fiction” of the firm – or the “corporation” in the form we are discussing here – to the actual human beings who are involved.  Although this methodological reduction may be useful for some kinds of analysis (economic modeling, etc.), it is wrong from a realistic legal and social perspective.  Firms exist because the law has evolved to say that they exist.  They are constructions of human relationships that are socially sanctioned and legally recognized.  They are “fictions” in the sense that they are created through the artificial mechanisms of law and government.  They are also “real” because people acting under law and in society believe in them and make them real.  Firms are therefore what I’ve called “real fictions”:  both nominalism and realism are right, but only when they are combined together into a nominalist realism.  See Business Persons, ch. 1.  Philosophers such as Margaret Gilbert, John Searle, and Philip Pettit support this view.  People acting in social groups form collective realities, which are reinforced and articulated by organizational law.  Business firms – including for-profit corporations – are in this sense social constructions.  Corporations are like money and nation-states.  Exxon-Mobil and Patagonia are as real as China and the United States.  They exist because we believe in them.  We act as if they exist – and so as social constructions they exist.  They have power and authority.

2. Firms are persons.  The method of legal recognition is to bestow “personality”:  The law recognizes an individual human being as a “person” who has “standing” to bring or defend a claim in court.  A person has rights: personal rights against mistreatment and rights against violations of one’s dignity and physical integrity.  The law matters here.  Consider the situation of a slave (historically not so very long ago in the United States) or an illegal immigrant (such as children from other countries crossing the southern border of the United States today).  The law does not recognize them fully as “persons” – or at least not to the same level of available rights and obligations as “citizens.”  Even children of citizens do not have a complete set of rights:  they cannot drive cars or enter contracts legally until reaching an age allowing legal capacity.  The law makes other distinctions:  “person” is a legally denominated concept.  It is extended (or not) for various reasons of philosophy and social policy.  Is a fetus a “person”?  What rights does a “terrorist” have?  Even: is a dog, such as my dog Butterbean, a legal person for certain purposes?  I cannot, for example, torture him for fun (assuming that I’m that kind of person, which I’m not).  In this sense, then, a dog too is a person:  he has some minimal rights recognized under law (though he'll need someone else to speak for him).

An analogous argument applies to firms.  They are “persons” because the law recognizes them as such and as having certain rights and obligations:  standing in court, holding of property, a party to contracts, an organizational principal, a target for tort liability, and a potential plaintiff to insist on its “rights,” whatever they may be.  The exact nature of these various rights of firms remains to be decided:  The controversial recent cases of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby extend claims of political and religious freedom to include corporations as persons.  Are these cases correctly decided?  The answer does not, I believe, turn on whether they are considered “persons” or not.  Firms are uncontroversially legal persons for many purposes.  The question is whether or not we should extend certain kind of rights to firms as “persons” derivatively – representing the people who act collectively through them.  Note that the answer can be qualified.  We may say: “Yes, corporations hold property and should have standing to object on constitutional grounds if a government attempts to expropriate the property without compensation.”  But we may also say: “No, corporations usually represent diverse groups of people regarding religion, so in these cases it is not correct to say that corporations should have religious rights" (contrary, of course, to the holding of Hobby Lobby).  I make this latter argument in a previous blog for The Conglomerate on Hobby Lobby here.

3. Legal personality matters, but it is not dispositive. Firms exist, firms have legal personality, and it matters.  The fact that a corporation is a person does not settle the argument for or against an assertion of rights or obligations.  This is a mistake in argumentation, in my view, that opinions on both sides of the divided Justices of the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby cases make.  In these kinds of cases, the Court should ask – as legislatures and citizens should as well – what is the purpose of a firm and of a corporation given the question that we're asking?  Arguably, as Justice Alito argues in Hobby Lobby, business firms are not just profit maximizers (as some students are taught in some business school classes).  They are moral creatures because the people who compose them are moral creatures (or, at least they have the potential to be moral -- nobody's perfect!)  But we then have to dig deeper and ask “who” is involved in the firm.  Why are we asking the question: “persons” for what purposes?  Perhaps firms should have political rights, but perhaps also they should be constrained in this respect for good reasons of political theory and modern democracy.  Perhaps some kinds of firms should have religious rights, but the scope of these potential rights should be constrained.  Rights of employees may be equal to those of owners and managers in this context.  There are other limits in principle that need to be drawn here too:  but my main point here is that doing so assumes that “legal personality” matters.  It is then a question of filling in the institutional portrait:  who is this person?  What kind of person?  And how does the nature of this person relate to the considerations in play on a specific issue?

4. Conclusion.  My argument is designed mostly to set up rather than to answer the hard questions, so I hope that my position will not be too controversial.  Here again are my main propositions.

a.  Firms exist. For our purposes here, corporations are a kind of firm.  (The difference between for-profit and profit corporations raises another set of issues.)

b.  Firms, including corporations, have legal personality.  The question is not whether firms are persons, but what the fact that they are persons means with respect to particular further questions regarding the rights or obligations that we should extend to them as persons.

c.  Legal personality matters, but is not dispositive.  To argue about whether firms are persons or not persons does not advance the ball very much.  The popular debate conflates the meanings of "persons" and "people."  Firms are persons; begin there.  And then engage the substantive policy issues as hand.  Move the discussion forward, while recognizing the truth of the “real fictions” of firms as legal persons.

Permalink | Business Ethics| Business Organizations| Corporate Governance| Corporate Law| Employees| Hobby Lobby| Legal Theory| Organizational Theory | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

July 02, 2014
The Supreme Court's View of the Corporation in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Posted by Usha Rodrigues

Home from teaching bar prep, I've just finished the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby opinion.  What does the opinion teach those highly stressed would-be attorneys about corporate law--or at least, the justices view of it?  Let's see, shall we?

Justice Alito's majority opinion:

Entity theory rejected--anyone for a nexus-of-humans theory?:

A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. For example, extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and others associated with the company. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people...Corporations, “separate and apart from” the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.

(UR: this sounds like my first day of BA speech, where I reassure the humanities majors that "business law is all about relationships, relationships between people and groups of people).

Shareholder wealth maximization vs. corporate social responsibility:

Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to make money.  This argument flies in the face of modern corporate law. “Each American jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication authorizes corporations to be formed under its general corporation act for any lawful purpose or business.” 1 J. Cox & T. Hazen, Treatise of the Law of Corporations §4:1, p. 224 (3d ed. 2010) (emphasis added); see 1A W. Fletcher,Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations §102 (rev. ed. 2010).  While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. Many examples come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires. A for-profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits. If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.

(UR: Kumbaya, my friends!  Shareholder wealth maximization does not rule with the majority, that's for sure.  Milton Friedman be damned, CSR is alive and well on the Supreme Court.

Tax is always with us:

For example, organizations with religious and charitable aims might organize as for-profit corporations because of the potential advantages of that corporate form, such as the freedom to participate in lobbying for legislation or campaigning for political candidates who promote their religious or charitable goals.

(UR: those pesky IRS 501(c)(3) restrictions! I always stress the importance of tax in BA.)

New corporate forms:

In fact, recognizing the inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals, States have increasingly adopted laws formally recognizing hybrid corporate forms. Over half of the States, for instance, now recognize the “benefit corporation,” a dual-purpose entity that seeks to achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its owners.

(UR: I was wondering if the Court would mention benefit corps.  Kind of surprised the majority does, because one could see the existence of a hybrid form as undermining the Hobby Lobby/Conestoga argument, i.e., if you were serious about your religion, why didn't you pick a different form?  I'm looking at you, Haskell Murray.)

General incorporation statutes, internal affairs doctrine, and ultra vires:

In any event, the objectives that may properly be pursued by the companies in these cases are governed by the laws of the States in which they were incorporated—Pennsylvania and Oklahoma—and the laws of those States permit for-profit corporations to pursue “any lawful purpose” or “act,” including the pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners’ religious principles. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §1301 (2001) (“Corporations may be incorporated under this subpart for any lawful purpose or purposes”);Okla. Stat., Tit. 18, §§1002, 1005 (West 2012) (“[E]very corporation, whether profit or not for profit” may “be incorporated or organized . . . to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes”); see also §1006(A)(3); Brief for State of Oklahoma as Amicus Curiae in No. 13–354.

Closely-held vs. public corps. 

These cases, however, do not involve publicly traded corporations, and it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS refers will often assert RFRA claims. HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring. For example, the idea that unrelated shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set ofstakeholders—would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems improbable. In any event, we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s applicability to such companies. The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs.

(UR: what's a closely held corporation, you ask.  I"m so glad you did.  Here's Steve Bainbridge's excellent post on the subject, and Anne Tucker with a solid but shorter treatment.) 

(UR2: One limitation for closely-held is Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act--which requires companies to make public filings when they reach 2000 investors (I'm omitting a lot, but that's the gist).  Look for me for more on this topic soon).

The certificate of incorporation governs the corporation:

The owners of closely held corporations may—and sometimes do— disagree about the conduct of business. 1 Treatise of the Law of Corporations §14:11. And even if RFRA did not exist, the owners of a company might well have a dispute relating to religion. For example, some might want a company’s stores to remain open on the Sabbath in order to make more money, and others might want the stores to close for religious reasons. State corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. See, e.g., ibid; id., §3:2; Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, §351 (2011) (providing that certificate of incorporation may provide how “the business of the corporation shall be managed”). Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes.

(UR: Alito is dead right about this--if you want to change the default rules, don't settle for a puny bylaw--get it in the charter).

Now we move to Justice Ginsburg's dissent.  She doesn't talk about the corporate form or corporate law as much--except to distinguish nonprofits from for-profits (if only she'd cited me!). I'll give one highlight:

Limited liability:

By incorporating a business ,however, an individual separates herself from the entity and escapes personal responsibility for the entity’s obligations. One might ask why the separation should hold only when it serves the interest of those who control the corporation.

I also note that while the conservative majority moves to embrace progressive CSR-style rhetoric, Justice Ginsburg resists the counter-move that for-profit corporations exist to maximize profit or shareholder wealth. 

 

Permalink | Corporate Law| Hobby Lobby| Humor| Supreme Court | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

June 11, 2014
Delaware as “Market-Dominant Small Jurisdiction”
Posted by Christopher Bruner

Those familiar with US corporate law are well aware that, in this field, a single small jurisdiction looms very large.  The state of Delaware is today the legal home to more than half of US public companies and about 64% of the Fortune 500.  It’s widely understood that no other US state even comes close, and there’s a substantial US corporate legal literature exploring the contours of, and seeking to explain, Delaware’s domestic dominance.  As I’ve ventured into the field of cross-border finance, however, I’ve been struck by the fact that Delaware isn’t really unique.  Taking a broad view of the regulatory fields relevant to cross-border corporate and financial services, there’s a set of small jurisdictions that are not merely successful in their respective fields of specialization, but are in fact globally dominant in those fields. 

In a current working paper I’ve selected a handful of these jurisdictions that I find particularly interesting; assessed whether extant theoretical paradigms can shed much light on their successes; and proposed an alternative approach that I think better captures their salient characteristics and competitive strategies – the so-called “market-dominant small jurisdiction,” or MDSJ.  The jurisdictions studied include Bermuda, well-established among the world’s preeminent insurance markets; Singapore, a rising power in wealth management; Switzerland, the long-standing global leader in private banking; and Delaware, the predominant jurisdiction of incorporation for US public companies and a global competitor in the organization of various forms of business entities.

The interesting question, of course, is why these small jurisdictions have been able to achieve global dominance in their respective specialties – and the paper includes an extended treatment of various theoretical lenses to which one might turn for an explanation.  None, however, can account for the range of jurisdictions that I identify.  Notably, while taxation (or lack thereof) certainly looms large as a competitive strategy in each case, the “tax haven” literature can’t explain the global dominance of these particular jurisdictions.  Simply put, it’s implausible that a new entrant could meaningfully challenge the competitive position of any of these jurisdictions simply by copying their tax codes, or any other component of their regulatory structures for that matter.  Each has a substantive domain of service-based expertise providing a source of real competitive advantage beyond the jurisdiction’s black-letter law – and this renders it effectively impossible to compete with these jurisdictions simply by copying and pasting their laws into one’s own books.  

The“offshore financial center” literature looks beyond tax, emphasizing cross-border services as such, yet encounters its own problems.  This literature has been heavily preoccupied with recent entrants, reflecting strong preoccupation with the global acceleration of cross-border finance since the late 1960s – an inclination that’s tended to distract this literature from the commonalities with early movers like Delaware and Switzerland, which rose to prominence in the early 20th Century.  In this light, it’s critical to observe that some of the most successful of the small jurisdictions active in cross-border finance aren’t actually “offshore” at all – again, including Delaware and Switzerland.  I argue that the onshore/offshore distinction has obscured more than it illuminates; it simultaneously fails to provide a comprehensive account of what’s truly distinctive about the range of successful small jurisdictions, and overstates the distinction between “us” (onshore) and “them” (offshore) – particularly in terms of involvement in problematic practices, which occur in both settings (of which more below).  The rhetorical function of this distinction is largely to paint small jurisdictions’ activities as uniquely and exclusively problematic, obscuring both small-market positives and big-market negatives. 

In developing my alternative – this “market-dominant small jurisdiction” (MDSJ) concept – I draw upon these and other literatures while endeavoring to avoid their limitations.  I argue that, notwithstanding substantial differences, these jurisdictions do exhibit fundamental commonalities in their contextual features and economic development strategies:

MDSJs are small and poorly endowed in natural resources, limiting their economic development options.  This creates a strong incentive to innovate in law and finance, while rendering credible their long-term commitment to the innovations undertaken.  These jurisdictions substantially depend on their legal and financial structures, and the market knows it. 

They possess legislative autonomy – the critical resource for such innovation.  This is obvious for sovereigns like Singapore and Switzerland, yet full-blown sovereignty isn’t required.  Delaware possesses sufficient room to maneuver under the internal affairs doctrine, and Bermuda – a British overseas territory – benefits from an express delegation of legislative authority.

MDSJs tend to be culturally proximate to major economic powers, and favorably situated geographically vis-à-vis those powers.  These ties can arise in various ways – through colonialism, common histories, and/or geography.  But in each case, their identification with – and capacity to interact closely with – multiple powers positions them to perform important regional and global “bridging” functions in cross-border finance. 

  • Bermuda has long bridged the Atlantic, maintaining strong ties with the UK and North America alike.  They benefit from the substantial ballast of association with the British legal system and insurance market (i.e. Lloyds) on one side, and proximity to the massive US economy and insurance market on the other. 
  • Singapore has long bridged East and West, having been established as a British colony to maintain an East Asian trade route.  Their location allowed them to contribute to the creation of a 24-hour global securities trading system – in the morning taking the baton from US markets that just closed, and in the afternoon handing the baton to European markets that just opened.  Since the 2000s Singapore has developed a two-way wealth management strategy, serving as the entry point for Western money into East Asia, and the entry point for rapidly accumulating East Asian money into the West – a strategy facilitated by a highly educated, bilingual (Mandarin-English) working population. 
  • Switzerland, located in the heart of Europe, borders on and transacts in the native languages of each of the surrounding economic powers.  German, French, and Italian are all official languages, and English-language proficiency is widespread as well. 
  • Delaware plays an under-explored bridging function in the US political economy, standing between and interacting with both the finance capital (New York) and the political capital (DC) – a geographic feature touted in corporate marketing materials. 

In addition to these contextual commonalities, MDSJs exhibit similar economic development strategies.  Notably, they’ve heavily invested in human capital, professional networks, and related institutional structures.  The aim is to foster a community of financial professionals with the incentives and capacity to develop high value-added niche specializations – a project eased by the fact that these are small places.  In each case the relevant public and private stakeholders often know one another personally, facilitating consensus and responsiveness to evolving markets.  Additionally, these public and private constituencies share largely homogenous interests – they all prosper if finance prospers.

Finally, MDSJs consciously seek to balance close collaboration with, and robust oversight of, the relevant professional communities – the aim being to at once convey flexibility, stability, and credibility.  Essentially these jurisdictions seek to avoid over-regulation frowned upon by the market, while at the same time avoiding under-regulation frowned upon by regulators in other jurisdictions.  In so doing, they generally try to bring private-sector experience to bear upon the regulatory design process, seeking to maintain cutting-edge regulatory regimes while at the same time conveying stability and credibility to global markets and their foreign regulatory counterparts. In each case this dual aim is reinforced by additional confidence-enhancing features – notably, low levels of perceived public corruption, and multi-party support for the development of financial services capacity.

The paper explores the embodiment of these characteristics in some depth, and ultimately suggests that examining such jurisdictions through this lens could offer tangible benefits as we continue to assess their costs and benefits in cross-border finance.  While potential abuse of the structures available in each of these jurisdictions is acknowledged – including money laundering and tax evasion – these problems are not unique to so-called “offshore” jurisdictions.  Notwithstanding Delaware’s extraordinary contribution to the development of substantive corporate law – principally attributable to their expert bench and bar – the state has been roundly criticized for creating some of the world’s most opaque shell companies.  At the same time, US calls for greater tax transparency are undercut by the fact that we ourselves don’t tax interest income on – and accordingly don’t require 1099s for – non-resident alien accounts.  In this light, to avoid charges of a regulatory double standard, US policymakers seeking greater financial and tax transparency – efforts I broadly support – may have to start by cleaning up their own backyards.

Permalink | Business Organizations| Corporate Law| Finance| Taxation | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

June 09, 2014
The Duty of Care as “Fiduciary Duty”
Posted by Christopher Bruner

While my writing on comparative corporate governance has focused principally on the core issues of power and purpose – that is, the division of governance authority between boards and shareholders, and the aims toward which board decision-making ought to be oriented – this work brought another striking divergence to my attention.  While in the US we refer to “fiduciary duties” (plural) to describe directors’ duties of loyalty and care, other common-law jurisdictions generally conceptualize only the duty of loyalty as “fiduciary” in nature.  That a well-functioning corporate legal system needn’t describe the duty of care as a fiduciary duty led me to ask, in a recent essay, whether there might be some practical utility in drawing such a clear distinction between loyalty and care concepts – and what costs might attend not doing so.

The rationale for applying the “fiduciary” label solely to the duty of loyalty is two-fold.  First, the duty of loyalty is unique to fiduciary status, whereas the duty of care isn’t.  Second, breaches of these respective duties involve differing consequences that ought to be distinguished analytically.  Millett L.J. summarized this position – in a manner consistent with approaches taken in Australia and Canada as well – in the UK Court of Appeal’s 1996 decision in Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew, [1998] Ch. 1 (Eng.):

The expression “fiduciary duty” is properly confined to those duties which are peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of which attracts legal consequences differing from those consequent upon the breach of other duties. Unless the expression is so limited it is lacking in practical utility. . . .

It is . . . inappropriate to apply the expression to the obligation of a trustee or other fiduciary to use proper skill and care in the discharge of his duties.

The issue of which duties ought to be described as “fiduciary” in nature has received some attention over recent years among US legal academics, and articulate advocates have urged narrower and broader frameworks, respectively.  Compare, for example, the approaches of William Gregory (endorsing the Mothew approach and arguing that equating duties of loyalty and care amounts to “bad law and worse semantics”) and Julian Velasco (arguing that there are five fiduciary duties – care, loyalty, objectivity, good faith, and rationality – corresponding with distinct standards of review).  In my essay I approach the issue somewhat obliquely, crediting the Mothew framework as a rational and comprehensible alternative and then asking what costs might have attended the differing US framework.  I conclude that describing both loyalty and care as fiduciary in nature has led judges – notably in Delaware – to conflate distinct analytical approaches to evaluation of board conduct, with consequences for the development of US corporate law that are not entirely positive. 

The duty of loyalty has historically been enforced more aggressively, an approach aiming principally to reduce conflicts of interest that scrupulous directors could realistically detect ahead of time, and thus avoid – associating a correlative moral stigma with breach.  The duty of care, on the other hand, generally has gone unenforced in order to promote entrepreneurial risk-taking – reflecting an assumption that even scrupulous directors could not manage their own liability exposure so straightforwardly, and accordingly diminishing the moral stigma associated with breach.  (I say that it has “generally” gone unenforced because this has not historically been the case in banking, where skepticism regarding the social benefits of risk-taking resulted in more robust enforcement of the duty of care – a dynamic that I explore here.)  As I describe in some depth, however, Delaware’s tendency to conflate the two duties as reflections of a singular fiduciary concept embodied by the business judgment rule (BJR) has tended to blur this core distinction – rendering Delaware’s analytical framework for the evaluation of board conduct considerably less coherent. 

The confusion latent in Aronson, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) – which described the BJR as a presumption of both informed and disinterested director decision-making (in contrast with an earlier formulation suggesting that only disloyalty could give rise to monetary liability) – fully manifested itself in the Cede litigation, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), where the Delaware Supreme Court depicted the BJR as the primary embodiment of the demands of “fiduciary” status, accordingly describing the duties of loyalty and care alike as mere elements of, and means of overcoming, the BJR.  In turn the court reached the remarkable conclusion that a care breach – with no showing of resulting injury – rebuts the BJR and “requires the directors to prove that the transaction was entirely fair,” the standard typically applied in the loyalty context, rendering rescissory damages available.  As Steve Bainbridge has observed, rescissory damages in a duty of care case could “have the effect of ordering the defendant directors to return a benefit that they never received,” and “threaten to be so astronomical as to substantially chill the decisionmaking process.” 

It is critical to recognize that each step in the development of this muddled analytical framework rests upon the conflation of loyalty and care as twin reflections of a singular fiduciary concept (via the BJR).  In this light, I believe that corporate law would have benefited from a clearer conceptual distinction between loyalty and care duties, fostering a clearer analytical distinction between the desirable enforcement regimes in these differing contexts. 

So, do I favor pursuing such clarity through a formal re-styling of the duty of care in non-fiduciary terms?  No.  While I might have favored such an approach if we were writing on a clean slate, we’re most assuredly not writing on a clean slate – and I think it quite reasonable to fear that abruptly re-styling care as non-fiduciary might be misinterpreted as some sort of demotion, potentially undercutting whatever degree of compliance might arise from motivations other than fear of damages.  A better approach, in my view, would be a statutory damages rule permitting imposition of monetary damages for loyalty breaches, but not for care breaches (along the lines that I initially proposed here).  Such an approach would permit the duty of care to retain whatever fiduciary oomph it currently possesses in the marketplace, while foreclosing the sort of analytical confusion described above and simplifying Delaware’s complex and convoluted framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct. 

Permalink | Corporate Law| Fiduciary Law | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

June 06, 2014
Karen Valihura for Delaware Supreme Court
Posted by Gordon Smith

Jack Jacobs is on the way out, and Governor Markell has nominated another Skadden attorney, Karen Valihura, to fill the vacancy on the Delaware Supreme Court. This follows the elevation of Leo Strine to the position of Chief Justice (joining Carolyn Berger, another Skadden alum) and the installment of Andy Bouchard as Chancellor. Nice run for Skadden Wilmington. Congrats, Karen! 

Permalink | Corporate Law| Delaware | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

June 05, 2014
Algorithm as Director
Posted by Gordon Smith

This looks like an April Fool's story, but the date is off:

A Hong Kong VC fund has just appointed an algorithm to its board.

Deep Knowledge Ventures, a firm that focuses on age-related disease drugs and regenerative medicine projects, says the program, called VITAL, can make investment recommendations about life sciences firms by poring over large amounts of data.

Just like other members of the board, the algorithm gets to vote on whether the firm makes an investment in a specific company or not. The program will be the sixth member of DKV's board.

I know what you are thinking ... could we see algorithms as board members in the US?

The Delaware General Corporation Law anticipates the question of non-human board members. Section 141(b) of the DGCL provides: "The board of directors of a corporation shall consist of 1 or more members, each of whom shall be a natural person."

The Model Business Corporation Act, on the other hand, provides: "A board of directors must consist of one or more individuals ..." As far as I know, "individual" is not a defined term in the MBCA or by any court interpreting this provision, but I assume it would be interpreted to mean "human being." That could be a nice question for a corpus linguist, if it came to that. Note that the statute does not provide every director must be an individual.

Permalink | Corporate Law| Corpus Linguistics | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

May 23, 2014
Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and RFRA
Posted by Alan Meese

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act applies only to "persons." Invoking this limitation, the Obama Administration claims that for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby are not RFRA persons, thus negating Hobby Lobby’s challenge to the Administration’s contraception mandate. In particular, the Administration claims that treating corporations as RFRA persons capable of exercising religion contravenes "fundamental tenets" of American corporate law.

In a brief amicus curiae, 44 professors of corporate and criminal law have elaborated on this argument. These scholars contend that treating corporations as RFRA persons that exercise their shareholders' religion violates basic principles of corporate law and would undermine that law's goals. The scholars’ brief emphasizes that corporations are separate legal entities protected from intrusion by shareholders, who enjoy limited liability behind the corporate veil. These essential attributes of corporateness, these scholars say, categorically preclude shareholders’ religion from “passing through” a boundary between shareholders and the firm and thus prevent shareholders from "impos[ing] their personal religious beliefs" on the firm. Allowing such imposition, the scholars say, would encourage intra-corporate struggles over religious identity, struggles that would sometimes result in litigation and discourage investment.

In a recent essay, Nate Oman and I argue that the Obama Administration and the scholars who support it are mistaken on this point and that for-profit corporations are in fact RFRA persons. Corporations often adopt policies that reflect shareholders’ religious beliefs. Examples include Jewish-owned restaurants or groceries that keep Kosher and remain closed on the Jewish sabbath, Christian-owned establishments that decline to sell alcohol and/or close on Sunday, and Muslim-owned firms that refuse to enter contracts that require the payment of interest. These practices do not offend corporate law, and the scholars cite no case to the contrary.

None of this is a surprise. Americans are the most religious people in the developed world. Moreover, the now-prevalent theory teaches that firms are nexuses of contracts among suppliers of various inputs. Modern corporate law reflects this contractual vision, allowing investors to alter default rules so as to facilitate the exercise of religion under the aegis of the corporate form. While the “standard” corporation entails separation of ownership from control of the sort found in large, publicly traded firms, the vast majority of corporations are closely held entities like Hobby Lobby, firms that courts and scholars have dubbed “chartered partnerships,” “incorporated partnerships,” or “corporations de jure and partnerships de facto.”

Several facets of modern corporate law empower shareholders to impose their religious beliefs on such corporations. Shareholders can adopt provisions in the corporate charter or the firm’s bylaws that limit what products firms may sell, days firms will operate, and how firms treat employees, customers, or the wider community. None of these provisions would contravene corporate law, which allows firms to pursue “any lawful businesses or purposes.” Shareholders can also enter shareholder agreements that govern operation of the firm or require unanimous consent before the firm takes certain actions. Indeed, shareholders can eliminate the Board of Directors altogether and operate the firm as a de facto partnership. Delaware law, for instance, expressly provides that shareholders may “treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or [ ] arrange relations among the stockholders or between the stockholders and the corporation in a manner that would be appropriate only among partners.” Shareholders may properly rely upon these devices (and perhaps others) to induce corporations to pursue religious objectives, even to the detriment of profits.

To be sure, shareholders of such “chartered partnerships” would retain limited liability (unless waived in the corporate charter) as well as entity status. But non-profit corporations, including churches, synagogues and mosques, and their members possess these very same attributes without forfeiting their ability to exercise religion. States confer limited liability on shareholders of for-profit corporations to encourage investment, risk taking and the like. Moreover, entity status reduces transaction costs that would result from individual shareholder transacting. Nothing about the rationales for these institutional devices justifies limiting the ability of shareholders to induce firms to pursue religious objectives.

Perhaps, however, pursuit of religion by for-profit corporations is inconsistent with the goals of corporate law, thereby suggesting that Congress did not extended RFRA to such entities. For example, the law professors’ brief suggests that allowing RFRA exemptions will lead to costly derivative suits over whether a corporation ought to adopt a particular religion and that firms will manufacture spurious religious claims to avoid onerous regulations.

We doubt it. Under current law a for-profit corporation may pursue a religious mission. It’s unclear why the predicted corporate-governance litigation over religion hasn’t already happened. It’s telling that the critics have been unable to cite a single derivative action or corporate governance dispute related to religion. In theory, it is possible that firms might manufacture insincere religious claims. This, however, has nothing to do with the corporate form. Natural persons also have incentives to manufacture religious claims. In applying RFRA, courts properly inquire into the sincerity of religious beliefs, booting spurious claims.

Finally, one might object that it simply makes no sense to give free-exercise rights (even statutory ones) to corporations. After all, a corporation has no soul, and religion is something that only natural persons can practice. We disagree. First, churches and other religious entities are corporations and no one has ever claimed that this fact disables them from practicing religion or meriting protection. Furthermore, these claims are not confined to uniquely “religious” corporations. Many churches, for example, are organized as LLCs. As a legal matter, they have the same form as Chrysler. The validity of RFRA claims should not turn on a claimant’s corporate status or lack thereof.

Perhaps the real problem is the for-profit character of firms like Hobby Lobby. Natural persons, however, also pursue profits. It would be very odd to say that a sole proprietorship or a partnership may claim the protections of RFRA but a corporation or an LLC may not. At a deeper level, it would be perverse to suggest that once a person is engaged in profit making activity they have given up their right to practice their religion. Such a principle would gut the idea of religious freedom.

Implicit in these arguments against RFRA personhood for corporations are two problematic assumptions. The first is that religion is fundamentally an individual and private affair, rather than a collective and public affair. This is a good description of a seventeenth-century Calvinist examining his or her soul for the signs of irresistible grace. This account does not work very well for many other approaches to religion. Jewish law, for example, denies that there is a distinction between the “private” and “religious” activity of the home and the “public” and “secular” activity of the marketplace. God’s demand that Israel live according to his law applies equally in both realms. Likewise, Catholic theology has a rich tradition of understanding corporate religious experience within a host of subsidiary organizations, including for-profit firms.

None of this means that the RFRA claims of for-profit corporation should always succeed. Courts should scrutinize all RFRA claims for sincerity, substantial burden, and whether any substantial burden is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. There is, however, no good reason for categorically excluding for-profit corporations from RFRA’s protection for religious freedom.

Permalink | Business Organizations| Corporate Governance| Corporate Law| Religion | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

May 13, 2014
What the Economist Forgets in its History of Five Financial Crises
Posted by Erik Gerding

A few weeks back (I am catching up on my blogging), the Economist featured a terrific essay on “A History of Finance in Five Crises.”  The conclusion of the essay – “successive reforms have tended to insulate investors from risk” and “this pins risk on the public purse … [t]o solve this problem means putting risk back into the private sector” – resonates.  However, the Economist makes a few surprising errors of omission in reaching this point.

First, many financial crises occurred without much of a state bailouts or safety net.  The Economist starts its history with the Panic of 1792 in the United States.  By that point England had already experienced a crisis in the late 1690s and the South Seas Bubble in 1720 and France had suffered through the searing Mississippi Bubble (I discuss all of these in Chapter 2 of my book).  The Economist then hopscotches to the Panic of 1825.  Roughly every ten years after that, Britain experienced another bubble and crash (also detailed in my book).  It is less than clear how government safety nets triggered these crises.

These crises point to a second omission: each of these 19th Century British crises – the Panic of 1825, the Panic of 1837, the Crisis of 1847 (it is a mystery to me what causes some incidents to qualify as a “Panic” and others to be a “Crisis”), the Crisis of 1857, and the Overend Gurney Crisis of 1866 – was preceded by a liberalization of corporate law or an expansion of limited liability for corporate shareholders.  Some scholars wax poetic about the “sine curve” of regulation without tracing that back in history.   Well, British corporate law (see also Chapter 2 of my book) provides the caffeine for that coffee.  This corporate law history has several important implications:

State intervention in financial markets takes other forms than deposit insurance and government bailouts.  This intervention often occurs before crises.  Indeed, I argue that booming markets and bubbles create strong incentives for interest groups to lobby for, and policymakers to provide, legal changes that further stimulate markets.  What I call “regulatory stimulus” goes beyond “deregulation” and includes government subsidies or legal preferences (think bankruptcy exemptions for swaps) for particular markets.  It also includes active government investments in markets (think all those state land and money giveaways to 19th Century railways). 

Regulatory stimulus in the form of changes to corporate law has particularly powerful effects.  The corporate form provides ideal for lobbying for regulatory favors: corporations solve collective action problems by centralizing decision-making and allow managers to lobby with “other people’s money.” 

Moreover, as the Economist hints but doesn’t quite hammer home, limited liability can generate moral hazard, which becomes particularly vicious if risk-taking can be externalized onto financial markets and taxpayers.

The Economist’s third omission is the most amusing (at least to nerds like me).  The magazine notes that after the Overend Gurney Crisis in 1866, “Britain then enjoyed 50 years of financial calm, a fact that some historians reckon was due to the prudence of a banking sector stripped of moral hazard.”  Many economists reckon that these years of calm owe more to the Bank of England finally assuming the mantle of lender of last resort in a banking crisis.  The intellectual godfather of this was none other than Walter Bagehot, the legendary editor of the Economist.  Perhaps this failure to provide credit where it is due owes to some intellectual Oedipal issues at the journal?

The fourth omission in the essay is perhaps the most unforgivable.  The Economist talks about the Great Crash of 1929 without mentioning the critique that the Federal Reserve failed to serve as lender-of-last-resort and pursued a destructive monetary policy at critical junctures.  Indeed, these are state interventions that many economists advocate that central banks take in the face of a banking crisis.  These state interventions also provide a government safety net that can create moral hazard.

 Which leads to the most biting criticism of the Economist piece: letting the economy burn in the wake of a financial crisis is pure but risks being purely destructive.  Rather than focusing on unravelling government safety nets for markets, we should be thinking about how to regulate financial firms given their inevitability.

Permalink | Corporate Law| Financial Crisis| Financial Institutions| Legal History | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

May 12, 2014
Summer Reading from Colorado’s Business Law Colloquium
Posted by Erik Gerding

We enjoyed a great lineup of speakers and cutting edge scholarship here in Boulder this past semester as part of CU’s Business Law Colloquium.  The following papers make for excellent start-of-the-summer reading:

Dan Katz (Michigan State): Quantitative Legal Prediction – or – How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry: a provocative look at Big Data will help clients analyze everything from whether to bring or settle a lawsuit to how to hire legal counsel.  Katz examines implications for legal education.

Rob Jackson (Columbia): Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill (with Lucian Bebchuk): Jackson and Bebchuk kicked a hornet’s nest with their argument that some state antitakeover statutes (and, by extension, poison pills under those statutes) may be preempted by the Williams Act.  See here for the rapid fire response from Martin Lipton.

Brad Bernthal (Colorado): What the Advocate’s Playbook Reveals About FCC Institutional Tendencies in an Innovation Age: my co-teacher interviewed telecom lawyers to map out both their strategies for influencing the Federal Communications Commission and what these strategies mean for stifling innovation in that agency.

Kate Judge (Columbia): Intermediary Influence:  Judge examines the mechanisms by which intermediaries – both financial and otherwise – engage in rent-seeking rather than lowering transaction costs for market participants.  The paper helps explain everything from Tesla’s ongoing fight with the Great State of New Jersey to sell cars without relying on dealers to entrenchment by large financial conglomerates.  

Lynn Stout (Cornell): Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of 'Pay For Performance': Stout argues that pay for performance compensation in companies undermines ethical behavior by framing choices in terms of monetary reward.  This adds to the growing literature on compliance which ranges from Tom Tyler’s germinal work to Tung & Henderson, who argue for adapting pay for performance for regulators.

Steven Schwarcz (Duke): The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability: Schwarcz argues for imposing additional liability on the “owner-managers” of some shadow banking entities to dampen the moral hazard and excessive risk taking by these entities, which contributed to the financial crisis.  This paper joins a chorus of other papers arguing to using shareholder  or director & officer liability mechanisms to fight systemic risk.  (See Hill & PainterAdmati, Conti-Brown, & Pfleiderer; and Armour & Gordon).

[I’ll inject myself editorially on this one paper: this is a provocative idea, but one that would make debt even cheaper relative to equity than it already is.  This would encourage firms to ratchet up already high levels of leverage.  I looked at the expansion of limited liability in Britain in the 18th Century in Chapter 2 of my book.  The good news for Schwarcz’s proposal from this history: expansions of limited liability seem to have coincided and contributed to the booms in the cycle of financial crises in that country that occurred every 10 years in that country.  The bad news: unlimited liability for shareholders does not seem to have staved off crises and likely contributed to the contagion in the Panic of 1825.]

The CU Business Law Colloquium also heard from Gordon Smith (BYU), Jim Cox (Duke), Sharon Matusik (Colorado – Business), Afra Afsharipour (UC Davis), Jesse Fried (Harvard), and Brian Broughman (Indiana).  Their papers are not yet up on ssrn.

Permalink | Corporate Governance| Corporate Law| Finance| Financial Crisis| Financial Institutions| Legal Scholarship | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

May 11, 2014
Program for the AALS Mid-year Meeting on Corporate and Financial Law
Posted by Erik Gerding

After the jump, is the program for the AALS Mid-year Meeting on Corporate and Financial Law in Washington, D.C. from June 7-9.  If you register (site restricted) and attend, make sure to stay until the fireworks at the very last panel!

Program

 

Saturday, June 7, 2014

 

4:00 - 8:00 p.m.

AALS Registration                                                                                                   

 

6:00 - 7:30 p.m.

AALS Reception

 

Sunday, June 8, 2014

 

8:45 - 9:00 a.m.

Welcome                                                                                                          

Judith Areen, AALS Executive Director, Chief Executive Officer

 

Introduction

Joan M. Heminway, Chair, Planning Committee for AALS Workshop on Blurring Boundaries in Financial and Corporate Law and The University of Tennessee College of Law

 

9:00 - 9:30 a.m.

Keynote

Donald C. Langevoort, Georgetown University Law Center

 

9:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

Sessions on Research

 

Recent appraisals of the state of legal education have raised questions about the value of legal scholarship.  Yet, most law scholars believe that their work contributes meaningfully to important theoretical and policy-oriented discussions-including those involving financial and corporate law.  What is the relevance and overall value of legal scholarship in financial and corporate law in an era of blurred and blurring boundaries? What methodologies, forms of scholarly output, and publication venues most effectively and efficiently reach the target audiences for financial and corporate law scholarship?  This segment of the program focuses on these and other questions relating to research and writing in financial and corporate law as a matter of current and desired future practice. 

 

Specifically, the segment features a two-part approach to questions involving research in the context of unclear substantive demarcations in financial and corporate law.  The first part is a plenary panel discussion, and the second part is a series of small-group networking sessions.  More detailed descriptions of each are set forth below.

 

9:30 -10:45 a.m.

Research Plenary Panel

Robert P. Bartlett, III, University of California, Berkeley School of Law

Jill E. Fisch, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Claire A. Hill, University of Minnesota Law School

 

The prevalence of economic analysis is one element that unites legal scholarship across the many areas of business law.  Scholars in the various business law fields of endeavor (e.g., business associations, securities regulation, financial institutions, insurance) have used other disciplines and methodological approaches to a far lesser extent.  Do we have the right mix of interdisciplinarity to most effectively respond to current challenges involving financial and corporate law?  How, if at all, do traditional legal scholars re-tool to address any perceived need for interdisciplinary research that engages academic disciplines outside their areas of expertise (or areas of expertise in which their knowledge is superficial or outdated)?

 

This panel explores the capacity of a variety of methodologies and disciplines to enrich the study of financial and corporate law in an era of blurring substantive and regulatory boundaries.  The panel also addresses cutting edge questions and controversies regarding blurring boundaries in particular research traditions.  The panel comprises scholars who use different quantitative and qualitative analytical methods in their work.   The panel is designed to allow these scholars to discuss techniques and tools they use and to yield valuable insights into questions that cut across financial and corporate law, such as the behavior of consumers, investors, financial institutions (and the individuals who work inside them), lawyers, and regulators.

 

10:45 - 11:00 a.m.                                                                                         

Refreshment Break                                                                                       

 

11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

Research Small Group /Networking Sessions

Michelle M. Harner, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
Christine Hurt, University of Illinois College of Law
Anne M. Tucker, Georgia State University College of Law

Others to be announced.

 

This part of the program is designed to offer participants the opportunity to share their thoughts on blurred lines in financial regulation research.  Topics will vary from session to session but may include:  how individual research approaches and methods have changed and are changing; how law academics keep up with emerging research approaches and methods-e.g., where research content is now found and how it is processed; whether (and, if so, how) individuals with different substantive law and research backgrounds "talk" to each other to help bridge gaps; and what optimal work product outcomes look like as substantive and regulatory lines continue to blur. Facilitators will report out the ideas from their sessions.

 

12:00 - 1:30 p.m.                                                                                             

AALS Luncheon

Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator for Massachusetts (Invited)

               

1:45 - 5:00 p.m.

Teaching Sessions

 

Associated legal and regulatory challenges and changes force us to reconsider our pedagogy and the business law curriculum in very fundamental ways.  Structuring courses and choosing and employing effective teaching tools are, of course, part of the discussion.  But teaching financial and corporate law in an era of blurring boundaries also engages larger issues, such as the role of different types of courses (e.g., clinics, practicums, externships, field placements, simulation courses) and pedagogies in teaching business law courses. Also important are pedagogical methods geared to develop the financial literacy, numeracy, and professional values that students concentrating in financial and corporate law should have when they graduate from law school.  Finally, it seems that it would be beneficial to address the value for law students, if any, in joint degree (e.g., JD/MBA) and advanced degree (LLM, Masters in Law, Juris Masters, etc.) programs and the overall place and prominence of financial and corporate law in the current and future program of legal education in the United States.  The program is designed to involve a significant amount of "show and tell," rather than predominantly focusing on traditional academic presentations.

 

1:45 - 3:00 p.m.

Teaching Plenary Panel

William A. Birdthistle, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology
James A. Fanto, Brooklyn Law School
Edward J. Janger, Brooklyn Law School
John Henry Schlegel, University at Buffalo Law School
David A. Westbrook, University at Buffalo Law School

 

This panel, populated with presenters culled from a call for proposals, explores the challenges and opportunities for legal educators in an era of blurring substantive and regulatory boundaries.  A range of possible teaching methods and tools can assist in the task.  But difficult questions exist as to how to best use these methods and tools in individual courses and across the curriculum-in and outside business law teaching.  Course selection and curricular options (including those external to the standard Juris Doctor courses and curriculum) deserve important consideration at both the individual (student and faculty) and institutional levels.  The panel is designed to allow academics specializing in financial and corporate law to discuss these and other issues relevant to educating business law students in light of blurring financial and corporate law boundaries.

 

3:00 - 3:15 p.m.                                                                                               

Refreshment Break                                                                                       

 

3:15 - 5:00 p.m.                                                                                              

Teaching Concurrent Sessions

 

This portion of the program features concurrent sessions on teaching led by law faculty chosen from a call for proposals.  Each session has a different topical focus and is offered twice-once in each breakout period.  Accordingly, each attendee has the opportunity to attend two sessions, each on a different topic.  These sessions are designed to involve significant interaction between the selected discussion leader and the attendees.  

 

3:15 - 3:45 p.m.

Concurrent Sessions

 

Consumer Protection Clinicas as a Site for Blurring Boundaries

Bryan L. Adamson, Seattle University School of Law


Teaching Banking Law

Mehrsa Baradaran, University of Georgia School of Law


A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Real Estate Investment and Finance Law

Andrea Boyack, Washburn University School of Law


Teaching the Federal Reserve in Law School: Crossing Disciplines, Paradigms and Vantage Points

Timothy A. Canova, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center


From the Balance Sheet to Beta: A Hands-On Approach to Teaching Accounting & Finance Concepts

Virginia Harper Ho, University of Kansas School of Law   

 

 

3:45 - 4:15 p.m.

Repeat of Concurrent Session Presentations

 

4:15 - 5:00 p.m.

Report Out

 

5:30 - 6:30 p.m.                                                                                                       

AALS Reception

 

Monday, June 9, 2014

 

9:00 - 10:15 a.m.                                                  

Complexity Plenary Panel

Henry T. Hu, The University of Texas School of Law   

Kristin N. Johnson, Seton Hall University School of Law

Tom C.W. Lin, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law

Saule T. Omarova, University of North Carolina, School of Law

 

Modern financial markets, as well as the firms that operate within these markets, have become increasingly complex over the last several decades.  This trend is attributable to various developments, including the accelerating sophistication of technology, the increasing size of firms, the more heterogeneous and sophisticated needs of users of financial services, and the inevitable desire of firms to seek out regulatory gaps.  This ever-growing complexity creates a broad set of new challenges for law and regulation.  For instance, complexity may confound the efforts of regulators to monitor financial markets for systemic risk or to erect rules to prevent or mitigate that risk.  Similarly, it can frustrate the capacity of law to promote more informed consumer and investor protection tools such as disclosure or financial literacy education. Increasing complexity also raises new challenges about the optimal modes of regulation: according to some, it demands greater reliance on regulatory approaches such as self-governance or "new governance," while others argue that it may counter-intuitively necessitate simpler and blunter rules.   Finally, market and firm complexity complicates the targets of regulation, which now consists not only of banks, insurers and broker-dealers, but also shadow banks, hedge funds, and participants in derivatives markets.

 

10:15 - 10:30 a.m.                                                                                         

Refreshment Break                                                                                       

 

10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

 

Modern Regulatory Approaches

 

Historically, scholars have studied law and regulation within a particular substantive area, such as banking, corporate, insurance, or securities regulation. However, modern regulatory approaches frequently require knowledge of multiple topics and raise challenges that cut across different areas of legal study. These two concurrent sessions will feature four approaches to understanding modern regulation, each led by a scholar whose work has been focused in the area. 

 

Regulatory arbitrage and cost-benefit analysis are issues that cut across many areas of modern regulation. Many costly rules create incentives for parties to transact in ways that are economically equivalent, but lead to differential regulatory treatment. Both regulators and courts increasingly are required to, and do, use cost-benefit analysis to justify new regulation.

 

10:30 - 11:15 a.m.

Modern Regulatory Approaches Concurrent Session #1

Jordan M. Barry, University of San Diego School of Law (confirmed)

 

Modern Regulatory Approaches Concurrent Session #2

Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, University of Southern California Gould School of Law (confirmed)

 

11:15 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

Modern Regulatory Approaches Concurrent Session #1

Adam J. Levitin, Georgetown University Law Center (confirmed)

 

Modern Regulatory Approaches Concurrent Session #2

Dana Brakman Reiser, Brooklyn Law School (confirmed)

 

12:00 - 1:30 p.m.                                                                                             

AALS Luncheon                                                                                           

Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC

                                      

1:30 - 3:00 p.m.                                                                                              

New Frontiers: Innovation, Competition and Collaboration in International Financial Markets

Wulf Kaal, University of St. Thomas School of Law

Eric J. Pan, Associate Director, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Securities and 

Exchange Commission, Washington, DC

Roberta Romano, Yale Law School

 

Innovation and the mobility of capital have changed global financial markets in profound and consequential ways. Advances in technology and developments in the infrastructure of financial markets have engendered new levels of interconnectivity. The creation of new financial products, the increasing prominence of market participants such as private equity and hedge funds, and the birth of complex trading strategies (namely algorithmic and high-frequency trading); have permanently altered the landscape of financial markets. Operating in this new frontier, significant financial institutions face historically unparalleled vulnerabilities. The financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated the broad range of concerns that challenge government efforts to regulate financial markets.

 

Responding to the crisis, authorities propose a diverse array of regulatory reforms. For example, the U.S. Congress and regulators have adopted an aggressive and extraterritorial policy governing domestic and international over-the-counter derivatives, creating a Financial Stability Oversight Council and articulating formal processes to address the insolvency of an international financial market conglomerate. In addition, the highly debated and not-yet-finalized Volker Rule promises to reduce excessive risk taking by systemically important financial institutions and minimize the likelihood of future crises. Other countries' proposed solutions take a different tack, adopting Vickers- and Liikanen-style "ring-fencing" policies. The trend toward diversity in regulatory approaches overshadows central bankers' collaborative efforts to craft, implement and enforce the third round of Basel accords.

 

The debate over uniformity or diversity in regulation provides a forum for evaluating the merits of these various regulatory approaches and the domestic and international actors who inform the discussion. Questions arising from the debate explore the value of efforts to adopt uniform regulatory approaches; the contributions of international regulatory bodies and trade organizations such as the BIS, the G-20, and IOSCO; the benefits and shortcomings of microprudential policies governing banking institutions; and the limits that political accountability and legitimacy pose for each of the governments whose regulatory policies may heighten or mitigate the potential for future financial crises.

 

3:00 - 3:15 p.m.                                                                                              

Refreshment Break

 

3:15 - 4:45 p.m.                                                                                              

Political Dynamics Plenary Panel

Erik F. Gerding, University of Colorado School of Law
M. Todd Henderson, The University of Chicago, The Law School
Steven Ramirez, Loyola University Chicago School of Law
Hillary A. Sale, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law    

 

Financial and corporate regulation no longer fits within the comfortable regulatory silos so familiar to scholars of previous decades.  The efforts to design and implement new regulatory structures after the financial crisis are taking place in sometimes unfamiliar political cross-currents that reshape prior theories.   This plenary panel will address the political dynamics of financial and corporate law in contexts framed by a series of important questions: Have financial and corporate law become more political (e.g. the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act within 20 months of each other)?  Have the roles of courts, legislators, the president, and independent agencies changed and what should those roles be, (with the Citizens United, Business Roundtable, and American Petroleum cases as recent relevant examples)?  How has the blurred world of financial and corporate law changed? Who are the constituencies to be considered in evaluating these laws? For example, whose primacy should be our focus and is there new space for occupiers, crowds, and those pursuing social benefit enterprises?  Does globalization stress our traditional reliance on state regulation and complicate our existing theories of political economy?

 

Permalink | AALS| Corporate Law| Finance| Financial Institutions | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

Bloggers
Papers
Posts
Recent Comments
Popular Threads
Search The Glom
The Glom on Twitter
Archives by Topic
Archives by Date
August 2014
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
          1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
31            
Miscellaneous Links