A lot of (not particularly good) buzz is being made about Chris Anderson's new book, Free.  Great concept, great title, but not so good reviews. (Here's another one.)  I'm not yet persuaded to buy the book ($17 on Amazon) or read it for free online at his blog The Long Tail, but here's Anderson's Wired piece on the same topic from last year.  There are a lot of memes in the book, but the interesting part is twofold:  first, behavioral economics tell us that people react to "free" pricing in irrational ways, ways that aren't a linear path from cheap pricing.  Second, and more interesting, the business model is moving to free pricing, with recoupment of costs by other means.  What is interesting in this to me is how society becomes used to free and then is not willing to pay for things we think are actually free, but actually aren't.

For example, once a week or so, one of my Facebook friends joins some group entitled something like "Keep Facebook Free."  Yes, Facebook is "free," (provided you have a computer, interest service, etc.)  Facebook adopted the business model of generating revenue through advertising.  Except it doesn't really work, which is why the only businesses that advertise on Facebook seem to people con artists selling acai berry diets (also for "free," but that's a different story).  So, every so often, a newspaper will run an article that repeats rumors that Facebook will start charging a fee to users, and Facebook will deny the rumours.  And Facebook users go up in arms.  But imagine 15 years ago, someone telling you about a site where you could create a profile, post pictures, communicate with old friends, link to articles, etc., and I bet you wouldn't have said that no one would pay for that.  That's a lot to get for free from strangers!  Now, Facebook could adopt another model -- charging a small number of people for a "premium" Facebook, for example.  However, Facebook chose not to charge a fee for claiming a "user name," but it could have tried.  Facebook is just one example of a site that people spend hours on without paying a fee, and most without even clicking on an ad:  Twitter, YouTube, many major newspapers, etc.

Another, less hip, example is Webkinz, which I've blogged about before.  Webkinz was one of the first toy companies to sell you a $12 stuffed animal with a code.  Take the code to the website, and voila, you open a virtual world of fun and excitement.  For "free."  Of course, you have to buy the stuffed animal, and presumably, your rights to the site expire 12 months after you've logged on your last animal.  Because 12 months never pass between our Webkinz animal purchases, I wouldn't know, but apparently to continue your account, your "renewal" is the purchase of a new Webkinz.  At one point, I was asked my a friend to sign some petition to keep Webkinz "advertising free" when it started experimenting with ads.  The site is for kids, and advertising is evil for kids, etc.  But, advertising would also keep the website "free," or possibly keep the stuffed animals from rising in price.  No one seemed to understand that the website wasn't free.  So now, there is almost no third-party advertising, and parent scan turn off what little third-party ads there are, and users are offered a "deluxe" fee-based membership.

When I was a kid, I grew up thinking TV content was free, and so was radio content.  (Yes, you have to have a TV and a radio, etc.)  Then came cable, and then premium cable (without ads).  Now we have premium radio even.  But I think there is still a segment that believes that TV is free -- notice the outcry over switching to digital television.  Now, to young people, it might be a stretch for anyone to think that television broadcasting is free, but it used to be.  In 30 years, internet entertainment and content may also develop to a point where most people pay for content, and the days of all content being free in return for advertising attention may seem like a relic of the past as well.  Some things have moved in the opposite direction -- phones in the 1970s were rented from Bell at an exorbitant price, then purchased for a reasonable price, and now a lot of cell phones are free.  Except that phones are beginning to be more than phones, and now cost more, like the iPhone.  Chris Anderson thinks we are all moving to the zero price; I wonder if he's wrong.

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Today and tomorrow, I'll be part of the Penn Program on Regulation's conference on Import Safety: Governance Challenges in the Global Economy. Ensuring that food, drugs, and consumer goods are safe is all over the news, a matter of international import, and a vexing challenge for regulators.  Hopefully the conference will make [at least] a small difference in addressing a big problem.  We've got attendees coming from New Zealand, France, Canada, China, and Brazil, as well as across the United States, and you'll want to save your pennies for the book following the conference that will come out in the fall, co-edited by Cary Coglianese, Adam Finkel, and yours truly.

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Unless you live under a rock, you know by now that President Obama has unveiled the latest proposal to help homeowners who cannot keep up with their mortgage payments and have little or no equity in their homes.  These homeowners are on the brink of default, which has negative effects not only on themselves and their families, but also on mortgage holders and their bondholders, neighborhoods, surrounding home owners, local taxing authorities, and more.  Obviously, the solution to this problem is not coming easy to anyone, and we've bounced around ideas on supporting various parties in an effort to save the real estate market from collapsing.

Much pressure has come to "help the homeowners."  The transaction costs of foreclosure, eviction and relocation are hard on everyone, but particularly the defaulting homeowners.  But in trying to help the homeowners, no one will be made happy:

You can't help all the homeowners.  This NYT editorial complains because the plan won't help homeowners who really can't afford their houses or who won't be able to afford them for long, even with a modification.  This NYT article complains that the plan will only help homeowners in severe trouble, not those with underwater mortgages who can still make their payments.  In any environment of scarcity, we must triage, so it seems rational to help those that can be helped with the most success.  I'm not sure how the government can (or should) help someone stay in a house that is unaffordable long-term or help someone who overpaid for a house they can afford.

More importantly, you can't make all homeowners happy.  People who can make their mortgage payments (or who don't have any, you lucky guys), aren't all that happy paying the mortgages of those who can't.  Rightly or wrongly, we're historically not the kind of country that likes to pool resources of those that made good decisions to help out those that made bad decisions.  So the above-water homeowners and the underwater homeowners are in tension here.

You can't make the pro-bank people happy.  We seem to like to compare the costs of forced mortgage modification to a mortgage lender with the prospects of the mortgage being paid off according to the contract.  Obviously, the mortgage lender is worse off.  Whether the mortgage lender is better off with the transaction costs of foreclosure and auction or a forced mortgage modification does not seem to be part of the debate.  See my friend Todd Zywicki's op-ed in the WSJ.  Some argue that if the modification would make the mortgage lender better off, then modifications would be happening already.  Others argue that the securitizations of mortgages make this almost impossible.  And others point out that modifications are more likely to end in eventual default anyway -- see here and the first point that you can't help all homeowners.

So, some very smart and able people have been trying to come up with a politically acceptable solution for quite awhile now.  I am going to take a stab at this myself, but from the standpoint of helping "home-debtors," not "homeowners."  The problem is that we have people who owe more than they can possibly pay back under any workable plan, and no one is willing to purchase the pledged collateral in any amount to pay off this debt.  The debtor has very little incentive and possibly no ability to pay off the debt over and above the value of the collateral, and the lender really doesn't want the collateral anyway.  If this were ordinary debt, there would be factoring and discounts and write-offs that were compensated by the higher rate of interest charged.  But here what is causing the problem, what is creating the negative externalities is (1) the illiquidity of the collateral, which is causing havoc to the market for that collateral and (2) the externalities of displacing the debtor.  For example, if the debt were a car loan and the collateral a used car, the car would be repossessed and sold into the used car market.  Used car loans are high because of this possibility, and repossessions are expected.  But houses are not cars.  So, let's come up with a plan that focuses on (1) and (2).  Here is a shot in the dark:

Take this money we have allotted and give grants to entities that will purchase these near-foreclosure houses.  These entities could be federal agencies or private entities (we'll call these "real estate trusts" or RETs).  That discussion is tabled for now.  The RETs would purchase the properties at appraised value, which may be greater than a lender would get at auction.  As part of the purchase, the homedebtor agrees to rent the property for a certain number of years from the RET.  The homedebtor doesn't have to move, relocate their families, change schools.  The neighborhood doesn't suffer from foreclosure ripple effects or houses sitting vacant or "for sale."  Now, the homedebtor isn't really a homeowner anymore, but they really weren't anyway.  They had no equity in a home they paid a mortgage for every month.  The stupid saying renters pay their landlords every month but owners pay themselves didn't apply here.  The homedebtor was paying the mortgage holders.  So, we are requiring both the homeowner to pay for its bad decision a little bit and the mortgage holder to pay for its bad decision a little bit.  Now the RETs won't want to hold these houses forever, so we could set up a system to allow the now homerenters to try to purchase the house several years down the road, possibly with tax credits earned through timely rental payments each year, etc.  Of course, this plan would cost a lot upfront.  However, the federal government should be able to see some income from the purchase of these assets, unlike some other troubled assets we've seen.  By controlling the supply of these 4 million foreclosed houses, then hopefully the houses could be sold over time as real estate markets recover.  And, the rental payments should be good for something.  This plan is just a suggestion of one that would keep the rewards for moral hazard down and de-mythologize homeownership out of the equation.

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The W$J has a feature on the death of Lehman Brothers. Lots of nuggets in this story, including this description of the last Lehman board meeting:

A more somber scene was playing out at Lehman. Directors, who had been camped at the Midtown offices all day, gathered at around 8 p.m. in the firm's board room. Weil lawyers and Lehman executives summarized the Fed meeting to the frustrated board.

"They bailed out Bear," said Roland Hernandez, the former CEO of Spanish-language TV network Telemundo and a longtime Lehman board member. "Why not us?"

One of Mr. Fuld's assistants broke in to hand him a note: The SEC chairman wanted to address Lehman's board by speakerphone.

Mr. Cox, criticized for his allegedly minor role in the government's bailout of Bear Stearns, had been reluctant to call Lehman. The SEC chief finally called from the New York Fed, surrounded by several staffers, at the urging of Mr. Paulson, the Treasury secretary.

"This is serious," said Mr. Cox. "The board has a grave matter before it," he said.

John D. McComber, a former president of the Export-Import Bank and a Lehman director for 14 years, asked: "Are you directing us to authorize" a bankruptcy filing?

The SEC chief muted his phone. A minute later, he came back on the line. "You have a grave responsibility and you need to act accordingly," he replied.

As the meeting wrapped up around 10 p.m., Mr. Fuld, his suit jacket now off, leaned back in his chair. "I guess this is goodbye," he said. Lehman would file about four hours later.

Chris Cox has been criticized for his inaction in the face of disaster, and that telephone call is emblematic of his approach to the crisis: enter the scene after the damage has been done and observe that things are really bad. What was the point of that call, anyway?

Last week Cox defended his passivity:

What we have done in this current turmoil is stay calm, which has been our greatest contribution -- not being impulsive, not changing the rules willy-nilly, but going through a very professional and orderly process that takes into account unintended consequences and gives ample notice to market participants.

So ... the last months could have been even worse without your steady hand? Is that seriously the argument?

It would be unfair to lay all of the problems with the SEC at the feet of Chris Cox, but let's just say that I am looking forward to seeing what Mary Schapiro can do with the agency.

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So, it's official that we are in a recession, but I feel oddly conflicted about this.  I have more job security than most, being tenured, etc., but I know there's something going on in those 401(k) and 529 plan statements that keep coming in the mail that's pretty bad.  But, I'm not retiring or sending anyone to college soon, so I'm keeping an optimistic outlook.  But the paper is all about people being laid off, fired, losing insurance, and generally being very vulnerable to the economic downturn and its ripple effects.

So, in the spirit of counting blessings, here are some of the silver linings out there, if silver linings count for much in a zero-sum game:

1.  The holidays seem to be 30-50% off the regular retail price.  If you're buying anything full price this year and it's not hot off the manufacturing floor, then you're not trying hard enough.  Every day I get an email from one of my favorite retailers telling me that I can save 30% off everything for 3 days only.  Then, in three days, I get another email telling me the same thing.  And I don't have to go anywhere at 4 a.m. to get that deal.

2.  Shipping seems to be free.  Again, if you're paying to have anything shipped, it better get there tomorrow or you're not trying hard enough.  Every day I get a "free shipping, today only!" email.  Then I get another one the next day.

3.  If I wanted to buy a house (and hopefully I don't own one already), I might soon be able to lock in at 4.5%.  (??!!??).  Yes, that's not much of a bargain today as Treasuries seem to be paying slightly above zero percent interest, but in 10 years or so, someone will be arbitraging quite nicely (hopefully).  Yes, I understand that first-time buyers might just prefer to let the prices fall instead of having prices propped up by easy financing, but you can't ask for everything in this mixed bag, I guess. 

So, the recession may be bad if you're my parents, who might like to retire sooner rather than later, but if you're in your mid-20s, have a job, and want to buy a house and maybe a lot of home electronics this Christmas, you're in luck!

Also, this seems to be the perfect economic environment to get everyone interested in a radical rethinking of the holidays, like The Advent Conspiracy.  (Watch the video -- if you aren't moved, then your heart is at least 2 1/2 sizes too small.)

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Going to the gas station is such a pleasure these days, which is exactly the wrong way to think about low gasoline prices, according to Allan Sloan, who wants us to  "jack them up, sharply, by adopting a big honking tax on gasoline." This part of his argument is highly entertaining:

Unless we can summon the political will to slap a big tax on gasoline, we'll be setting ourselves up for the next spike in oil prices. History shows that there will be a spike, whether it comes from a world economic recovery or a terrorist strike against oil facilities or something else that we can't predict.

So ... unless we jack up gas prices, we will be setting ourselves up for a big increase in gas prices!

I realize that there is more to the idea than just this silly argument, but the other arguments seem pretty silly to me, too. Like the one where Sloan suggests that he would "let the market ... guided by a high gas tax ... rule." The market Sloan has in mind is the one that produces  high-mileage vehicles and lots of customers to buy them. Even if the federal government has to create that market with a "big honking tax on gasoline."

In fairness, nothing about oil and gasoline seems to resemble a functioning market. Remember when we were speculating about $200/barrel oil earlier this year? Oil is now selling for $54/barrel. Of course, Saudi Arabia thinks that's too low because it would rather get a higher price. Here is how we arrive at the new "fair price" of $75/barrel:

Saudi oil minister, Ali Naimi, argued [in Cairo this weekend] that oil prices should be around $20 a barrel higher than they are now. Mr. Naimi's remarks represented an unusual departure for Saudi Arabia, which has long avoided the appearance of trying to set the price of oil. Saudi King Abdullah also used the $75-a-barrel price tag in an interview on Saturday with a Kuwaiti newspaper. Other OPEC ministers quickly seized on the $75 target, saying that current prices were too low to sustain needed investments in oil exploration and production in higher-cost areas.

The big question is whether the OPEC countries can actually pull off a price maintenance strategy. Even if they succeed, $75 sounds a lot better to me than $150 or $200, unless Allan Sloan gets his way, in which case it won't make any difference.

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Everyone seems to be linking to Tyler Cowen for thoughts on Paul Krugman's Nobel Prize in Economics. Tyler offers a nice summary of Krugman's accomplishments and a nifty pocket interpretation of the award: "This was definitely a 'real world' pick and a nod in the direction of economists who are engaged in policy analysis and writing for the broader public." That's the sort of thing you can use at a cocktail party.

I don't have much to add, other than the fact that I used to read Krugman's books. In fact, I was reading Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations when I decided to become an academic. My wife saw me reading the book and asked about it. When I told her what it was, she said something like, "you need to become a law professor." Or maybe that's just what I heard. Maybe she really said, "you are a geek."

Anyway, Krugman was fun to read back then. I find his NYT columns less interesting because I don't enjoy reading overtly political commentary as much as veiled political commentary.

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EESA is a week old and already irrelevant--or at least the TARP part where the Treasury is supposed to be buying up bad mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.  As world markets continue to tumble, it's clear that EESA has had little positive impact on bank lending or market confidence.  We always knew that buying up bad bank assets was only an indirect way to pump up bank capital.  Now, it looks like more drastic measures are afoot.

Yesterday, central banks coordinated emergency interest rate cuts in an attempt to spur lending globally.  The Treasury is now considering 3 aggressive moves to get bank lending back on track: 

1.  injecting capital directly into banks by buying equity stakes  ;

2.  guaranteeing interbank debt; and

3.  extending deposit insurance to all bank deposits. 

The interbank debt guaranty is a UK proposal, where such a guaranty is being implemented.  The move to buy equity stakes raises strong doubts as to the efficacy of last week's plan to buy up mortgage assets.  Existing EESA authorization is likely broad enough to encompass purchase of bank equity stakes.  EESA's definition of "troubled assets"--authorized to be purchased under TARP--includes "any other financial instrument that the Secretary . . . determines . . . is necessary to promote financial stability."

Keep your fingers crossed.

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Yesterday the Federal Reserve agreed to provide AIG with an additional loan for up to $37.8 billion to help improve the liquidity of its securities lending business.  This amount is in addition to the $85 billion loan from the Fed, $61 billion of which has apparently already been drawn down by AIG.  On the one hand, the additional loan to AIG is just another in a series of steps aimed at trying to shore up troubled companies.  On the other hand, its timing has sparked renewed concern and outrage on the part of the public.  This is because the new loan came just one day after Congress expressed its own outrage and frustration with AIG executives not only for their seeming refusal to admit any wrongdoing, but also for spending some $440,000 on a retreat just days after the federal bailout—called "pretty despicable" by the White House press secretary.  The Washington Post blog is filled with comments about AIG, and the comments are almost uniform in their stinging criticism.  There were at least two overarching concerns captured by the comments.

First, commentators suggested that the Fed’s decision appears to confirm the public’s suspicion that government will provide money to ailing companies without being willing or able to hold management accountable.  Thus, many comments consisted of complaints that, instead of seeking ways to hold management accountable for what Congress viewed as improper behavior, the act of providing additional funding appeared to be rewarding them or at the very least not sanctioning such behavior. As one post noted, “the AIG Executives are probably saying to themselves, ‘what is Congress going to do to us, nothing.’” In this regard, this issue with AIG adds to the perception not only that corporations are being bailed out for their own mistakes, but also that corporate executives feel free to make those mistakes without any fear of repercussions.  To be sure, AIG offered many reasons for their decision to host the retreat.  Apparently the retreat had been planned before the bailout and was aimed at rewarding independent life insurance agents for their successes.  Then too, an AIG spokesperson pointed out that the retreat was important because it rewarded those aspects of AIG that were self-sustaining, thereby increasing the likelihood that they would remain healthy.  Hence, AIG executives did offer some business justifications for the retreat.  Moreover, there may be no connection between the retreat, the companies need for additional cash, and the government's decision to provide that cash.  Yet when viewed together, the decisions feed into the public’s perception that their tax money will be lent to executives who will not be held accountable.

Second, as one person put it, “this is exactly what the taxpayers were concerned about . . . life as usual for the Wall Street executives while we, on Main Street and other streets, suffer the consequences.”  This comment captures two sentiments.  The first is the concern that these kinds of retreats represent standard business practices, even though many—though not all—of those who commented on such practices found them to be problematic.  The second is the concern that such practices will remain unchanged despite the fact that many in the public will have to make changes in their way of life.  Indeed, it seemed that even those who recognized that it may be appropriate to reward people for their service to the corporation had problems with such a reward coming on the heels of an $85 billion bailout.  Initially an AIG spokesperson indicated that several AIG firms planned to go ahead with other social and business events, and pointed out that these kinds of events happen all the time.   His comments sparked outrage because they seemed to confirm the public’s fear that they would be asked or required to tighten their belts without any corresponding tightening on the part of executives.

To be sure, AIG’s CEO said that he would be “reevaluating” the costs of all operations "in light of the new circumstances" underwhich the company would be operating, and in fact apparently AIG now has canceled another scheduled retreat.  Nevertheless, this back and forth with AIG feeds into the generally negative public perception about the bailout, its implementation, and those in charge of that implementation, making it that much harder to restore confidence.

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In a true "sign of the times," the national debt clock, which sits in Times Square and keeps tabs on the national debt level, has to be replaced because it has maxed out--that is, it does not have enough digits to capture our national debt level because that level has passed the 10 trillion dollar mark.  The plan is to install a new debt clock that can calculate our debt up to a quadrillion dollars.  That would be 1 plus 15 zeros or one thousand million million dollars.  A number that is almost incomprehensible.  And yet the change is symbolic not only of the difficulties we face with keeping track of our growing and staggering debt obligations, but also of the manner in which this current economic crisis will impact our future. 

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Central banks around the world -- even China! -- are cutting interest rates. So what exactly is supposed to happen now?

Bankrate senior financial analyst Greg McBride has a nice analysis of the implications of the rate cut for consumers. His bottom line: this hurts savers (lower CD rates) and doesn't incite new borrowing, but helps some people who have an adjustable rate mortgage. Hmm.

Most of the talk about the rate cut looks like this from Don Rissmiller, of Strategas Research Partners in New York: "A coordinated rate cut is symbolic as much as anything else. It's the most traditional tool that central banks have at their disposal, its readily understood by everyone in the markets, and by deploying it, they therefore hope to instill confidence."

Instill confidence. That is the mantra. Watch David Wessel of the WSJ ...

So if everyone believes that the rate cut is mostly symbolic, why would we think that it should instill confidence?

No need to answer that. It's a rhetorical question. Just note that the rate cut didn't stop markets around the world from sliding further. FT sums it up nicely: "Markets shrug off rate cut."

UPDATE: I posted this, went to get some lunch, and came back to find that the market has done an about face. CNBC commentators are speculating that stock traders are seeing some hopeful signs in the credit markets.

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So Warren Buffett has decided to invest in Goldman, to the tune of $5 billion for the purchase of preferred shares and warrants to purchase up to an additional $5 billion in common shares.  While there is certainly lots of things going on in the markets right now, it is interesting to ponder what that investment means.

It seems like a tremendous vote of confidence in Goldman, and in fact prompted others to invest some $5 billion in the company.  Though Business Week cautions that the deal is “hardly a glowing statement about Goldman’s health and upbeat prospects,” and warns that the company is likely to face years of financial trouble.

It also could be viewed as a revelation that private investors actually can help boost the financial markets, and hence maybe the investment undermines the notion that we need government intervention.  And yet in a CNBC interview, Buffett admitted that he would not have been willing to invest in Goldman if he didn’t believe that some government help was on the way, calling such help “absolutely necessary” to “avoid going over the precipice.”  So in this regard it may be a signal that government intervention is necessary to encourage private help. Moreover, Buffett’s decision appears to confirm what we have been hearing from the feds—that broader and more sweeping intervention is necessary, even for companies otherwise able to attract private funds.

The decision also appears to say something about Goldman’s management.  Indeed, Buffett admitted that other entities have asked for his financial help, but he has declined.  So why Goldman when he has steered clear of others?  Buffett said it was the right price with the right terms.  But that wasn’t all it took for him to step forward.  He also said it was the “right people,” suggesting that he trusted Goldman’s management in a way that he did not trust the management of other companies, particularly those who seemed incapable of making a realistic assessment of the risk they were facing. 

As Gordon points out, this issue of trust is important, and a nagging question with the bailout plan is, if we give companies billions of dollars, how do we trust that they have the leadership and governance apparatus to navigate their way out of their financial crisis?  In other words, how do we find or make sure that they are the “right people”?

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Like Usha, I have been trying to puzzle through what the executive compensation provision of the new bailout/rescue bill really means and how it will work in practice.  Although part of the problem may be that its precise contours continue to evolve.  Indeed, in an interview with CNBC tonight, Barney Frank, chair of the House Financial Services Committee, indicated that while there would be no dollar limits on executive compensation, he was fighting hard to make sure that the bill would at least ensure that shareholders get a say on pay and that there would absolutely be no golden parachutes.  To be sure, these are the kinds of provisions that long have been advocated by shareholder advocates and the public, but it is not clear if they will serve to curb the kind of rising executive compensation packages that concern many.  Though perhaps people will view it as a step in the right direction. 

And even as I puzzle through these issues, what is not a puzzle to me is the apparent growing consensus that the bill needs to address executive compensation in some manner.  Of course because things are still evolving, it is still possible that the executive compensation issue will not be a part of the legislation.  And yet even Paulson now has indicated that the new legislation must address the executive compensation issue. 

As I mentioned, this kind of growing consensus should not be surprising.  Indeed, as an initial matter, executive compensation has been a hot button issue for some time, especially when it seems like executives are being rewarded while shareholders and tax payers suffer.  So it is little wonder that this would be an issue on the forefront of people's mind.  Second, unlike the complex nature of mortgage-backed securities, credit default swaps, and other financial instruments, it is likely that the public views the executive compensation issue as relatively straightforward, and hence a relatively easy piece of the legislation (or hole in the legislation) upon which to focus their attention.  Third, given how long the business community and other sectors have grappled with how best to curb rising executive pay and prevent inappropriate pay packages, there is no reason to think that the issue would have been addressed post-legislation or otherwise in some other context.  Hence this may have presented the perfect opportunity for those who have long pushed for some federal legislation in this area. 

Again, it is not clear what kind of impact the provisions on executive compensation will have, and it is also not clear that such provisions will even make it into the final bill.  But it does seem clear that the issue of executive compensation and the seeming failure to address that issue resonates with many people, and hence could play a central role in their perception of the validity of the bailout plan.

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The government bailout of Fannie and Freddie is big news, and while you're digesting what has happened and what you think about it, let me point you to the following takes:

• Did Paulson kill Frannie?  Sorkin and Salmon weigh in.
• The WSJ's fantastic - and very old-style-WSJ - tick tock
• .Remember the legal authority Paulson got to take over Frannie?  Well, he said he wouldn't use it.  Chris Dodd's reaction: "“We accepted him at his word that all he needed was the authority and that he wasn’t going to exercise it. Then he used his authority very aggressively."  What we may have here, my friends, is an interbranch disagreement.
• It's still true that bailout ground rules are sorely needed.
• Frannie fooled famous investors like Bill Miller (and economists like DeLong, I might add).  And Miller's "cool it, guys" strategy sounded kind of convincing to me.
• Radar provides a guide for the perplexed.

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In case you've been wondering where you should spend that last bit of your conference budget, we'd like to note that the American Association of Wine Economists hits attractive spots in the US and Europe every year.  They've got a name-brand president in Orly Ashenfelter, a board of heavy hitters and wine-region academics (one of whom calls the society "the definition of tenure"), a journal, and a terrible website.

Every industry presents some interesting case studies, I figure.  But I think lawyers, allegedly big institutionalists, haven't institutionalized societies to study sports, movies, cuisine, and so on the way that other social scientists have.  What are the implications for interdisciplinarity, I wonder?

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