I am attending the Economics Bloggers Forum 2012 today at the Kauffman Foundation. You can get a progam and live stream here. Cool event, as is the norm with Kauffman and Bob Litan.
UPDATE: The Kauffman sketchbook series is fun. We just watched "I'm a blogger" featuring Tyler Cowen. Nice.
On Sunday, the NYT published a long, front-page story that is getting a lot of attention, Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend On It. The article has a lot of interesting facts, like the amount of spending on government entitlement programs has skyrocketed, but those dollars are going less and less (as a percentage) to the lowest fifth of the population. Relatedly, though surveys show that most Americans believe that the programs that are growing the fastest are for the poor, these programs are not growing at all, except for Medicaid. And, the program that is growing the fastest is Medicare.
But the article wants to point out what it seems to see as a hypocrisy: that people who are arguing that government should be smaller, and voting their concerns, are beneficiaries of these programs. So, folks that argue that government should cut spending to the poor are taking advantage of free lunch programs and getting disability checks, Social Security and Medicare. The article seems to think that this irony is the result of some sort of "except me" selfishness or cognitive dissonance. If the latter is the case, then voters are surely not voting their interests, and next year they will wake up and realize that they can't make ends meet any more because they can't qualify for free lunch or their unemployment checks were much smaller. And then, of course, it's too late to re-cast your vote. The article seems to hold up these people as sort-of ignorant victims of Tea Party rhetoric who maybe shouldn't deserve to vote.
But, there could be alternative theories. It could be that a voter doesn't think that some of these programs should be funded by the government. But they are. So, if I can't control how that money is being spent, then it's in my interest to take advantage of the program until the program is ended. So, I may think that our summer research grants are too large (obviously a hypothetical) or that our teaching load is too small (again, just go with me). But, I'm not in a position to change either of those, so I might as well take the summer money and teach the prescribed load. But, if a Dean candidate came through saying that she would reduce summer grants and increase the teaching load (this candidate has become extinct due to evolution), then I wouldn't be a hypocrite or a creature of cognitive dissonance to vote for that candidate. Now, I have known a few people who turn down free government services they otherwise qualify for because they can pay their own way (special needs services for children, for example). But these folks are few and far between, I think.
No one in the article seems to articulate that "ride the wave" type of thinking (at least how the article is written), but some do seem to fit into the category of "I spent my life thinking I could count on Social Security and Medicare, and now I depend on it. But I do think the government should make cuts so as not to overburden the youth. But any cuts to my income would be devastating because I was counting on those." I don't think that's hypocritical or cognitive dissonance; that's just realistic pragmatism.
The 2011 symposium edition of the Berkeley Business Law Journal on Dodd-Frank is out. I would like to thank the editors and the Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy for inviting me to a great conference. My contribution, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s Missing Macroeconomic Dimension is now up on ssrn. Here is the abstract:
Of all OTC derivatives, credit derivatives pose particular concerns because of their ability to generate leverage that can increase liquidity - or the effective money supply - throughout the financial system. Credit derivatives and the leverage they create thus do much more than increase the fragility of financial institutions and increase counterparty risk. By increasing leverage and liquidity, credit derivatives can fuel rises in asset prices and even asset price bubbles. Rising asset prices can then mask mistakes in the pricing of credit derivatives and in assessments of overall leverage in the financial system. Furthermore, the use of credit derivatives by financial institutions can contribute to a cycle of leveraging and deleveraging in the economy.
This Article argues for viewing many of the policy responses to credit derivatives, such as requirements that these derivatives be exchange traded, centrally cleared, or otherwise subject to collateral or 'margin' requirements, in a second, macroeconomic dimension. These rules have the potential to change – or at least better measure – the amount of liquidity and the supply of credit in financial markets and in the 'real' economy. By examining credit derivatives, this Article illustrates the need to see a wide array of financial regulations in a macroeconomic context.
Understanding credit derivatives’ macroeconomic effects has implications for macroprudential regulatory design. First, regulations that address financial institution leverage offer central bankers new tools to dampen inflation in asset markets and to fight potential asset price bubbles. Second, even if these regulations are not used primarily as monetary or macroeconomic levers, changes in these regulations, including changes in the effectiveness of these regulations due to regulatory arbitrage, can have profound macroeconomic effects. Third, the macroeconomic dimension of credit derivative regulation and other financial regulation argues for greater coordination between prudential regulation and macroeconomic policy.
Comments by e-mail are always welcome.
Originally, I was hoping to start this post with a link to some research a colleague and I just completed that discusses how lenders may be overestimating property values prior to foreclosure. But it has not made it through formatting and on to the web yet, so I will instead share the findings with you.
In this research we find that lenders may be overestimating property values prior to foreclosure in weak housing submarkets. (By “lender” I mean banks servicing their own loans or securitized loans.) We find evidence of overestimating values by looking at the difference between the sale price at foreclosure auction (in this case the lender’s reserve/minimum bid) and the subsequent sale price of the home out of REO in submarkets in Cuyahoga County, OH (home to Cleveland). As the housing market gets weaker, the gap between those two sale prices grows. We also find that lenders’ value estimates may be dramatically improved by incorporating a few simple factors such as the age of the home and the poverty level in the home’s census tract. So we would expect lenders to pick up on this at some point and adjust their models accordingly. But we don’t see that happening. There are three possible explanations I can think of, though I welcome others.
First, lenders may not be overestimating the value at all. The price they pay for property may represent bidding in accord with an Ohio law that automatically sets the minimum bid at the first foreclosure auction, rather than waiting for subsequent auctions when the minimum bid can be adjusted. The way Cuyahoga County interprets this law, prior to foreclosure the County pays for a drive-by or walk-around appraisal. The initial minimum bid is set at two thirds of that appraisal. (If anyone can think of a good reason for this law, please share in the comments.) If no one bids at the first auction, the lender can lower the minimum bid at subsequent auctions. Anecdotally, bankers report credit-bidding their judgment to meet the minimum bid to obtain control of, and begin marketing, the property.
Automatically placing the minimum bid may be routine for bankers, but it probably does not always payoff: we find that the worst 25% of REO property sells for less than half of its minimum bid, if it sells in the quarter it is taken into REO. If it stays in REO for four quarters, it sells for less than 10% of its minimum bid. If the property’s minimum bid was $50,000 (remember, this is the worst 25% of property taken into REO), the lender recovers $5,000 before the broker’s commission, maintenance, taxes, and transfer costs. It is unclear why lenders would be in such a rush to obtain such low-quality properties if they were valuing them correctly.
The next two explanations differ from the first, because they assume that lenders are actually bidding at or close to their estimated value of the property. The second explanation may be that the methods used to value property just don’t work well in weak submarkets, and lenders’ valuation models are not correcting for that. It is not hard to imagine that a walk-around appraisal is a reasonably accurate way to value most property in most markets. If brokers want to find non-foreclosure sales to use as comparables, they have to reach back further in time in weak markets than they do in others, so the prices they use are more likely to be stale. Walk-around appraisals may also miss interior damage(stripped copper pipe and wire, appliances, etc.) that properties are more likely to have suffered in weak markets.
The third possible explanation is that lenders are shifting accounting losses from loan portfolios to REO portfolios. This could be accomplished by using the inflated estimated value to prevent recognizing losses on the loan, and instead writing down the value in the REO portfolio. There are two potential benefits to this. The first is that capital markets tend to pay more attention to loan portfolio performance than REO portfolio performance. The second benefit is that most solvency tests for banks focus on loan portfolio performance metrics, and pay little or no attention to REO portfolio performance. So shifting these losses could potentially make lenders look healthier and more attractive than they actually are.
Any way you slice it large REO portfolios are bad for banks and communities. One way to reduce the size of these portfolios is to lower foreclosure auction reserves, increasing the chance that others will purchase the property at auction instead of it becoming REO. If there is no market for the property, then donation to a land bank or similar entity may be the answer.
Since the mid-2000s, researchers have been studying the impact of foreclosures on surrounding property values. A colleague and I recently finished an important contribution to this line of research. Anyone attempting to craft responses to the housing market's current woes, particularly efforts to stabilize neighborhoods and home values, should give two of our results serious consideration.
First, our findings suggest that most prior studies overstate the impact that foreclosures have on surrounding property values. The reason they overstate the impact of foreclosures is that they don't take into account long term vacancy or property abandonment even though vacancy and abandoned property also drive down surrounding property values (either by adding units of supply or dis-amenities, depending on the vacant home or abandoned property's condition). In our study, we include measures of all three (both individually and collectively) and we find (in Table 10 on p.42, for those interested) that when you only measure one of the three factors that drive down housing values, you overstate the influence of the factor you are measuring. This result is important because it tells us that foreclosures do not decrease surrounding property values as much as previous studies suggest, and that attempts to stabilize markets should address vacancy and abandonment in addition to foreclosure.
Second, and more importantly, we illustrate how foreclosure, vacancy, and abandonment have differential impacts on weak housing markets relative to average housing markets. (The following information summarizes Tables 12-14.) When we subdivide Cuyahoga County's (home to Cleveland) housing markets by strength, we see huge differences. In the markets that more closely approximate the average market in the US, we see what prior research and theory would predict: foreclosures, vacancies, and abandoned housing all substantially lower surrounding home values. In these markets, long-term vacancy and property abandonment are not as common or as problematic as foreclosure.
But in weaker sub markets, things are strikingly different: long term vacant homes and abandoned properties drive down prices more than foreclosures, and are more common than they are in normal markets. Part of what drives this result is that lenders are attempting (and usually succeeding) to selectively foreclose on the "best-of-the-worst:" properties that have some prospect of resale because they are in the best neighborhoods in weak housing sub markets.
Understanding the relationship between foreclosure and abandonment is tricky: in weak markets, foreclosure accelerates abandonment, but does not appear to cause it. Foreclosed properties are sometimes abandoned, for example when lenders foreclose on a property that turns out to be among the worst-of-the-worst, they sell it to a property speculator that usually abandons it. But abandonment is really driven by long-term population loss that resulted in an oversupply of housing relative to demand. Plenty of property has been vacant long term or abandoned but has not been through a foreclosure recently.
The fact that vacancy and abandonment are bigger problems in weak housing markets than foreclosure is not surprising to those that have studied, worked, or lived in these markets. People with no experience with weak housing markets often overlook the problems of vacancy and abandonment, instead focusing on foreclosure. It is critical for policymakers to understand the differences between average and weak housing markets because the best tools for stabilizing housing in them differ. Weak markets need subsidies for the removal of vacant or abandoned homes, and less funding for rehabilitation. Likewise, proposals to move REO to rental property might not be as wise in weak markets as they are in average or stronger markets.
There are some promising local practices, such as modern land banking and low-value REO donation accompanied by per-property demolition grants that will help correct this supply/demand imbalance. Still, I personal think it would be better in the long run if policymakers paid more attention to right-sizing weak housing markets, and less to subsidizing rehab and new construction in them.
This post is a summary of a working paper the two of us finished recently, available here.
There are numerous discussions taking place about the future of housing finance, most focusing on the secondary market. The central themes in theses discussions have been the government's future role in secondary markets and restarting private secondary markets. But one area that is not receiving much attention is the potential liability of either the entities that arrange securitizations or the trusts (the assignees) that end up owning loans, for unlawful acts at loan origination.
During the housing boom, everyone seemed to think that assignees were shielded from the consequences of lenders' illegal acts. It appears that the market assumed that the holder in due course (HDC) rule(which protects note purchasers from most defenses to non-payment on notes) and originators' loan repurchase obligations through representations and warranties would take care of assignee liability risk. These turned out to be pretty bad assumptions. Originator repurchase obligations are only effective if the originator is still around to repurchase loans, which has been the case less and less frequently through the crisis.
In addition, assignees are not protected from liability by the HDC rule unless the notes are negotiable instruments, and the buyers and sellers of the notes observed the formalities necessary to obtain the rules protection. As we have seen with the shoddy foreclosure documentation, the industry ignored fundamental formalities and undermined the HDC shield.
The more interesting point is that many securitization arrangers may find themselves exposed to liability for the illegal actions of originators based on theories such as joint venture. Such claims have survived summary judgment motions when the arrangers prospectively agreed to purchase all or some of the loans originators made, and the arrangers had some knowledge of the originators' illegal acts. Arrangers could often glean information on lenders and their loan practices through due diligence, media reports, and informal information sharing in vertically-integrated firms (the last being very difficult to prove). Arrangers have also exposed themselves to liability by actually supplying deceptive disclosures and payment schedules to originators, who then provided the documents to borrowers.
So far, consumer claims against securitization arrangers have been rare and most have been settled, but this trend may reverse. Now that litigators and judges better understand the organization of the private label securities markets, these claims may have sturdier footing and judges and juries may be more sympathetic to consumers.
Uncertainty is clearly the theme when it comes to both assignee and arranger liability. This uncertainty impedes accurate pricing of MBS, especially given the potential for claims by attorneys general, large class actions, and widespread borrower rescission of loans. Policy-makers that want to stimulate the secondary market need to address the legal complexity that causes uncertainty (among other things). Going forward, the simplest solution is to create incentives for the market to police itself, by allowing assignee and arranger liability for originator wrongdoing. The next step should be to set parameters for arranger and assignee liability to allow it to be quantified and priced into credit. Together these actions will sanction future bad actors, protect consumers, and help the MBS market by making it possible to price litigation risk.
Time Magazine’s “person of the year” is the “protestor.” Occupy Wall Street’s participants have generated discussion unprecedented in recent years about the role of corporations and their executives in society. The movement has influenced workers and unemployed alike around the world and has clearly shaped the political debate.
But how does a corporation really act? Doesn’t it act through its people? And do those people behave like the members of the homo economicus species acting rationally, selfishly for their greatest material advantage and without consideration about morality, ethics or other people? If so, can a corporation really have a conscience?
In her book Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People, Lynn Stout, a corporate and securities professor at UCLA School of Law argues that the homo economicus model does a poor job of predicting behavior within corporations. Stout takes aim at Oliver Wendell Holmes’ theory of the “bad man” (which forms the basis of homo economicus), Hobbes’ approach in Leviathan, John Stuart Mill’s theory of political economy, and those judges, law professors, regulators and policymakers who focus solely on the law and economics theory that material incentives are the only things that matter.
Citing hundreds of sociological studies that have been replicated around the world over the past fifty years, evolutionary biology, and experimental gaming theory, she concludes that people do not generally behave like the “rational maximizers” that ecomonic theory would predict. In fact other than the 1-3% of the population who are psychopaths, people are “prosocial, ” meaning that they sacrifice to follow ethical rules, or to help or avoid harming others (although interestingly in student studies, economics majors tended to be less prosocial than others).
She recommends a three-factor model for judges, regulators and legislators who want to shape human behavior:
“Unselfish prosocial behavior toward strangers, including unselfish compliance with legal and ethical rules, is triggered by social context, including especially:
(1) instructions from authority
(2) beliefs about others’ prosocial behavior; and
(3) the magnitude of the benefits to others.
Prosocial behavior declines, however, as the personal cost of acting prosocially increases.”
While she focuses on tort, contract and criminal law, her model and criticisms of the homo economicus model may be particularly helpful in the context of understanding corporate behavior. Corporations clearly influence how their people act. Professor Pamela Bucy, for example, argues that government should only be able to convict a corporation if it proves that the corporate ethos encouraged agents of the corporation to commit the criminal act. That corporate ethos results from individuals working together toward corporate goals.
Stout observes that an entire generation of business and political leaders has been taught that people only respond to material incentives, which leads to poor planning that can have devastating results by steering naturally prosocial people to toward unethical or illegal behavior. She warns against “rais[ing] the cost of conscience,” stating that “if we want people to be good, we must not tempt them to be bad.”
In her forthcoming article “Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of ‘Pay for Performance,’” she applies behavioral science to incentive based-pay. She points to the savings and loans crisis of the 80's, the recent teacher cheating scandals on standardized tests, Enron, Worldcom, the 2008 credit crisis, which stemmed in part from performance-based bonuses that tempted brokers to approve risky loans, and Bear Sterns and AIG executives who bet on risky derivatives. She disagrees with those who say that that those incentive plans were poorly designed, arguing instead that excessive reliance on even well designed ex-ante incentive plans can “snuff out” or suppress conscience and create “psycopathogenic” environments, and has done so as evidenced by “a disturbing outbreak of executive-driven corporate frauds, scandals and failures.” She further notes that the pay for performance movement has produced less than stellar improvement in the performance and profitability of most US companies.
She advocates instead for trust-based” compensation arrangements, which take into account the parties’ capacity for prosocial behavior rather than leading employees to believe that the employer rewards selfish behavior. This is especially true if that reward tempts employees to engage in fraudulent or opportunistic behavior if that is the only way to realistically achieve the performance metric.
Applying her three factor model looks like this: Does the company’s messaging tell employees that it doesn’t care about ethics? Is it rewarding other people to act in the same way? And is it signaling that there is nothing wrong with unethical behavior or that there are no victims? This theory fits in nicely with the Bucy corporate ethos paradigm described above.
Stout proposes modest, nonmaterial rewards such as greater job responsibilities, public recognition, and more reasonable cash awards based upon subjective, ex post evaluations on the employee’s performance, and cites studies indicating that most employees thrive and are more creative in environments that don’t focus on ex ante monetary incentives. She yearns for the pre 162(m) days when the tax code didn’t require corporations to tie executive pay over one million dollars to performance metrics.
Stout’s application of these behavioral science theories provide guidance that lawmakers and others may want to consider as they look at legislation to prevent or at least mitigate the next corporate scandal. She also provides food for thought for those in corporate America who want to change the dynamics and trust factors within their organizations, and by extension their employee base, shareholders and the general population.
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I am grateful for Usha’s latest post about her ambivalence to law and emotions scholarship because it provides an opportunity to engage in extended public discussion about what are some of the legal payoffs to (business) law professors of learning and teaching about emotions in general and happiness in particular.
I concur with Usha that it’s a busy time of the academic year as the semester is coming to a close and many of us will soon be traveling for the holidays (and some of us have traveled to participate in conferences). Of course, most of us feel that we are if not always, then at least constantly busy. In their article titled Idleness Aversion and the Need for Justifiable Busyness, Christopher K. Hsee, Adelle X. Yang, and Liangyan Wang present experimental evdience that busier people self-report being happier. The following is a video short about how the days are long, but the years are short.
I am quite sympathetic to Usha’s opinion that while happiness research is “all fascinating and it shapes my daily choices and reaffirms (or causes me to question) my life choices. Happiness research goes to the core of myself as a person. Still I wonder: what does this have to do with law?” This is partly because her view is one that many people including myself from a couple of years ago share. As Usha pointed out, I’ve already written a number of law review articles and some peer-referred articles about law and emotions including but not limited to happiness. Rather than repeating any of those article’s themes (those interested can find all of them available here), I’ll share five concrete responses to the specific challenge that Usha issued about what are the legal implications of and payoff to emotions and happiness research.
First, much of law concerns and is about human behavior: how to discourage anti-social human behavior and encourage pro-social human behavior. In attempting to change human behavior, law is and must be predicated upon a theory of human behavior. The theory can be Oliver Wendell Holmes’ bad man or neoclassical economics’ much caricatured rational actor. Whatever that underlying theory of human behavior is that law is based upon, that theory must address human JDM (Judgment and Decision Making) because in order for the law to change human behavior the law must change the judgments and/or decisions that humans make. It just so happens there has been a recent flood of research about how emotions in general and happiness in particular influence human JDM. This research is diverse and scattered across many disciplines, including anthropology, economics, finance, neuroscience, marketing, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology. Of course, this plethora of non-legal interest and research does not have to mean there are legal implications of new understandings about how emotions and happiness shape human JDM. But at least some law professors can and should read this rapidly growing literature to digest it and see if any of it has legal implications or payoffs. Professor Emeritus and former Dean of Stanford Law School and current President of the William and Flora HEwlett Foundation, Paul Brest teaches a graduate course on JDM at Stanford University. He has co-authored with Professor of Law and Director of the Ulu Lehua Scholars Program at the William S. Richardson School of Law in Honolulu, Hawai'i and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Law and Society at the University of California, Berkeley, Linda Hamilton Krieger a book titled Problem Solving, Decision Making, and Professional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers amd Policymakers. Chapter 13 of their book analyzes complexities about decision-making including predicting future well-being and Chapter 16 is titled The Role ofAffect In Risky Decisions.
Second, much of business law is premised upon the neoclassical economics model of utility maximization or the behavioral economics challenge to that model. In either case, business law can benefit from recent work on happiness economics because happiness economics raises a more fundamental challenge to and radical critique of neoclassical economics than does behavioral economics. Some view happiness economics as being a proper subset of behavioral economics, while others view happiness economics as being an extension of behavioral economics. In any event, behavioral economics points out that people have bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest. The theoretical core of behavioral economics is an article titled Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. This is an article which is likely to have been cited more times than it has been read by law professors and certainly more times than it has been understood by law professors as evidenced by overly broad attempted legal applications.
Happiness economics points out how people often systematically make decisions that fail to maximize their experienced happiness ex post as opposed to their anticipated or predicted happiness ex ante. This robust empirical and experimental finding means that at least in principle there is room for some other party, public or private, to help improve (or take advantage of) people’s JDM. In a recent working paper that is a forthcoming article in the American Economic Review, titled What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would Choose?, Daniel Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees-Jones present survey evidence that although what people choose hypothetically and what they predict would maximize their SWB (Subjective Well-Being) typically coincide, there are systematic reversals. They identify such factors as autonomy, family happiness, predicted sense of purpose, and social status to help account for hypothetical choices while controlling for predicted SWB. Their methodology has a number of possible legal and policy applications, including the development of aggregate measures of happiness. Another example is the application of their approach to reconcile the tension between an empirical finding in the article The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness by economists Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers of declining average SWB of American women since the 1970s, both in absolute terms and in relative terms compared to men, with a common intuition that expanded political and economic freedoms for American women have made American women better off. Survey respondents who were asked to rank living in a world with or without such increased political and economic freedoms for women. Significantly more respondents choose to live in a world having expanded political and economic freedoms for women despite believing that a world without such expanded political and economic freedoms would make them happier than the opposite. Their National Bureau of Economic Research working paper 16489 titled Do People Seek to Maximize Happiness? Evidence from New Surveys contains additional examples and more details.
Third, research into two specific emotions, namely fear and greed finds that participants in financial markets are sometimes emotional and sometimes unemotional because they engage in both emotional and unemotional types of mental processing in responding to ever-changing market circumstances. In a series of articles titled,
finance professor Andrew W. Lo posits that many tenets of rational expectations and the so-called efficient markets hypothesis fail to hold always, despite serving as useful benchmarks of what might eventually happen under certain idealized conditions. He speculates that an evolutionary theory of punctuated equilibria involving rare but big environmental shocks resulting in mass extinctions and eruption of new species could apply to financial markets. As Lo points out, law and policy that is based upon assuming rationality or more precisely lack of emotionality is going to be inapt during financial crises. Similarly, law and policy that is based upon assuming emotionality is going to be inapt during financially calm times. His Adaptive Markets Hypothesis implies that effective law and policy should adapt in light of changing financial markets and their participants. Examples of such adaptive business law and policy include:
(1) Countercyclical capital requirements.
(2) Collection, communication, dissemination, publication, and transparency of information about accurate systemic risk measures.
(3) Creation of a Capital Markets Safety Board (CMSB), analogous to the National Transportation Safety Board which conducts an independent investigation of all transportation accidents, in order to perform definitive forensic analysis of past financial crises. The CMSB would be made up of “teams of experienced professionals— forensic accountants, financial engineers from industry and academia, and securities and tax attorneys—that work together on a regular basis to investigate the collapse of every major financial institution.”
As Professor Lo cogently observes,
“The fact that the 2,319-page Dodd-Frank financial reform bill was signed into law on July 21, 2010—six months before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission submitted its January 27, 2011 report, and well before economists have developed any consensus on the crisis—underscores the relatively minor scientific role that economics has played in responding to the crisis. Imagine the FDA approving a drug before its clinical trials are concluded, or the FAA adopting new regulations in response to an airplane crash before the NTSB has completed its accident investigation.”
Fourth, central to effective JDM is the development and practice of skills related to emotions and emotional intelligence. A number of business trade books and business school courses focus on how managers can improve their emotional intelligence and in so doing become more effective organizational leaders. Law school clinical and negotiation casebooks and courses often discuss the importance of recognizing and responding appropriately to emotions in attorneys, clients, judges, juries, and other legal actors. For example, in their chapter, If I’d Wanted to Teach About Feelings, I Wouldn’t Have Become a Law Professor, Melissa L. Nelken, Andrea Kupfer Schneider, & Jamil Mahuad present concrete tools for teaching law students about the importance of emotions in negotiation. Yet much of current American legal non-clinical education teaches students explicitly and implicitly that lawyering is just about logical analysis and not about feelings. For example, in another article titled The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Negotiation, Erin Ryan writes that "[b]y acknowledging the salience of wise emotionality in individual and collective deliberation, lawyers will not only improve their own personal repertoires, but propel the practice of law, negotiation, and policymaking toward new horizons of efficacy." Similarly, a recent book titled How Leading Lawyers Think: Expert Insights into Judgment and Advocacy by Randall Kiser discusses (at pages 75-85) how important emotional intelligence is to legal practice.
Fifth and finally, law professors can and should incorporate more information about emotions into law school. Many law professors and law students share a common discomfort with and disdain for emotions in part because of what many law students and faculty believe it means to think like a lawyer. For example, see page 422 of the article titled Negotiation and Psychoanalysis: If I’d Wanted to Learn about Feelings, I Wouldn’t Have Gone to Law School by Melissa L. Nelken. In her anthropological study of first–year contracts classes at eight law schools, law professor and senior fellow of the American Bar Foundation Elizabeth Mertz found that being taught to think like a lawyer caused students to lose their sense of self as they develop analytical and emotional detachment, resulting from the discounting of personal moral reasoning and values, as they learn to substitute purely analytical and strategic types of reasoning in place of personal feelings of compassion and empathy.
In fact, empathy is an important skill that lawyers can and should learn. In his article, Thinking Like Nonlawyers: Why Empathy Is a Core Lawyering Skill and Why Legal Education Should Change to Reflect Its Importance, Ian Gallacher analyzes pedagogical implications of lawyers communicating a lot with people who are not lawyers, such as clients, jurors, and witnesses.
In conclusion, a better and more nuanced understanding of what roles emotions generally and happiness particularly can play in human JDM, economic behavior, financial markets, legal practice, and legal education can and should inform how law professors conduct academic research and teach law students.
As promised this post will be about recent proposals advocating that governments adopt various measures of aggregate happiness to complement such traditional measures of economic well-being as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP). The basic premise for these proposals can be found in the first major campaign speech that Senator Robert F. Kennedy gave on March 18, 1968 at the University of Kansas. That speech challenged the prevailing orthodoxy of how governments measure progress and well-being.
Not surprisingly, the speech is right in that many items that are part of GNP do not reflect genuine social progress. To be clear and for the record, most economists themselves have long understood that GDP is an imperfect proxy for social welfare. Such proposed refinements as the idea of Net Economic Welfare (NEW) attempt to improve GDP by placing values upon and subtracting the costs on such negative externalities as crime, congestion, and environmental pollution from GDP. The last paragraph of the speech is what proposed social measures of subjective well-being intend to capture:
"Yet the Gross National Product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country; it measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it can tell us everything about America except why we are proud that we are Americans."
Of course, the claim that GNP "measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it can tell us everything about America except why we are proud that we are Americans" is a bit overstated. Nonetheless, GNP can be improved to better measure what governments and societies value. There is currently a lively debate over whether and if so, how governments can pragmatically measure aggregate happiness. One reason that such a debate is and will be contested is that once an item is measured and recorded, that item becomes harder to ignore and is likely to become a part of policy discussions. As Kenneth Arrow pointed out on pages 47-48 of his book, The Limits of Organization,
"The Full Employment Act of 1946 amounted to nothing more than a statement that full employment was at last on the Federal agenda, and many felt that this was a hollow victory indeed. But those who opposed it so violently were not deceived; in the long run, this recognition was decisive, though the process of implementing the responsibility was slow indeed. Once an item has arrived on the agenda, it is difficult not to treat it in a somewhat rational manner, if that is at all possible, and almost any considered solution may be better than neglect."
Professors Kahneman and Sugden introduce a methodology of policy evaluation based on experienced utility to environmental economics that avoids well-known problems of preference anomalies for contingent valuation studies. French President Nicolas Sarkozy recently created a Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, chaired by 2001 Nobel Laureate in economics, Joseph E. Stiglitz. The report by this commission makes a number of recommendations, including “Recommendation 10: Measures of both objective and subjective well-being provide key information about people’s quality of life. Statistical offices should incorporate questions to capture people’s life evaluations, hedonic experiences and priorities in their own survey." In a discussion paper titled Beyond GDP and Back: What is the Value-Added by Additional Components of Welfare Measurement, economists Sonja C. Kassenboehmer and Christoph M. Schmidt analyze quality-of-life indicators that are suggested in the Stiglitz Report to find that much of the variation in many well-being measures is already well-captured by such traditional economic indicators as GDP and the unemployment rate, but because the correlation of alternative indicators with monetary measures is far from perfect, there is room to augment traditional statistical reporting by non-standard indicators.
British Prime Minister David Cameron recently announced similar plans to collect national well-being measures that incorporate life satisfaction. In an article titled Emotional Prosperity and the Stiglitz Commission, British economist Andrew Oswald argues that countries are capable of and should measure their emotional prosperity and focus on mental well-being. In that article, Oswald summarizes seven studies that suggest emotional prosperity and broad measures of psychological well-being have recently been declining over time. In a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper titled, Beyond GDP? Welfare across Countries and Time, American economists Charles I. Jones and Peter J. Klenow propose a simple summary statistic for a country’s flow of well-being that combines data about consumption, inequality, leisure, and mortality.
In an article titled Happiness and Public Choice, European economists Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer caution that a policy of maximizing aggregate happiness faces a number of difficulties including that it reduces people to being merely happiness metric stations in addition to discounts problems with political institutions and incentive distortion. In their article, they instead propose two practical ways to utilize happiness research for policy: (1) facilitate identification of those institutions that assist people in best achieving their personal goals and in so doing contributing maximally to individual happiness, and (2) provide crucial information as inputs to political discussion process.
Instead of maximizing a measure of aggregate happiness, it might be more politically feasible to minimize a measure of aggregate misery, stress, or unhappiness, such as the U-index, which in their article titled Recent Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, Daniel Kahneman and labor economist Alan Krueger proposed and defined to measure the fraction of time that people spend experiencing unpleasant emotions. The U-index provides empirical information about negative emotional experiences that society may care about.
Another way to incorporate happiness data into policy analysis is to introduce maximum levels of a measure of unhappiness or minimum levels of a measure of happiness as constraints that government policies must satisfy while optimizing some objective function or goal besides happiness or unhappiness. This approach is analogous to philosopher Robert Nozick’s approach in his book titled Anarchy, State, and Utopia to incorporating rights as constraints that are not to be violated as opposed to rights as part of a policy goal to be optimized.
In her article titled Happiness on the Political Agenda? PROS and CONS, philosopher Valérie De Prycker argues that actual incorporation of happiness research into policy implicates a number of value-loaded ethical, ideological, and moral issues. But, in his article titled Greater Happiness for a Greater Number Is that Possible and Desirable?, sociologist Ruut Veenhoven believes that empirical research about life satisfaction refutes all theoretical philosophical objections against the greatest happiness principle. In yet a third article titled Greater Happiness for a Greater Number: Some Non-controversial Options for Governments, social scientist Jan C. Ott believes that governments can increase average happiness, eventually reduce happiness inequalities, and realize both purposively by non-controversial means. In another article titled Good Governance and Happiness in Nations: Technical Quality Precedes Democracy and Quality Beats Size, Professor Ott examines how quality of governance and in particular technical as opposed to democratic quality is correlated with average happiness of a country's citizens and finds that technically good governance appears to be a universal condition for happiness independent of culture. Once technical quality of governance reaches a minimum level, democratic quality of governance adds substantially to the positive effects of technical quality of governance upon average happiness.
In his chapter titled That Which Makes Life Worthwhile in the book Measuring the Subjective Well-Being of Nations: National Accounts of Time Use and Well-Being, behavioral economist George Lowenstein proposes that time-use surveys ask people not just about how much positive and negative affect is felt during a particular activity, but also if people believed that a particular activity was a valuable or worthwhile use of their time or instead a waste of their time. In their article titled Accounting for the Richness of Daily Activities, psychologist Mathew P. White and economist Paul Dolan ask people not just about how they felt during a particular activity, but also six additional questions about such non-hedonic aspects of experience as being engaged, focused, and finding meaning. These fundamental insights about how people care about not just positive affect, but also meaning in their lives raise questions about whether law and policy should care more about positive affect versus meaning in people’s lives.
In the article titled The Metrics of Subjective Wellbeing: Cardinality, Neutrality and Additivity, Australian economist Ingebjørg Kristoffersen provides a legitimate source of uneasiness about basing social policies upon aggregation of empirical happiness data via his quantitative analysis of certain mathematical properties of empirical happiness data that continue to remain contentious among economists, namely additivity, cardinality, and neutrality of such data, even though psychologists have to some degree already been able to address how to make international, interpersonal, and intertemporal comparisons of happiness data. This mathematical analysis also serves to provide a cautionary, persuasive critique of recent proposals by law professors for governments to eschew cost-benefit analysis and instead to determine and evaluate policy based upon aggregation of happiness, defined simply as experienced positive feeling.
Finally, a concern with experienced subjective well-being captured by self-reports of happiness is what economist Carol Graham terms a paradox of happy peasants and miserable millionaires, due to differences in anticipations or expectations between poor and rich people. As Graham notes, optimism among poor individuals can be a tool for their survival and parents who are poor may revise their own personal expectations downward but maintain hopeful expectations for their children. If peasants report being happy due to lowered expectations and (perhaps some) hedonic adaptation, while millionaires report misery due to envy towards even richer people and (perhaps unrealistic) expectations, should law and policy be more concerned over self-reported unhappiness of rich people, or about increasing self-reported happiness of poor folks, even if that means encouraging or nudging poor individuals to expect more of their future?
Except for Arizona and Hawaii, the United States ended this calendar's observance of Daylight Saving Time at 2 a.m. local time today. In a fascinating book titled A Time for Every Purpose: Law and the Balance of Life, Harvard University Byrne Professor of Administrative Law Todd D. Rakoff argues that social regulation of time can and should create more room for people to balance time at work with time away from work.
In the article Losing Sleep at the Market: The Daylight-Savings Anomaly, three financial economists document that in international financial markets, the average Friday-to-Monday return on daylight-savings weekends is much lower than expected, with a magnitude 200 to 500 percent larger than the average negative return for other weekends of the year. This finding is consistent with psychological research about how changes in sleep patterns have impacts on accidents, anxiety, decision-making, judgment, reaction time, and problem solving. In this article Winter Blues: A SAD Stock Market Cycle, financial economists found that the lack of sunlight during winter months tends to depress stock prices across international markets. More recently, the article This is Your Portfolio on Winter: Seasonal Affective Disorder and Risk Aversion in Financial Decision Making reported that people with SAD (Seasonal Affect Disorder) exhibited financial risk aversion that varied across seasons because of their seasonally changing affect. SAD-sufferers had much stronger preferences for safe choices during winter than non-SAD-sufferers, and SAD-sufferers did not differ from non-SAD-sufferers during summer.
In two articles, The Psychophysiology of Real-Time Financial Risk Processing and Fear and Greed in Financial Markets: An Online Clinical Study, Andrew Lo and co-authors find traders who respond with too little or too much emotion tend to be less profitable than traders with middle of the range types of emotional responses. Another article Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a London Trading Floor documents that traders tend to make more money on days when their testosterone levels are higher than average.
All of the above differing strands of empirical research share in common the finding that emotions play important roles in how people arrive at financial judgments and financial decisions. Of course, even just a moment of introspection is enough for us to realize that we are like other people in making emotional judgments and emotional decisions. In the article Who's Afraid of Law and Emotions?, the Herma Hill Kay Distinguished Professor of Law at Boalt Hall Kathryn Abrams and Southestern law school professor Hila Keren analyze the ambivalent reactions by mainstream legal academics to law and emotions scholarship and conclude that part of the reason for such responses is the persistence of rationalist tendencies within the legal academy.
I have often heard after making a presentation about emotions in financial markets and regulation the view that emotions could matter in non-financial areas of life and law, but emotions in general and happiness in particular are not what business and business law are and should be about. Such a point of view strikes as being wrong and closed-minded. As economist Andrew J. Oswald cogently observes in the opening paragraphs of his article Happiness and Economic Performance:
"Economic performance is not intrinsically interesting. No-one is concerned in a genuine sense about the level of gross national product last year or about next year's exchange rate. People have no innate interest in the money supply, inflation, growth, inequality, unemployment, and the rest. The stolid greyness of the business pages of our newspapers seems to mirror the fact that economic numbers matter only indirectly.
The relevance of economic performance is that it may be a means to an end. That end is not the consumption of beefburgers, nor the accumulation of television sets, nor the vanquishing of some high level of interest rates, but rather the enrichment of mankind's feeling of well-being. Economic things matter only in so far as they make people happier."
I will expand in a later post on decisions to measure happiness by an increasing number of governments of countries, states, and cities as diverse as Bhutan, England, Guandong province in China, Maryland, and Somerville in Massachusetts. For now, check out:
Finally, Glom readers may find this five-day free virtual event of interest: The Enlightened Business Summit which takes place this week November 7-11 and is hosted by Chip Conley, the founder of Joie de Vivre, a two-time TED Speaker, and author of the book Peak: How Great Companies Get Their Mojo from Maslow and the forthcoming book Emotional Equations: Simple Truths for Creating Happiness + Success:
I am happy to recommend a new blog Brazen And Tenured - Law Politics Nature and Culture from two of my colleagues: Pierre Schlag, Byron White Professor of Constitutional Law, and Sarah Krakoff, Wolf-Nichol Fellow. Pierre's research interests include constitutional law, jurisprudence, legal philosophy, and tort law. Pierre wrote an essay, The Faculty Workshop, which examines how the institution of law school faculty workshops expresses, regulates, and reproduces legal academic behavior, governance, hierarchy, norms, and thought. Sarah's research interests include civil procedure; Indian law, and natural resources law. Sarah is working on a book about the different stages of humans' relationship to nature, which extends her book chapter, Parenting the Planet.
As Pierre described their blog, it's quite idiosyncratic as far as blogs are concerned. That having been said, Glom readers are likely to find their blog to be amusing, informative, and thought-provoking. Here are the two most recent examples.
Pierre's post entitled Tips for Legal Commentators: How to Talk to the Press is a delightful compendium of speaking points. It explains why the legal talking heads who come out of the woodwork to appear on television during any high-profile trial or other legal event always seem to say the same things with a high noise to signal ratio. My personal expeirence when speaking to print media financial journalists about securities fraud, materiality, derivatives, and Goldman Sachs is there is a very high probability (equal to one minus epsilon, where epsilon is a very small positive number) that I'll be misquoted to have said exactly the opposite of what I actually said! Pierre's advice for speaking to journalists has the virtue that it has the property of being subject matter and position invariant. In other words, no matter what legal topic and what viewpoint you have, Pierre's suggested sound bites will apply. Because they are universal and timeless, these quotes have the added virtue of making you sound profound and wise. Finally, these sample responses to media questions are brief, intuitive, memorable, and predictable. Once you deploy one, there is likely to be repeat demand for your expertise. On the other hand, if you do not enjoy being a talking head, then do the opposite of what Pierre recommends to ensure that reporters will not seek you out.
Sarah's post entitled The Economy versus the Environment? Not! (Or Why to Be Tigger Instead of Eeyore this Halloween) is a welcome reminder for both economists and environmentalists that being offered a choice between the economy and the environment is a false dichotomy that privileges a myopic time horizon and local opposed to global perspectives. Her post also nicely dovetails the small but growing literature applying empirical happiness research to support sustainable environmental policy. For example, Daniel A. Farber recently posted a working paper entitled Law, Sustainability, and the Pursuit of Happiness, which demonstrates that sustainability for society and the pursuit of individual happiness do not have to be at odds.
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Some bemoan big government. Others bemoan big business. What if they're both right?
Therein lies the essence of "distributism," a "third-way" socio-economic philosophy that eschews bigness in general.
An important book in the distributist tradition is E.F. Schumacher's "Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered." A highly credentialed economist, Schumacher challenges the notion that "more is better" - a notion upon which everything seems predicated nowadays. I found it extremely interesting, and it launched my own personal interest in distributism.
I have kept my developing interest in distributism pretty much to myself given the fact that, well, there aren't too many distributionists out there. What's the point of talking about something if no one's interested in listening? But that might be changing.
A Washington Post article from a couple of weeks ago (now available on the Huffington Post) discusses the stirrings of a newfound appreciation of distributionist thought.
Although I'm far from ready to declare myself a "distributionist," I am comfortable admitting that there is much in distributism that strikes me as persuasive. As such, I certainly hope that distributist thought works its way into our conversations regarding the regulation of business and the role of government.
An article in today's Life section of USA Today titled Movies tap into anger at Wall Street describes how 3 movies in current release mirror public angst over economic inequalities and inequities: Tower Heist, In Time, and the already mentioned in 2 Glom blogs, Margin Call.
This autumn's documentary Chasing Madoff recounts Harry Markopolos’ multi-year crusade to expose the multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernie Madoff. Alleged victims of this massive fraud include the celebrity couple of Kyra Sedgwick (star of The Closer on TNT) and Kevin Bacon (of the original Footloose (1984) fame). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act included a broad set of whistleblower provisions under which the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted specific rules and procedures to incentivize potential whistleblowers by way of cash rewards and protection from retaliation.
There is also a 2009 documentary about the subprime mortgage fiasco, which is now available on DVD, American Casino. 2001 economics Nobel laureate Joseph Stigltiz described it as being "a powerful and shocking look at the subprime lending scandal. If you want to understand how the US financial system failed and how mortgage companies ripped off the poor, see this film."
This May, the HBO Films production of Too Big to Fail, based on the book of the same name with the subtitle of The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System--and Themselves depicted the autumn 2008 U.S. financial crisis and the sequence of (less than intertemporally consistent) policy responses by the Treasury department, the Federal Reserve, and other financial regulators.
Last autumn's Inside Job made a compelling argument in five parts about how the American financial services industry systematically and systemically corrupted the United States government and in so doing brought about changes in banking practices and legal policies that led directly to the Great Recession.
Although the documentary Client 9: The Rise and Fall of Eliot Spitzer focused primarily on the interaction of ego, hubris, power, scandal, sex, and politics, it also touched upon Wall Street and efforts by Spitzer to reform its excesses.
Of course, no list of movies related to the recent financial crises would be complete without including documentary film-maker Michael Moore's 2009, Capitalism: A Love Story, which criticizes the current American economic system in particular and capitalism in general. At one point, it asks if capitalism is a sin and whether Jesus would be a capitalist, who wanted to maximize profits, deregulate banking, and have the sick pay out of pocket for pre-existing conditions via clips from Jesus of Nazareth. Moore asks if one could patent the sun and questions how the brightest American youth are drawn towards finance and not science. He proceeds to Wall Street asking for non-technical explanations of derivative securities in general and credit default swaps in particular. Both a former vice-president of Lehman Brothers and current Harvard University economics professor Kenneth Rogoff fail to clearly explain either term. Moore thus concludes that our complex economic system and its arcane terminology exist simply to confuse people and that Wall Street effectively has a crazy casino mentality.
Finally, the PBS Nova episode, Mind Over Money, which originally aired on April 26, 2010 asks whether markets can possibly be rational when people clearly are not. In other words, is there a version of the efficient markets hypothesis that can be true in a world populated by at least some boundedly rational actors? In posing this question, the show offers an entertaining, yet quite informative survey of elements of behavioral economics and finance. Its companion website provides additional resource materials concerning the role of emotions in financial decision-making. The debate which it depicts between the University of Chicago school of economics and the behavioral economics approach (including scenes of Dick Thaler playing pool) is a bit overdone and perhaps unintentionally comical, but it raises the question of whether it matters for law and policy how people make their financial judgments and decisions? Of course, the natural follow-ups of if so, then how and if not, then why not, are questions about which business law professors, Glom readers, and policy makers are likely to have perhaps quite strong and certainly divergent opinions.
A television program that has become quite popular is the USA network's original dramatic series White Collar, which is based upon the premise of an F.B.I. agent solving white collar crimes with the assistance of consultant who is a former (and current?) art thief and con man extraordinaire. Episodes have featured a black widow, baby selling, bank robbery, black market kidneys, bond theft, collusion, corporate espionage, derivatives, financial fraud by a Wall Street brokerage firm, identity theft, and political corruption.
It is reminiscent of the 1960's campy, classic, and tongue-in-cheek television series, It Takes A Thief.
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I recently saw the movie, Margin Call, which is currently playing in theaters and is available on demand at Comcast. There are curretly 34 reviews of it by viewers at imdb, where it has a rating of 7.3 out of 10.
I also just finished reading this paper, Fear, Greed, and Financial Crisis: A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective, prepared for a forthcoming handbook on systemic risk. This chapter is by finance professor Andrew Lo, who is the director of the MIT laboratory for financal engineering. He also wrote another excellent paper which Glom readers are likely to find of interest, namely Reading About the Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review, that was prepared for the Journal of Economic Literature.
In the interests of full disclosure, I taught at Temple law school a seminar titled Law, Emotions, and Neuroscience and co-taught at Yale law school with professor Dan Kahan a seminar titled Neuroscience and the Law. The seminars covered some basic materials about affective,cognitive, and social neuroscience before analyzing the potential and limits of applications to business law, conflict resolution, criminal law, ethics, evidence, morality, paternalism, and social policy. Media coverage of neuroscience and law has a tendency to focus almost exclusively on such controversial issues as free will and responsibility in the criminal law context. Glom readers are more likely to focus on neuroeconomics and neurofinance, two nascent fields that ask how human brains engage in JDM (Judgment and Decision Making) in general and over time and under risk in particular.
Also, as cognitive neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga recently stated: responsibility, like generosity, love, pettiness, and suspiciousness, is a strongly emergent property, which although being derived from biological mechanisms, has fundamentally distinct properties, just like the case of ice and water. The press and the public also seem to be fascinated with very colorful fMRI brain scans because they like the idea of being as the Wall Street Journal science writer, Sharon Begley, calls them: cognitive papparazi.
My system 1 believes in synchronicity, so this post, as evidenced by its title's homage to Lo's chapter, approaches the movie Margin Call from a cognitive neuroscience perspective informed by Lo's chapter. Lo provides a brief history of what we know about brains. He then explains how fear and the amygdala can exacerbate financial crises. He also demonstrates how the reward of money appears to share the same neural system and the release of the neuortransmitter dopamine into the nucleus accumbens as these rewards do: beauty, cocaine, food, music, love, and sex.
Lo proceeds to discuss a neurophysiological explanation for Kahneman and Tversky's experiment demonstrating people's aversion to sure loss. Lo proposes a neuroscientifically informed view of rationality that differs very much from an economic rational expectations conception, with the key difference being the role that emotion plays in JDM. Lo extends his analysis from individuals to groups by explaining the neurophysiology of mirror neurons, theories of mind, social interactions, and the efficient markets hypothesis. He concludes his neuroscience survey by describing the marvels and limits of the human prefrontal cortex, also known as the "executive brain." Of particular interest to Glom readers is decision fatigue, documented recently among judges rendering favorable parole decisions around 65% of the time at the start of and close to 0% by the end of each of 3 daily sessions that were separated by 2 food breaks (a late morning snack and lunch). This empirical finding that parole rates increased after food breaks is consistent with recent experimental research finding that glucose can reverse decision fatigue and the common adage to not make important decisions when tired.
Lo provides several practical and reasonable suggesions based upon cognitive neurosciences about how policymakers can engage in financial reform to deal with systemic risk. He concludes by advocating that financial economists utilize the great recession to re-conceptualize, rethink, and revamp neoclassical economics by forging a consilience between the neurosciences and financial economic theory. Building a deeper and better understanding of economic phenomena through improved economic models and intellectual frameworks can and should lead to a more appropriate financial regulatory infrastructure.
And now onto a few comments about the movie Margin Call. Without giving away the plot for those who may want to see it without any knowledge of its ending, this movie raises ethical and moral questions about individual versus social optimality, trading on the basis of private information, panic selling, professional codes or norms of behavior, and the costs a company may impose on society and pay to others to survive. There is certainly lots of fear and greed on display in this film. Set over the course of a day and sleepless night in NYC, the movie viscerally illustrates various forms of JDM and how individuals and groups of individuals can persevere under stress and time pressures. It is a movie that can and should provoke discussion about what could have been done differently by individuals, financial firms, and regulators. It is a film that I'm going to put on the list of movies at the start of the chapter about business law in the text, Law and Popular Culture: Text, Notes, and Questions (LexisNexis Matthew Bender, 2007) by David Ray Papke, Melissa Cole Essig, Christine Alice Corcos, Lenora P. Ledwon, Diane H. Mazur, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Philip N. Meyer, Binny Miller, and myself that we are revising for a second edition.
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Another college football scandal, another round of calls for the NCAA to get tough on schools.
Why can’t we just admit that the NCAA is doomed to perpetual failure? Enforcing amateurism in big revenue sports is just a price control on the labor of college-age athletes. Price controls succeed mainly in creating black markets. Although, if they are effectively enforced, price controls can reduce supply.
But does the NCAA really want to reduce supply? Does it really want to enforce its rules? Miami won’t be treated like SMU and have its football program shut down because that would hurt television revenue.
There are really three explanations for why the NCAA seeks to enforce price controls:
1. It sincerely believes that doing so will encourage schools to provide the students who are generating the billions of dollars in revenue to NCAA schools with an education. (This focuses only on the supply side of education and ignores the demand side. It also is only lightly tethered to reality.).
2. It wants to prevent rising labor prices for student athletes from eating into the revenue to schools.
3. It needs to protect the “amateur” brand that it thinks creates such strong demand for its product.
If this last assumption is true, it leads to a perverse result: demand for amateurism threatens to undermine that amateurism. As a result, the NCAA would have to do just enough enforcement to maintain a perception of amateurism.
Likely some combination of all three of the above explanations accounts for the continuing NCAA game: being “shocked, shocked” to find that college athletes are getting paid under the table and then imposing some penalties on schools, but not enough to actually hurt the egg-laying goose.
So let’s be frank. Division 1 football and basketball is about gobs and gobs of money. If universities would like to engage in a little less hypocrisy and actually serve the interests of its money-generating athletes, isn’t it time to actually test the premise of reason number three above? Is amateurism really essential to rabid demand for college football and basketball? Let’s pay college athletes a market rate for bringing in revenue to their schools. Better yet, let’s have schools sponsor professional athletic teams.