June 29, 2015
Law And Custom On The Federal Open Markets Committee
Posted by David Zaring

My article on the administrative law and practice of the FOMC is available on SSRN, and has come out as part of a great symposium in Law and Contemporary Problems, with articles by Jim Cox, John Coates, Kate Judge, and many other people smarter than me.  Do give the paper a download, and let me know what you think.  Here's the abstract:

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which controls the supply of money in the United States, may be the country’s most important agency. But there has been no effort to come to grips with its administrative law; this article seeks to redress that gap. The principal claim is that the FOMC’s legally protected discretion, combined with the imperatives of bureaucratic organization in an institution whose raison d’etre is stability, has turned the agency into one governed by internally developed tradition in lieu of externally imposed constraints. The article evaluates how the agency makes decisions through a content analysis of FOMC meeting transcripts during the period when Alan Greenspan served as its chair, and reviews the minimal legal constraints on its decisionmaking doctrinally.

In addition to being your one stop shop for the legal constraints on the FOMC, the paper was an opportunity to do a fun content analysis on Greenspan era transcripts, and to see whether any simple measures correlated with changes in the federal funds rate.  In honor of Jay Wexler's Supreme Court study, I even checked to see if [LAUGHTER] made a difference in interest rates.  No!  It does not!  But more people may show up for meetings where the interest rate is going to change, tiny effect, but maybe something for obsessive hedge fund types.  Anyway, give it a look.

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June 18, 2015
Victories With No Damages
Posted by David Zaring

The AIG suit is over, and the shareholder who was zeroed out by the government won a judgment without damages.  These kinds of moral victories are cropping up against the government: a Georgia judge just ruled that the SEC's ALJ program was unconstitutional, but easily fixed.  The Free Enterprise Fund held that PCAOB was illegal, but not in any way that would undo what it had achieved.  And now AIG.  A right without a remedy isn't supposed to be a right at all, but it is true that this is incremental discipline of the government for business regulation excesses.  That won't make any of these plaintiffs happy, however.

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June 10, 2015
Checking In With The Takings Cases
Posted by David Zaring

The Washington Post has a story on the AIG and Fannie and Freddie cases, which, as you might remember, use the Takings Clause to go after the government for its financial crisis related efforts.  In theory, that's not the worst way to hold the government accountable for breaking the china in its crisis response - damages after the fact rectify wrongs without getting courts in the way.  And I've written about both cases, here and here.

Anyway, the Post has checked in on the cases, and the view is "you people should be worrying more about the possibility that the government may lose.

Greenberg is asking the court to award him and other AIG shareholders at least $23 billion from the Treasury. He says that’s to compensate them for the 80 percent of AIG stock that the Federal Reserve demanded as a condition for its bailout. Judge Thomas Wheeler has repeatedly signaled his agreement with Greenberg. A decision is expected any day.

In the Fannie and Freddie case, the decision is further off, with the trial set to begin in the fall. The hedge funds are challenging the government’s decision to confiscate all of the firms’ annual profits, even if those profits exceed the 10 percent dividend rate that the Treasury had initially demanded. This “profit sweep” effectively prevents the firms from ever returning the government’s $187 billion in capital and freeing themselves from government control.

Earlier this year, Judge Margaret Sweeney refused to dismiss the case and gave lawyers for the hedge funds the right to sift through the memos and e-mails of government officials involved. Within weeks, Fannie and Freddie shares, which had been trading at about $1.50, started trading as high as $3 based on rumors that the documents revealed inconsistencies in government officials’ statements.

They checked in with me on the article, so there's that, too.

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June 05, 2015
International Ethical Banking
Posted by David Zaring

We've been speaking about banker ethics that week, though it is still unclear what, exactly, supervisors want when they call for it.  Maybe the network-of-regulatory-networks the Financial Stability Board will come up with an answer.  The G-7 has just asked it to develop a code of ethics that would apply to all of the banks across the world.

“This kind of malpractice has got to do with the dominant company culture but not just that -- it’s also about the behavior of individuals, who should not be absolved from responsibility,” Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann said in the German city of Dresden on Friday, announcing the G-7’s lead. The code “should be a voluntary self-commitment made by the financial industry, an international initiative,” he said.

...

“Currently a certain number of disparate codes exist in different jurisdictions, and they were often ignored,” Banque de France Governor Christian Noyer said after the Dresden meeting. “We need to pull all this together, so that we have a code that is coherent and applicable everywhere.”

It will be interesting to see how voluntary this voluntary code is.  And how the FSB is going to harmonize the cultures of, say, Japanese conglomerates and American four branchers.  But it is either an example of how financial regulation is increasingly done at the global level ... or an example of regulators saying: we give up!  All our rules are meaningless!  Please be nicer!

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June 03, 2015
Did The Fed Fail To Save Lehman Brothers Because It Legally Couldn't?
Posted by David Zaring

My soon to be colleague Peter Conti-Brown and Brookings author (and future Glom guest) Philip Wallach are debating whether the Fed had the power to bail out Lehman Brothers in the middle of the financial crisis.  The Fed's lawyers said, after the fact, that no, they didn't have the legal power to bail out Lehman.  Peter says yes they did, Philip says no, and I'm with Peter on this one - the discretion that the Fed had to open up its discount window to anyone was massive.  In fact, I'm not even sure that Dodd-Frank, which added some language to the section, really reduced Fed discretion much at all.  It's a pretty interesting debate, though, and goes to how much you believe the law constrains financial regulators.

Here's Peter:

as I discuss at much greater length in my forthcoming book, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve, the idea that 13(3) presented any kind of a statutory barrier is pure spin. There’s no obvious hook for judicial review (and no independent mechanism for enforcement), and the authority given is completely broad. Wallach calls this authority “vague” and “ambiguous,” but I don’t see it: broad discretion is not vague for being broad. In relevant part, the statute as of 2008 provided that “in unusual and exigent circumstances,” five members of the Fed’s Board of Governors could lend money through the relevant Federal Reserve Bank to any “individual, partnership, or corporation” so long as the loan is “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank.” Before making the loan, though, the relevant Reserve Bank has to “obtain evidence” that the individual, partnership, or corporation in question “is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.”

In other words, so long as the Reserve Bank was “satisfied” by the security offered and there is “evidence”—some, any, of undefined quality—the loan could occur. 

Here's Philip:

I (and most observers) read the “satisfaction” requirement as meaning that the Fed can only lend against what it genuinely believes to be sound collateral—i.e., it must act as a (central) bank, and not as a stand-in fiscal authority. The Fed’s assessment of Lehman Brothers as deeply insolvent at the time of the crisis meant that it did not have the legal power to lend. Years later, we have some indication that this assessment may have been flawed, but I don’t take the evidence uncovered as anything like dispositive. As I note in the book, the Fed’s defenders make a strong substantive case that the Fed was right to see Lehman as beyond helping as AIG (rescued days later) was not.

And the debate will be going on over at the Yale J on Reg for the rest of the week.  Do give it a look.

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May 20, 2015
Ben Lawsky's Departure As New York's Financial Services Supervisor
Posted by David Zaring

Lawsky had a tough reputation, and was probably the most challenging state corporate regulator since Spitzer (the Times: " a polarizing four-year tenure that shook up the sleepy world of financial regulation in New York").  And I can say that I knew him when - we were in the same unit at DOJ.  But really, I'm awfully impressed that 1. he is leaving to start his own firm, continuing the craze for boutiques that has animated investment bankers, and now, perhaps their former regulators?  And 2. this excellent front page from the Village Voice.

Apparently, the new firm will specialize in digital security.  Congratulations, Ben!

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May 11, 2015
Ending the (New York) Fed
Posted by David Zaring

There's a proposal out there, with support from various surprising corners of the political spectrum, to get rid of the NY Fed's place on the FOMC, on account of it being too close to Wall Street, big banks, and so on.  I wrote about it for DealBook - do check it out.  A taste:

I have my doubts about any legislation that threatens the central bank’s independence, but would evaluate it by looking to three of my pet axioms of financial regulation.

The first is that procedural reorganizations almost never matter – an axiom that counsels indifference about the change. The second is that the New York Fed has always been special – an axiom that cuts the other way. And the third, given that Congress comprises legislators who need to be re-elected, is to consider the short-term as well as the long-term functions of the change.

When I apply these axioms, I conclude that the New York Fed should not lose its vote. The short-term benefits are unclear, making the change look like a symbolic effort to shift the long-term focus of the Fed away from Wall Street. But Wall Street is important, and deserves its focus. There’s no reason to believe that the New York Fed will do a better or different job on Wall Street if it loses its automatic vote.

Do let me know what you think, either in the comments or otherwise.....

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April 02, 2015
The Dutch Banker's Oath
Posted by David Zaring

How can we persuade bankers to follow the law?  Other regulators looks to a familiar calculus inspired by Holmes' "bad man."  You write regulations that are clear enough, and threatening enough, to induce obedience by someone who, left to their own devices, would do the things the law is meant to prohibit.  So you provide for treble damages for illegal combinations in restraint of trade, you beef up enforcement where detection is difficult, and so on.

But banking regulation is increasingly talking less about clear laws, more about broad principles, and also about "ethical banking."  The New York Fed President has brought the ethics question up, as has the Comptroller of the Currency.  And check out, via Justin Fox, this new oath that every Dutch banker must take:

I swear within the boundaries of the position that I hold in the banking sector

  • that I will perform my duties with integrity and care;
  • that I will carefully balance all the interests involved in the enterprise, namely those of customers, shareholders, employees and the society in which the bank operates;
  • that in this balancing, I will put the interests of the customer first;
  • that I will behave in accordance with the laws, regulations and codes of conduct that apply to me;
  • that I will keep the secrets entrusted to me;
  • that  I will make no misuse of my banking knowledge;
  • that I will be open and transparent, and am aware of my responsibility to society;
  • that I will endeavor to maintain and promote confidence in the banking system.

So truly help me God.

I'm unaware of other regulatory schemes do this sort of thing, though lawyers certainly have codes of conduct, and I suppose that accountants do as well.  What is it supposed to do?  Three possibilities:

  • Regulators think that ethical bankers are likely to be the traditional "boring bankers" who took less risks - and believe that talking to them about ethics and requiring oaths will induce this sort of weltanschauung.
  • Regulators don't know what to do to make banking safe, and so are delegating the safe banking question to the industry, at least in part, by lecturing them about ethics, and hoping that they'll devise practices in this light that will make banking safer
  • This is an effort, by regulators and bankers, to rehabilitate the reputation of the industry by proclaiming ethics commitments.

If you have views about the new role of ethics in banking regulation, let me know in the comments.

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April 01, 2015
Oral History of Drexel Burnham Lambert
Posted by David Zaring

They didn't even get Milken or some of the other most august alumni of the firm to participate (Ken Moelis, though!), and it's still a really great read.

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March 24, 2015
Big Foreign Banks Get Rejected By American Regulators
Posted by David Zaring

One of the things you now have to do if you're a bank with over $50 billion in American assets is to file a resolution plan, or living will, with the authorities - this basically states how you are going to dispose of the company if it becomes insolvent.  After passing all the big American banks through an annual set of stress tests, the regulators have turned their attention abroad:

In their review of the resolution plans from BNP Paribas, HSBC Holdings plc, and The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, the agencies noted some improvements from the original plans. However, the agencies have jointly identified specific shortcomings with the 2014 resolution plans that will need to be addressed in the 2015 submissions.

It's annoying enough to be told by some foreign regulator that you aren't sufficiently prepared for a disaster, given that you're home regulator is telling you that you are.  But it must be especially annoying if you are a state-owned bank, which RBS is, to the tune of 66% of its outstanding shares. That's almost a foreign relations issue.  And given that the resolution of international banks like these is one of the most difficult issues facing bank regulators - there has been a failed effort to create a framework going on since Lehman Brothers failed so chaotically - it must be grating to be told to revise the plan:

The agencies will require that the annual plans submitted by these three institutions on or before December 31, 2015, demonstrate that the firms are making significant progress to address all the shortcomings identified in the letters, and are taking actions to improve their resolvability under the U.S. bankruptcy code.  These actions include:

  • Amending the financial contracts entered into by U.S. affiliates to provide for a stay of certain early termination rights of external counterparties triggered by insolvency proceedings to the extent those rights are not addressed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 2014 Resolution Stay Protocol;
  • Ensuring the continuity of shared services that support critical operations and core business lines throughout the resolution process; and
  • Demonstrating operational capabilities for resolution preparedness, such as the ability to produce reliable information in a timely manner.

Those are actual requirements!  The first one anyway.  The other two could be goalposts that just get moved further away next time.  Anyway, one question in the brave new world of international banking supervision is whether supervision is a tool that home banks are using for competitive advantage against foreign banks.  It will be interesting to see whether this sort of charge is leveled at this sort of action.

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March 05, 2015
Happy Stress Test Day!
Posted by David Zaring

The 31 banks subject to stress tests - to see how their positions would hold up if the economy hypothetically tanked - all passed, good news for them, and especially for Citi, which failed the last one, and vowed not to do so again.  More here, featuring a picture of former law professor/current Fed board member Dan Tarullo, who supervised the test.  And if you're thinking of investing in banks, the Times has a chart of the percentage of money-like assets in the banks' total assets mix.  If you are risk averse, you want to invest in Deutsche Bank or Discover.  But I think leverage is the most powerful force in the world, so hello, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley!

 

 

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February 19, 2015
Gary Osen, Scourge of Banks
Posted by David Zaring

Here's an interesting profile of the guy who is going after banks that held money eventually used in terrorist activities by clients - a potentially long list of defendants, if he can make the legal theory stick.  He came up with that theory, by the way, by noodling it out with one of his law school professors.  HT: Matt Levine

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February 09, 2015
Suicide By Cop, Filed By A Decent Firm?
Posted by David Zaring

I'll outsource the content to Matt Levine's new email, but you just don't see briefs filed by financial businesses against their regulators like the one Powhatan Capital filed against FERC, abetted by one of Philadelphia's good law firms.

There are sections headed "Dr. Chen’s Trades Were Not 'Wash-like' Or 'Wash-type' -- Whatever The Heck That Means," "The Staff’s Stubborn Reliance On The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Amanat Case Is Just Lame," and "Uttering the Phrase 'Enron' Or 'Death Star' Does Not Magically Transform The Staff’s Investigation." It's like an angry trader's dream of what a legal brief might look like ("This is America"!)

It's really quite amusing - check it out.

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January 30, 2015
The Ethical Slide, Train Tickets, and Helping the Next Generation of Corporate Leaders to Choose Differently
Posted by Josephine Sandler Nelson

It has been a pleasure to guest-blog for the last two weeks here at the Glom. (Previous posts available here: one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and nine.) This final post will introduce the book that Lynn Stout and I propose writing to give better direction to business people in search of ethical outcomes and to support the teaching of ethics in business schools.

Sometimes bad ethical behavior is simply the result of making obviously poor decisions. Consider the very human case of Jonathan Burrows, the former managing director at Blackrock Assets group. Burrows’s two mansions outside London were worth over $6 million U.S., but he ducked paying a little over $22 U.S. in train fare each way to the City for five years. Perhaps Burrows had calculated that being fined would be less expensive than the inconvenience of complying with the train fare rules. Unluckily, the size of his $67,200 U.S total repayment caught the eye of Britain’s Financial Conduct Authority, which banned Burrows from the country’s financial industry for life. That’s how we know about his story.

But how do small bad ethical choices snowball into large-scale frauds? How do we go from dishonesty about a $22 train ticket to a $22 trillion loss in the financial crisis? We know that, once they cross their thresholds for misconduct, individuals find it easier and easier to justify misconduct that adds up and can become more serious. And we know that there is a problem with the incentive structure within organizations that allows larger crises to happen. How do we reach the next generation of corporate leaders to help them make different decisions?

Business schools still largely fail to teach about ethics and legal duties. In fact, research finds “a negative relationship between the resources schools possess and the presence of a required ethics course.” Moreover, psychological studies demonstrate that the teaching of economics without a strong ethical component contributes to a “culture of greed.” Too often business-school cases, especially about entrepreneurs, venerate the individual who bends or breaks the rules for competitive advantage as long as the profit and loss numbers work out. And we fail to talk enough about the positive aspects of being ethical in the workplace. The situation is so bad that Luigi Zingales of the University of Chicago asks point-blank if business schools incubate criminals.

New business-school accreditation guidelines adopted in April 2013 will put specific pressure on schools to describe how they address business ethics. Because business schools are accredited in staggered five-year cycles, every business school that is a member of the international accreditation agency will have to adopt ethics in its curriculum sometime over the next few years.

We hope that the work outlined in my blogposts, discussed at greater length in my articles, and laid out in our proposed book will be at the forefront of this trend to discuss business ethics and the law. We welcome those reading this blog to be a part of the development of this curriculum for our next generation of business leaders.

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January 26, 2015
The Silenced Connecticut Sex-Abuse Case
Posted by Josephine Sandler Nelson

My previous blogposts (one, two, three, four, and five) introduced why conspiracy prosecutions should be used to reach wrongdoing by agents within an organization. The 2012 prosecution of Monsignor Lynn for twelve years of transferring predator priests from parish to parish at the command and for the benefit of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia was defeated by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Moreover, this was not the first time that the Roman Catholic Church had used the doctrine to help its bureaucrats escape liability for suppressing sex abuse cases.

In 1997, employees of the Roman Catholic Church in Connecticut were alleged—very much like Lynn—to have covered up the sexual misconduct of a priest, enabling him to continue to abuse children entrusted to the Church’s care by virtue of his office. When sued for civil conspiracy by the victims, the employees’ defense was that they were acting in the best interest of the corporation.

The Connecticut court found that the test for whether an agent is acting within the scope of his duties “is not the wrongful nature of the conspirators’ action but whether the wrongful conduct was performed within the scope of the conspirators’ official duties.” If the wrongful conduct was performed within the scope of the conspirators’ official duties, the effect of applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is to find that there was no conspiracy. Because covering up the priest’s sex abuse was in the best interest of the corporate organization, the court found that the employees were all acting on behalf of the corporation. The court never reached the issue of whether the employees’ actions rose to the level of a civil conspiracy. Under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, it was a tautology that no conspiracy could be possible.

This case is interesting not only because it documents the way that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine protects enterprises from inquiry into conspiracies, but also because of the subsequent history of its allegations. The full extent of the Bridgeport Diocese’s wrongdoings—if current public knowledge is indeed complete—only came to light in December 2009, twelve years after the 1997 case. It took twelve years, the combined resources of four major newspapers, an act displaying public condemnation of the Roman Catholic Church by members of the state legislature, and finally a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to release the documents that could have become the basis of the intracorporate conspiracy claim in 1997. There is still no conspiracy suit or any criminal charge against the Diocese. Additional details about the case are available in my article The Intracorporate Conspiracy Trap. The article will be published soon in the Cardozo Law Review, and it is available in draft form here.

Astonishingly, none of the extensive news coverage about the sexual abuse cases in Bridgeport over those additional twelve years has connected these facts to the original 1997 case defeated by application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. If the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine had not provided immunity, the case might have revealed the Diocese’s pattern of wrongdoing long beforehand and in a much more efficient way.

My next blogpost reveals additional dangers from the spread of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine: frustration with the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine has started to distort other areas of law.

Permalink | Agency Law| Business Ethics| Business Organizations| Businesses of Note| Corporate Governance| Corporate Law| Crime and Criminal Law| Employees| Finance| Financial Crisis| Financial Institutions| Law & Economics| Law & Entrepreneurship| Law & Society| Management| Masters: Dodd-Frank| Masters: Dodd-Frank@1| Politics| Popular Culture| Roundtable: Corps/B.A.| Social Responsibility| White Collar Crime | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Bookmark

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