When you join a transnational regulatory network, you have to report to the network that you're acting consistently with its principles, that you have the powers that it expects you to have, and that you're a worthy member of the club. The SEC just made its case to its peers through a 700 page Q&A that is worth a look, though it exemplifies the differences in the way a lawyer or a social scientist might approach the question "what do you do?" The SEC is full of lawyers, and so this report includes not so many numbers, but plenty of discussion of regulatory powers, and representative matters that show how those power are exercised.
However there is some aggregate data. For example, the SEC keeps track and categorizes the sorts of cases that it brings. In 2013, the agency was, for example, mostly likely to initiate a securities offering proceeding, which it did 103 times, followed by 68 reporting and disclosure cases, 50 market manipulation cases, and, bringing up the rear, only 44 insider trading cases (the agency was only asked about these categories, the reporting is on page 184 et seq. Did I know this? More pump and dump proceedings than insider trading cases? Anyway, it's that sort of thing that will surely have you reading the whole 700 pages, just as I did.
They didn't even get Milken or some of the other most august alumni of the firm to participate (Ken Moelis, though!), and it's still a really great read.
I have argued in a paper that the revolving door seems much less problematic than conventional wisdom would have it. And Ed DeHaan, Simi Kedia, and their co-authors have found that SEC lawyers who go through the door usually try to show off when at the agency by bringing and winning bigger cases.
But Congressman Stephen Lynch isn't so sure about that door, and has introduced the SEC Revolving Door Restriction Act of 2015 to put some brakes on it. His press release:
H.R. 1463, the SEC Revolving Door Restriction Act of 2015, amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prevent former employees of the SEC from seeking employment with companies against which they participated in enforcement actions in the preceding 18 months. H.R. 1463 defines enforcement action as court actions, administrative proceedings, or Commission opinions. Former employees must seek an ethics opinion from the SEC if they are interested in seeking employment within a year of their termination at the SEC with a company that was subject to an SEC enforcement action in which they participated.
I'm actually not too sure what this adds to the typical revolving door restriction. Federal prosecutors can never work on matters on which they worked while in government service. And they are barred from representing clients for at least one year. This lengthens that limitation to 18 months, but at the White House, it's already 2 years for lobbying.
The agency isn't too excited about this, as they have observed over at Jim Hamilton's World of Securities Regulation:
Delaying staffers’ employment in the private sector would affect a significant number of SEC employees, who have a long tradition of leaving government service to join the defense bar. At the 2015 SEC Speaks conference, when current and former agency staff members were asked by Chair Mary Jo White to stand, at least two thirds of the room took to their feet.
But it doesn't seem to add much to the regs already in place. Even POGO, the NGO that seems to be behind the introduction of the bill, acknowledges - indeed, it collects data on - previous ethics restrictions: "SEC regulations require former employees to file [ethics] statements if they intend to represent an employer or client before the agency within two years of their SEC employment." This even gives them the out of a waiver. But you can look over the text of the bill and let me know if you see anything more than a more specific ban of agency officials working on matters post-employment that they handled pre-termination.
Via Matt Levine, you should really read this excellent profile of a proprietor of a pawn shop for penny stocks. A tremendous underwriting workaround.
The SEC still hasn't gotten around to finishing the latest version of the resource extraction rule, which requires publicly traded extractive industries to disclose every payment they make to a government. But their flexibility is limited, Congress signed on to the rule, and quite explicitly linked it to the so-called Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which encourages the adoption of this sort of rule. I made a map, which shows that the US is one of two wealthy countries to announce that it would abide by the rule. What do you think of it?
The latest civil fine has been paid by...well, let's go through the chain of information:
- Company A buys Company B
- A law firm is retained to facilitate to the transaction
- A legal assistant at the firm complains to her boyfriend that the merger is resulting in long hours
- The boyfriend tells his dad about the deal
- The dad trades
And then the SEC sues and settles. So you've got quite a trail here. Insiders didn't trade or tip, but that is what they misappropriation doctrine is for - it imposes duties not to trade on information that belongs to someone else, in this case, I guess, the duty of law firm employees not to reveal confidential information generated as part of the firm's business. The legal assistant didn't intend trading to occur, the son didn't trade on the information from her, and so the misappropriation appears to be trading "in breach of a duty of trust and confidence owed to his son." The father son relationship! It's too bad the son didn't tell this information to his neighbor, or a guy on the street, because then we could see if the duties stretch that far as well.
Kevin LaCroix has all the information on the first securities fraud lawsuit to be filed against Alibaba regarding its sale of ADS on the NYSE in September. For securities regulation professors, there are a few nice issues here.
Materiality. The complaint cites two separate "revelations" that appeared in the U.S. in the WSJ on the same day (January 29). One article reports that the company announced that it had come to an agreement with China's State Administration for Industry and Commerce to strengthen its websites ability to monitor unlawful activity. In addition, the article noted that the SAIC had met with Alibaba for the first time in July, two months prior to the IPO. This meeting was not mentioned in the registration materials. The other article reported disappointing revenue numbers and a decline in profits. That day, the share price drops about 7%. Which revelation caused the drop if we believe that a "market test" determines materiality? What about the "total mix" test? Would investors have wanted to know about the sit-down meeting? Aren't the disappointing numbers most likely non-actionable under a forward-looking safe harbor for any contrary statements in the registration materials?
The Difference Between Section 11 and 12 of the Securities Act and Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act. The plaintiffs have only brought suit under Section 10, even though the false statements would be in the registration statement. Kevin hypothesizes that the plaintiffs can't meet the tracing requirements of the Securities Act, but a commenter also points out that those who purchased at the IPO or shortly thereafter bought at a purchase price lower than the market price now, even with the January 29 price drop, so no damages.
Fee-Shifting Provision. Alibaba has a fee-shifting provision in its (Grand Caymans) charter. Will the fee-shifting provision hold up in federal court under the Securities Exchange Act? Does federal securities law (specifically the PSLRA) pre-empt this provision? We shall see.
When I practiced in the mid-1990s, I occasionally worked on projects we called "asset securitizations." We didn't talk about it to our friends or families, because their eyes would glaze over and then they would pass out from boredom. Because of our client base, our asset securitizations were generally either used car loans from the finance side of large auto companies or franchise loan securitizations from oil and gas companies. Only when the financial crisis hit did everyone seem to become conversant in asset-backed securities, and the process of wide-spread securitization of mortgages seemed to be at the root of all the mortgage troubles.
The hypothesis is this, and it has some support: If lenders held their loans, particularly their mortgages, then they would only make good loans. By having a market to dump loans into, lenders loosen criteria to make more mortgages. Ignorant bond holders can't buy enough MBS, so lenders loosen criteria even more to meet demand. Lenders may even engage in fraud or encourage borrowers to engage in fraud. The Dodd-Frank Act tries to remedy these ills by having regulation at the lender end and the MBS end. We'll see if it works.
But the NYT this week tells us the securitization evil has spread to used car loans. Because I'm pretty sure used car loans have been securitized since at least 1993, I don't see this as news. However, the article suggests that because of less fun in MBS, those investors now have poured their money into used car loan-backed securities (let's say UCBS). The article doesn't state it's hypothesis, but suggests this is bad because (1) car buyers are defaulting and losing their vehicles and (2) financial players who package UCBS are getting rich. But, the article doesn't go so far as to provide evidence that (1) car buyers are defaulting more than usual or (2) that the demand for UCBS has caused lenders to be more unscrupulous than they have been in the past.
In addition, problems in the MBS market, particularly mortgage defaults, have pretty big negative externalities: foreclosures, neighborhoods with empty houses, dislocation of families, home prices, etc. When car borrowers default, the lender takes the car back. The borrower is out the car payments that were made (the NYT focuses on car buyers who never made any payments, so not particularly left worse off), but the car lot now can resell the car again. Cars are more liquid than houses, and repossession is quicker and cheaper than foreclosure.
So, I'm not getting very worried about the used car loan bubble just yet. If we think that used car loan rates are too high, then that's another concern. If we think that used car sales people are pressuring or misleading customers, that's another concern. But I don't think securitization is the problem.
While defendants are gearing up to make arguments against the constitutionality of the SEC's increasing inclination to use its ALJs, rather than the courts, to serve as the venue for fraud cases, it looks like it has already flipped that way for foreign corrupt practices cases. Mike Koehler did the counting:
More recently, the SEC has been keen on resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions in the absence of any judicial scrutiny. As highlighted in this 2013 SEC Year in Review post, a notable statistic from 2013 is that 50% of SEC corporate enforcement actions were not subjected to one ounce of judicial scrutiny either because the action was resolved via a NPA or through an administrative order. In 2014, as highlighted in this prior year in review post, of the 7 corporate enforcement actions from 2014, 6 enforcement actions (86%) were administrative actions. In other words, there was no judicial scrutiny of 86% of SEC FCPA enforcement actions from 2014.
It is interesting to note that the SEC has used administrative actions to resolve 9 corporate enforcement actions since 2013 and in none of these actions have there been related SEC enforcement actions against company employees.
Maybe we are seeing an agency decision to prefer administrative adjudication to, you know, adjudicative adjudication.
Peter Henning has a nice overview of recent claims made against the SEC's growing inclination to take fraud cases before its handful of agency-judges (ALJs), instead of to court. Why should that be okay?
From a policy perspective, there's reason to worry. I did some litigation before an administrative tribunal, and it's not that different from in court litigation, with the exception of evidence admissability and objections. But it could be really quite different. Hearsay is in theory fine, there's no requirement that you be able to present evidence in person, and the judge works for the agency that is suing you. It's fair to say that defendants get less process from an ALJ than they would from a federal judge.
But not that much less. ALJs are required to hold hearings, permit the introduction of rebuttal evidence, the statute that governs them makes what they do ("formal adjudication" in the verbiage of administrative law) pretty similar to a trial.
That matters for the equities, as does the almost absolute discretion that agencies have to prosecute in the way they see fit. The SEC can drop claims, send scoldy letters, use ALJs, take you to court, or refer you to the criminal lawyers at DOJ with the recommendation that imprisonment could be sought. Because we wouldn't want judges second guessing the decisions to, say, emphasize insider trading prosecutions over accounting fraud claims, we leave those policy calls to the agency.
Which then begs the question: why now with the constitutional case against the ALJ, a thing that has existed since the end of WWII?
Well, the SEC hasn't used its ALJs for high profile cases very often, at least until recently. But the claims against the turn to administrative tribunals aren't getting a lot of love, and I predict that will continue to happen. Judge Lewis Kaplan, who isn't afraid to savage a government case alleging financial wrongdoing, concluded that he didn't have the power to judge whether an ALJ proceeding violated due process or equal protection standards, given that other, similar cases had been brought in court. The SEC recently ignored a declaratory relief case filed by an S&P executive when it brought an administrative complaint against her.
Some well-heeled defendants may have been emboldened to bring these cases by the Free Enterprise Fund decision in the Supreme Court, which constrained the number levels of tenured officials that could separate the president from policymakers. But administrative adjudication is simply too resource intensive and carefully done to be rendered illegal because of its insulation. The alternative would be to replace ALJs with political hacks, and no one wants that. So I'm not predicting a lot of luck for the defendants in these cases.
The government’s response to the financial crisis was dramatic, enormous, and unprecedented, and nothing about it has been overseen by the courts. In our federal system, the courts are supposed to put the policies of presidents and congresses to the test of judicial review, to evaluate decisions by the executive to sanction individuals for wrongdoing, and to resolve disputes between private parties. But during and after the financial crisis, there has been almost none of that sort of judicial review of government, few sanctions on the private sector for conduct during the crisis, especially criminal ones, for the courts to scrutinize, and a private dispute process that, while increasingly active, has resulted in settlements, rather than trials or verdicts. This Article tells the story of the marginal role of courts in the financial crisis, evaluates the costs of that role, and provides suggestions to ensure a real, if not all-encompassing, judicial role during the next economic emergency.
Do give it a download, and let me know what you think. And thanks in advance for supporting us around here - we do like downloads!
Glass-Steagall may have lasted only 65 years, but the actual life of the Volcker Rule may be measured in months, if at all. Several pieces of legislation entitled "A bill to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act" have been introduced in Congress, but one bill has passed the House that seeks to dampen a handful of its provisions, including the rule requiring banks to get rid of its collateralized debt obligation businesses. (The Promoting Job Creation and Reducing Small Business Burdens Act, H.R. 37). However, one legislation tracking site gives the bill a 7% chance of passage. Also, Elizabeth Warren is on the case.
For us boring Securities Regulation professors, the bill also would give the SEC more marching orders (as if they had finished their original Dodd-Frank marching orders). Specifically, the Bill requires that the SEC:
Not later than the end of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall take all such actions to revise regulation S–K (17 CFR 229.10 et seq.)—
(1) to further scale or eliminate requirements of regulation S–K, in order to reduce the burden on emerging growth companies, accelerated filers, smaller reporting companies, and other smaller issuers, while still providing all material information to investors;
(2) to eliminate provisions of regulation S–K, 2 required for all issuers, that are duplicative, overlapping, outdated, or unnecessary; and
(3) for which the Commission determines that no further study under section 1003 is necessary to determine the efficacy of such revisions to regulation S–K.
STUDY ON MODERNIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF REGULATION S–K. (a) STUDY.—The Securities and Exchange Commission shall carry out a study of the requirements contained in regulation S–K (17 CFR 229.10 et seq.). Such study shall
(1) determine how best to modernize and simplify such requirements in a manner that reduces the costs and burdens on issuers while still providing all material information;
(2) emphasize a company by company approach that allows relevant and material information to be disseminated to investors without boilerplate language or static requirements while preserving completeness and comparability of information across registrants; and
(3) evaluate methods of information delivery and presentation and explore methods for discouraging repetition and the disclosure of immaterial information.
REPORT.—Not later than the end of the 360-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, theCommission shall issue a report to the Congress containing—
(1) all findings and determinations made in carrying out the study required under subsection (a)
(2) specific and detailed recommendations on modernizing and simplifying the requirements in regulation S–K in a manner that reduces the costs and burdens on companies while still providing all material information; and (3) specific and detailed recommendations on ways to improve the readability and navigability of disclosure documents and to discourage repetition and the disclosure of immaterial information.
RULEMAKING.—Not later than the end of the 360-day period beginning on the date that the report is issued to the Congress under subsection (c), the Commission shall issue a proposed rule to implement the recommendations of the report issued under subsection (c).
Wouldn't that be awesome? Why hasn't Congress done that before -- told the SEC to make Regulation S-K easier, clearer, shorter, but still as effective? I can't wait to see what happens.
So, I suppose the Glom should mention one of the weirder but more interesting securities fraud issues around these days. Joseph Grundfest (Stanford) and SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher posted a paper on SSRN entitled "Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors." One could presume that the authors believe the answer to be "yes," or they would not have taken the time to ask the question. Here is Jonathan Macey's reply to the question and the paper, and his reply is "no." There has been more volleying back and forth, so here is the summing up of links at Bainbridge (as of today). Here is a letter from 34 senior law professors at Top 17 law schools in support of Harvard's Shareholder Rights Project. I was not asked to sign it, but I would have if asked.
Interestingly, many of us who teach Securities Regulation begin with "Materiality." If so, then this case fits right in. The thrust of the argument is that the Shareholder Rights Project (SRP) wrote shareholder's proposals for over 100 firms, proposing that each firm declassify its staggered board of directors. In this proposals, which must not be over 500 words long, the authors of the proposal cite studies that show that staggered boards depress firm value and only one study that supports an opposite conclusion (staggered boards are good). And, the proposals fail to cite a recent study supporting staggered boards. This omission constitutes securities fraud. The counterargument (besides "what the heck?") is that the exclusion of all relevant studies on either side is immaterial, particularly a very recent study that may not have been posted publicly yet or for a short time. The proposals may have been subject to counter-argument, but that is not the same thing as false or misleading.
So, if you say "see, e.g." is that better?
The Times reports that S&P will soon be paying a billion dollar fine - or roughly one year's annual profits - to make a case that it commited fraud in relation to a financial institution go away. What should we make of this decision to settle?
- The government is using FIRREA to go after S&P, the obscure statute that combines harsh penalties with a civil burden of proof. To apply, FIRREA has to be about fraud "affecting a federally insured financial institution," and that has been conceptually challenging when applied to banks who have defrauded themselves by overstating the quality of various financial products to their counterparties and in their quarterly statements (you see? doesn't that sound like the opposite of defrauding yourself? It sounds like fraud affecting someone doing business with an FI?), but is more easily fit into a case against S&P's allegedly fraudulent ratings of banks.
- S&P hired Floyd Abrams, who has in the past successfully invoked the First Amendment to defend credit ratings agency rights to offer opinions about securities. I've never really understood why this works, as no one has a First Amendment right to defraud someone. A one billion dollar settlement doesn't suggest that the free speech at stake here is something that, you know, the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press is really willing to get behind.
- This is something of a "first principles" observation, but fraud. Doesn't that sound like a bad word? Fraud! S&P is a fraud! Intentionally deceiving someone? Or omitting information you had a fiduciary duty to disclose? I don't think fraud means "fraud," anymore. I think it means something more like reckless wrongheadedness, at least in the financial markets.
- Why settle? The Times has a nice blurb on this:
Most Wall Street institutions, when faced with the threat of a Justice Department lawsuit, eventually cut a check rather than go to court: JPMorgan agreed to pay $13 billion to settle a crisis case;Bank of America more than $16 billion.
That settle-at-all-costs mentality stems from fears that a courtroom fight might antagonize the government and unnerve shareholders. It also spares a company the embarrassment of paying the same or even more after a trial, where an anti-Wall Street sentiment might sour the jury pool.
Financial institutions still manage to wring concessions from the government, often persuading prosecutors to water down a statement of facts that accompanies a settlement or provide immunity from other charges. And for all the leverage the government possesses, its approach has not translated into criminal charges against a single top Wall Street executive.
The Times reports:
The billionaire investor, who managed to fend off a criminal insider trading investigation of himself, if not of his former hedge fund, is looking for a former prosecutor and several agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to join his new $10 billion investment firm, Point72 Asset Management, said several people briefed on the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Look, one of the reasons to feel good about the revolving door is that it salts financial institutions with people who expect law compliance. So maybe that explains this development, and we should celebrate Cohen's search for g-men. Or maybe it is, as the Times reports, that he was heartened by the insider trading ruling of the Second Circuit requiring the trader to know both that he was trading on inside information and that the information was obtained in exchange for a benefit, and just wants to grow the enterprise on a number of different fronts.
I'm not sure he should be too heartened by that ruling. It only may free one of his convicted lieutenants, and certainly wouldn't do anything about Matthew Martoma, who both paid for and traded on information provided by a pharma insider.