An article by Paul Bedford, Adrian Penalver and Chris Salmon in this month's Financial Stability Review, a publication of the Bank of England, suggests that the simple opposition some commentators have presented between regulatory solutions to the sovereign debt problem (the IMF's proposed SDRM) and contractual solutions (collective action clauses) does not adequately reflect the impact of IMF policies on sovereign debt restructuring on the "market mechanism". They argue for further work on the market mechanism and also suggest that the IMF should

address current weaknesses in the design and implementation of the IMF’s exceptional access framework and its LIA policy to provide greater clarity and predictability to the Fund’s role in crisis resolution.

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