As each day’s headlines attest, the world’s stock exchange
business is consolidating. The NYSE has bid
for Euronext, the company that owns and operates the Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, and
The conventional story for this consolidation seems to be
the inexorable scale economies that come from pushing more trading volume
through expensive computerized trading systems with unlimited capacity. Given the technological advances, the world’s
securities trading may be a winner-take-all market, and once the large start-up
costs of the trading infrastructure are sunk, it behooves each exchange to
gobble up as much volume as possible. For consumers, the story goes, benefits will come in the form of cheaper
trades at better prices.
This conventional story comes with a number of interesting
complications, though—economic, regulatory, and political. On the economics, while competition among exchanges to capture scale economies is surely an important impetus to consolidation, as the Economist points out, the exchanges are also coming under increasing pressure from alternative trading venues. First off, the big Wall Street firms are increasingly internalizing their crossing trades--matching buy and sell orders internally instead of sending them to the exchanges for execution. In addition, brokerage firms are registering their internal crossing networks as alternative trading systems with the SEC, thereby bringing in regulatory oversight, which allows for connections with external networks and increased liquidity. Second, over-the-counter trading via brokers is becoming more and more popular. Third, block trading by institutions is more and more being conducted over private electronic trading systems like Liquidnet and Pipeline, where anonymity is more readily available. So exchanges as a group are losing market share. Up to two-thirds of British share trading and 75% of German trading now occur off-exchange. The consolidation of exchanges turns out to be as much survival strategy as innovative cost cutting strategy.
On the regulatory side, Sarbanes-Oxley is the big gorilla everyone is trying to keep behind the closet door. The UK’s Financial Services Authority has received comfort from the SEC that a NASDAQ-LSE merger would not by itself trigger an attempt by the SEC to apply SOX or other US regulation to LSE-listed firms. SEC commissioner Anne Nazareth has been publicly commenting to similar effect, and last week, the SEC issued a blunt fact sheet stating that:
– Joint ownership of a U.S. exchange and a non-US exchange would not result in automatic application of U.S. securities regulation to the listing or trading activities of the non-U.S. exchange.
– Whether a non-U.S. exchange, and thereby its listed companies, would be subject to U.S. registration depends upon a careful analysis of the activities of the non-U.S. exchange in the United States.
– The non-U.S. exchange would only become subject to U.S. securities laws if that exchange is operating within the U.S., not merely because it is affiliated with a U.S. exchange.
This is of course no small concern. In 2000, ninety percent of the world’s IPO dollars were raised in the US; in 2005, ninety percent of the world’s IPO dollars were raised outside the US. SOX has largely been blamed for this IPO flight from the US. FSA chair Callum McCarthy did note, however, the possibility that the merged NASDAQ-LSE entity itself might seek to rationalize its regulatory structure by consolidating its operations within one jurisdiction in order to subject itself to only one regulatory regime. He went so far as to suggest the possibility that some day the LSE might not be subject to UK regulation.
It's complicated! Stay tooned.
Europe, Globalization/Trade, IPOs, Securities, Takeovers | Bookmark
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