1. Federalism And Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 1974 83 Yale L. J. 663 William L. Cary

2. The Proper Role Of A Target's Management In Responding To A Tender Offer, 1981 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 Frank H. Easterbrook , Daniel R. Fischel

3. Do The Merits Matter? A Study Of Settlements In Securities Class Actions, 1991 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 Janet Cooper Alexander

4. Understanding The Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications Of Economic Theory For Private Enforcement Of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions, 1986 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 John C. Coffee, Jr.

5. The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role In Class Action And Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis And Recommendations For Reform, 1991 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 Jonathan R. Macey , Geoffrey P. Miller

6. Corporate Control Transactions, 1982 91 Yale L.J. 698 Frank H. Easterbrook , Daniel R. Fischel

7. A Structural Approach To Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics In Tender Offers, 1981 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819 Ronald J. Gilson

8. A Team Production Theory Of Corporate Law, 1999 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 Margaret M. Blair , Lynn A. Stout

9. Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 1990 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520 Bernard S. Black

10. The “Race To The Bottom” Revisited: Reflections On Recent Developments In Delaware's Corporation Law, 1982 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913 Daniel R. Fischel

11. Piercing The Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 1991 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036 Robert B. Thompson

12. Toward An Interest-Group Theory Of Delaware Corporate Law, 1987 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 Jonathan R. Macey , Geoffrey P. Miller

13. Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis Of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879 Deborah A. Demott

14. Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, 1986 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 John C. Coffee, Jr.

15. Empowering Investors: A Market Approach To Securities Regulation, 1998 107 Yale L.J. 2359 Roberta Romano

16. Fair Shares In Corporate Mergers And Takeovers, 1974 88 Harv. L. Rev. 297 Victor Brudney , Marvin A. Chirelstein

17. Federalism And The Corporation: The Desirable Limits On State Competition In Corporate Law, 1992 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435 Lucian Arye Bebchuk

18. Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, And The Rhetoric Of Contract, 1985 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403 Victor Brudney

19. The Political Economy Of Takeover Statutes, 1987 73 Va. L. Rev. 111 Roberta Romano

20. Corporations, Corporate Law, And Networks Of Contracts, 1995 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 Michael Klausner

Honorable Mention: Legal Implications Of Network Economic Effects, 1998 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479 Mark A. Lemley , David McGowan (“network theory may help explain Delaware's dominance in the market for corporate charters”)

This was assembled through WestlawNext's Law Reviews and Journals database, with non-corporate articles mentioning Delaware discarded (there were only three of those).  Lemley & McGowan would have been about 10^th, and theirs is the second youngest of the articles on the list, which range in publication date from 1974 to 1999.  The oldest, and most-cited, is Cary’s; Ralph Winter’s article responding to Cary's did not make the list, suggesting it is not in Westlaw’s database.  Fischel wrote three of 20, Coffee, Romano, Brudney, and Easterbrook two (both of Easterbrook’s co-written with Fischel).

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